Wages determination, wage subsidies and training. by Lydon, Reamonn
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88469  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Wages determination, wage subsidies and training 
by 
Reamonn Lydon 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
University of Warwick, Department of Economics 
November 2004 
Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Estimates ofthe Effect of Earnings on Job Satisfaction 
2.2 Job satisfaction as an economic variable 
2.2.1 Measurement issues with subjective data 
2.2.2 Job satisfaction as an explanatory variable 
2.2.3 The determinants of job satisfaction 
2.3 A model of job satisfaction as experienced preference 
2.3.1 The LGM model and stylised facts from the literature 
2.4 Data and Job Satisfaction Measures 
2.5 Estimating the determinants of job satisfaction 
2.5.1 Estimates of the basic model 
2.5.2 Current earnings comparison model 
2.5.3 The LGM model with backward- and forward-looking 
comparisons 
2.6 Conclusion 
Chapter.3 Cross Country Evidence on the Returns to Education: 
Patterns and Explanations 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 The private return to education 
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
3.3 Stylised Facts 
3.3.1 Gender Differences 
3.3.2 Time trends in the return to education 
3.4 Explaining the observed differences in the return to education 
3.4.1 Technological Change and the return to education: 
technology leaders and followers 
3.4.2 Capital skill complementarity and the return to education 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 The impact of income support programmes in the United 
2 
~ 
12 
16 
18 
18 
21 
22 
24 
26 
27 
35 
36 
42 
51 
59 
80 
82 
82 
89 
90 
90 
96 
106 
107 
, 
123 
"'" 
130 
138 
3 
Kingdom on wage growth 
4.2 Background on welfare-to-work programs in the United 140 
Kingdom 
4.2.1 The Structure of Family Credit and the Working Families' 140 
Tax Credit 
4.2.2 Comparisons with other in-work benefit programs 143 
4.2.3 General literature on wage growth 145 
4.2.4 Literature on the labour market effects of wage subsidy 147 
programs 
UD~ rn 
4.3.1 Data used to construct the tax benefit model 157 
4.4 Results for the LFS 161 
4.4.1 Wage Growth by FC/WFfC History 164 
4.4.2 Wage Growth by job tenure and FC/WFfC History 173 
4.4.3 Wage growth by qualifications and education 178 
4.4.4 Job changes and wage growth 181 
4.4.5 The starting wage and wage growth 184 
4.5 Wage growth and the FC/WFfC reform 187 
4.5.1 Econometric model of wage growth and FC/WFfC 191 
receipt 
4.5.2 Self-selection and attrition 193 
4.5.3 Self-selection into and out of employment 195 
4.5.2 Instrumenting FC/WFfC status 200 
4.5.5 Results from estimating the wage growth equation 204 
4.6 Conclusions and suggestions for further work 208 
Chapter 5 Tax Credits and training 215 
5.2 Literature on training and wage subsidies 216 
5.4 A model of training in the presence of a wage subsidy 219 
5.4 Summary statistics on the effect of FC/WFfC on training 222 
5.3 Multivariate analysis of the effect of FC/WFfC on training 231 
5.3.1 The effect of the welfare taper on wage growth 237 
5.4 Conclusions 242 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 249 
Figures 
Figure 2.1 Reported job satisfaction by cohort and gender - degree recipients 
(undergraduate & postgraduate) .............................................................................. 29 
Figure 2.2 Reported job satisfaction by cohort and gender - diplomas and 
Open University ............................................................................................................. 29 
Figure 3.1 Log wages by schooling: USA, UK, Germany and Ireland ............. 93 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.4 
Figure 3.5 
Return to Schooling 1965-1993: Psacharopoulos data (1994) .......... 98 
Time variation in returns: 1960 -1998 ................................................ 102 
The return to education and changes in rnulti-factor productivity .. 
....................................................................................................................... 106 
The demand for skills in the technology bias modeL .................. 109 
Figure 3.6 The relationship between the return to schooling and the ratio of 
capital equipment to skilled labour ....................................................................... 128 
Figure 4.1 FC and WFTC weekly award, June 2000 ............................................... 143 
Figure 4.2 Reported hourly pay against earnings per hour worked: 
Married/cohabiting fathers in the LFS 1997 - 2003 ......................................... 158 
Figure 4.3 Average annual change in earnings per hour worked against 
annual change in reported hourly pay: Married/cohabiting fathers in the 
LFS 1997 - 2003 ........................................................................................................... 158 
Figure 4.4 Reported hourly pay against earnings per hour worked: 
Married/ cohabiting mothers in the LFS 1997 - 2003 ....................................... 159 
Figure 4.5 Average annual change in earnings per hour worked against 
annual change in reported hourly pay: Married/cohabiting mothers in the 
LFS 1997 - 2003 ........................................................................................................... 160 
Figure 4.6 Reported hourly pay against earnings per hour worked: Single 
mothers in the LFS 1997 - 2003 ............................................................................... 160 
Figure 4.7 Average annual change in earnings per hour worked against 
annual change in reported hourly pay: Single mothers, LFS 1997 - 2003 .. 161 
Figure 4.8 Take-up rate FC/WFTC 1997 - 2003 .................................................. 164 
Figure 4.9 The relationship between real wage growth and the ratio of 
current earnings to the level of earnings that moves individuals on the 
maximum onto the taper - single mothers only, FC period .......................... 172 
Figure 4.10 The relationship between real wage growth and the ratio of 
current earnings to the level of earnings that moves individuals on the 
maximum onto the taper - single mothers only, WFTC period ................... 173 
Figure 4.11 Wage growth of married fathers by FC/WFTC history and job 
tenure ....................................................................................................................... 177 
Figure 4.12 Wage growth of married mothers by FC/WFTC history and job 
tenure ....................................................................................................................... 177 
5 
Figure 4.13 Wage growth of single mothers by FC/WFfC history and job 
tenure ....................................................................................................................... 178 
Figure 4.14 Breakdown of highest qualification by WFfC status ................... 179 
Figure 4.15 Job changes by FC/WFfC status ....................................................... 183 
Figure 4.16 Wage growth by FC/WFfC status ..................................................... 184 
Figure 4.17 Position of FC/WFfC recipients in the wage distribution .... 186 
Figure 4.18 % Wage growth by quintile of the wage distribution (wave 1) and 
FC/WFfC status ........................................................................................................ 187 
Figure 4.19 Take-up of FC/WFfC by age youngest dependent child -
single mothers ............................................................................................................. 201 
Figure A4.20 Distribution of job tenure by FC/WFfC history - married fathers 
......................................................................................................................................... 213 
Figure A4.21 Distribution of job tenure by FC/WFfC history 
married/mothers ........................................................................................................ 213 
Figure A4.22 Distribution of job tenure by FC/WFfC history - single mothers 
......................................................................................................................................... 213 
Figure 5.1 Type of training in the last 4 weeks, by FC/WFfC status .......... 224 
Figure 5.2 Proportion of employees offered training at least once in the last 
year ....................................................................................................................... 226 
Figure 5.3 Proportion of taking up work related training least once in the last 
year, conditional on the employer offering training ......................................... 227 
Figure 5.4 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last quarter, 
conditional on the employer offering training ................................................... 227 
Figure 5.5 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last 13 weeks 
- comparing FC/WFrC recipients by position on the taper ........................ 230 
Figure 5.6 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last 13 weeks 
- comparing FC/WFrC recipients on the taper pre-reform with recipients 
on the taper post reform ........................................................................................... 230 
Figure 5.7 Proportion oftaking up work related training in the last 13 weeks, 
Natural experiment- comparing FC/WFrC recipients ................................ 231 
6 
Tables 
Table 2.1 Average annual earnings by reported job satisfaction, 1985 
graduates ...................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 2.2 Average annual earnings by reported job satisfaction, 1990 
graduates .......................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 2.3 Average growth real in annual earnings 1991-1996 by reported job 
satisfaction, 1985 graduates ........................................................................................ 35 
Table 2.4 Average growth in real annual earnings 1991-1996 by reported job 
satisfaction, 1990 graduates ........................................................................................ 35 
Table 2.5 
Table 2.6 
Coefficient on earnings in the basic job satisfaction equation ...... 38 
Marginal effect of earnings on job satisfaction .................................. 39 
Table 2.7 Earnings comparison model, no controls for current comparison 
earnings .......................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 2.8 Earnings comparison models, controlling for current 
comparison earnings .................................................................................................... 50 
Table 2.9 Coefficients on the earnings gaps from estimating the LGM 
model of job satisfaction as experienced preference (equation (15» - 2-
period model ................................................................................................................... 57 
Table 2.10 Coefficients on the earnings gaps from estimating the LGM 
model of job satisfaction as experienced preference (equation (15» - 3-
period model ................................................................................................................... 58 
Table A2.11 Full results from estimating the basic model (equation (12» ... 61 
Table A2.12 Full results from estimating the LGM model of job satisfaction 
as experience preference (equation (15» - 2-period model... ........................... 63 
Table A2.13 Full results from estimating the LGM model of job satisfaction 
as experience preference (equation (15» - 3-period model.. ............................ 66 
Table A2.14 Summary Statistics, Female Graduates 1985 ...................................... 68 
Table A2.15 Summary Statistics, Male Graduates 1985 ....................................... 70 
Table A2.16 Summary Statistics, Female Graduates 1990 ...................................... 72 
Table A2.17 Summary Statistics, Male Graduates 1990 ....................................... 74 
Table A2.18 Reduced form earnings equation ........................................................... 76 
Table 3.1 Cross-country evidence on the returns to schooling ............................. 88 
Table 3.2 The gender pay gap and the female-male difference in the return 
to schooling ..................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 3.3 Time variation in the returns to schooling ............................................... 97 
Table 3.4 Time variation in the return to schooling: Meta-analysis ................. 100 
Table 3.5 Relationship between Union Activity and return to education .. 105 
7 
Table 3.6 Technology leaders and technology followers: WDI data 1995-1996 
....................................................................................................................... 113 
Table 3.7 Skilled biased technological change and the returns to education 
- Technology leaders ................................................................................................ 115 
Table 3.8 Skilled biased technological change and the returns to 
education - Technology followers ......................................................................... 117 
Table 3.9 Impact of trade in the technology-bias model, technology leaders . 
....................................................................................................................... 121 
Table 3.10 Impact of trade in the technology-bias model, technology 
followers ....................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 3.11 Stocks of capital equipment.. ................................................................ 128 
Table 3.12 Estimates of the parameters from the capital skill 
complementarity model. ........................................................................................... 129 
Table M.13 Correlation matrix for Barro-Lee and Kyriacou-type measures 
of average schooling (Panal A) ............................................................................... 135 
Table 4.1 FC/WFTC receipt for married couples and lone mothers ............... 162 
Table 4.2 Wage (hourly pay) growth (% change) by Fe and WFTC receipt 
status ............................................................................................................................ 171 
Table 4.3 Single mothers receiving the maximum FC/WFTC, time taken to 
come onto the taper, given current wage growth, children and earnings. 172 
Table 4.4 Mean job tenure (months) by FC/WFTC history .......................... 176 
Table 4.5 Real wage growth for FC/WFTC recipients and non-recipients by 
highest qualification (wave 1) ................................................................................. 180 
Table 4.6 Real wage growth for FC/WFTC recipients and non- by highest 
qualification (wave 1), job tenure restricted to two years or less (wave 1) for 
all individuals ............................................................................................................... 181 
Table 4.7 
Table 4.8 
5 
Table 4.9 
Wage growth under FC and WFTC ........................................................ 190 
Participation by in employment by FC/WFTC status, waves 1 and 
....................................................................................................................... 197 
Results of bivariate probit for employment in wave 1 and wave 5 .... 
....................................................................................................................... 199 
Table 4.10 Results from estimating the bivariate probit for take-up in wave 1 
and wave 5 (OLS) ....................................................................................................... 202 
Table 4.11 
group 
Table 4.12 
Table A4.13 
TableA4.14 
type 
Results from estimating the wage growth equation (OLS), by 
....................................................................................................................... 206 
Results from estimating the wage growth equation ...................... 207 
Constructing the LFS sample ............................................................... 210 
Breakdown of the LFS sample (balanced panel) by household 
....................................................................................................................... 211 
B 
Table A4.1S FC/WFTC receipt for married couples and lone mothers - not 
conditioning on individuals working and reporring hourly earnings in both 
waves 1 and 5 ............................................................................................................... 212 
Table A4.16 Comparing the mean age of the youngest dependent child in 
the family for eligible families who take-up and do not take-up the credit ..... 
................................................................................................................... 212 
Table A4.17 Attrition in the LFS, comparison of mean characteristics ....... 214 
Table 5.1 The determinants of training take-up in the last quarter, 
comparing FC/WFTC recipients and non-recipients ..................................... 236 
Table 5.2 The determinants of training take-up in the last quarter -
comparing FC/WFTC recipients by position on the taper off welfare ...... 239 
Table 5.3 The determinants of training take-up in the last quarter - Natural 
experiment sample ..................................................................................................... 241 
Table A5.4 Summary statistics for training take up ............................................. 243 
Table AS.S Wage equation to predict log hourly pay for participation in 
employment regression ............................................................................................ 245 
Table AS.6 Probit regression for participation in employment ........................ 246 
Table A5.7 The determinants of FC/WFTC take-up ......................................... 248 
9 
Abstract 
In the economics literature, there has been a resurgent interest in measures of 
subjective well-being. This literature ftnds mixed results for the relationship between 
job satisfaction and earnings. We argue that this is due to the fact that earnings in a job 
satisfaction regression are endogenous. We estimate a job satisfaction equation that 
includes exogenous variation in earnings. We ftnd that earnings have a consistently 
signiftcant, but small positive effect on job satisfaction, and that relative earnings also 
matter 
Despite over fifty years of research into the returns to education around the world, 
there has been no unified effort to analyse why the returns differ so signiftcantly both 
over time and across countries. We specify two models where the returns to education 
are affected both directly and indirectly by changes in technology over time. Both 
models show that a large proportion of the variation in the returns to education can be 
explained by changes and differences in technology. 
Through the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, the UK government currently 
subsidises the wages of around 6.3 million low-paid workers. The long-run 
implications of the tax credits for these workers have only been evaluated in terms of 
their effects on labour supply. We estimate the impact of the tax credits on wage 
growth and the take-up of training. We flJ1d no signiftcant differences in the average 
wage growth of individuals receiving and not receiving the tax credits. We find that 
training is affected, with those individuals close to coming off welfare much more likely 
to take up training than individuals who face the prospect of staying on welfare for a 
longtime. 
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1. Introduction 
Wages are important in labour markets, and it is important to have estimates of the 
effect of individual characteristics on wages. It has been suggested that job satisfaction 
plays an important role in wage determination, yet estimates of the effect have been 
blighted by simultaneity between the job equation and the earnings equation. In the 
second chapter of this thesis, we estimate the determinants of job satisfaction. While 
you cannot identify the effect of job satisfaction on earnings without an instrument for 
job satisfaction, you can infer the correlation between unobservable determinants of 
wages and job satisfaction by comparing OLS and IV estimates of job satisfaction 
equations. If estimates of the job satisfaction equation by OLS are similar to those by 
IV, then that suggests that the strength of the causation is weak. We fmd this in 
Chapter 2, where we analyse the determinants of job satisfaction in a sample third level 
UK graduates. This justifies the omission of job satisfaction form the subsequent work 
where we analyse the determinants of wages. \Vhile we do find wages to be a 
consistently significant determinant of job satisfaction, the size of the effect is small. 
In Chapter 3 we look at the relationship between earnings and education. Competitive 
labour markets are often thought of as a virtue, in that a competitive market is assumed 
to be a more efficient one. However, there is some theoretical and empirical evidence 
to show multiple equilibria can arise in competitive labour markets (Manning, 1992). 
Two such equilibria are low-wage low-skills and high-wage high-skills. For a given time 
period, we would expect the classification of different countries into such equilibria to 
be correlated with the returns to education in the economy. Consistent with the 
literature on changes in the wage structure over time (Autor et aL 2003), we test the 
hypothesis that differences in the return to education are correlated with differences 
13 
and changes in technology. We characterise production in an economy using a 
production function where technology endowed inputs are complementary to skills. 
We fmd that the greater the degree of capital skill complementarity in production, the 
greater the return to education. 
The implications of the results in Chapter 3 are that human capital accumulation is 
important in order to achieve the more desirable high-skills high-wage equilibrium. One 
of the criticisms of the tax credit wage subsidy programmes in the UK was that they 
would undermine the incentives of workers to avail of the rising returns to education 
(through technological change), and accumulate more human capital. In the fmal two 
chapters of the thesis we test this hypothesis for a group of workers who received the 
Family Credit (FC) or the Working Families Tax Credit ~'FfC) as an in-work benefit. 
We first consider whether the observed effects of human capital accumulation, i.e. wage 
growth, are correlated with receiving the tax credit. The results of the analysis we 
present would seem to suggest that at worst, individuals receiving the tax credit 
experienced wage growth that was no different on average than individuals not 
receiving the tax credit. We also fmd some evidence that the tax credit was associated 
with a wage growth premium for some recipients - thus reflecting the fact that the wage 
subsidy also had a positive effect on the net incentives of some individuals. 
In Chapter 5 we analyse the take up of training by FC/WFTC recipients and oon-
recipients. Surprisingly, given the lack of any significant difference in observed wage 
growth from Chapter 4, we fmd that the take up of training by FC/WFTC recipients 
was significantly lower than similar non-recipients. This result is difflcult to reconcile 
with the results from Chapter 4 on relative wage growth. 
The inconsistency in the two sets of results could be a due to two factors: flIScly, 
problems with the estimation methods employed; and secondly, the type of training we 
14 
observe in the survey may not actually contribute much to wage growth in any case (see 
Blundell It al. 1999). In the conclusions section to the thesis, we consider which of 
these factors is likely to be more important and consider how we might deal with them 
in any future work.; 
The key contribution of the papers in this thesis to the economics literature are 
• We use exogenous variation in earnings to show the strength of the correlation 
between earnings and job satisfaction. The results show that the simultaneity 
bias between earnings and job satisfaction is likely to be small, and therefore 
earnings equations that omit job satisfaction as an explanatory variable are 
unlikely to be severely biased 
• We show that the differences in the returns to education across countries and 
time can be explained by observed differences in the technology employed in 
production. Thus countries that wish to encourage investments in human 
capital by increasing the returns to skills should prioritise investments in 
technology. 
• A commonly held belief regarding in welfare programmes that use wage 
subsidies is that they tend to lead to dead end jobs with little or no wage growth 
prospects. We show that for the UK tax credit programmes this is not the case. 
Indeed we provide some evidence to show that recipients may actually 
experience a wage growth premium. 
• The training effects of the tax credit programmes are, however, less positive. 
We find tax credit recipients are less likely to do work-related training, and we 
attribute this to the disincentive associated with the taper off welfare. 
15 
2. Estimates of the Effect of Earnings on Job 
Satisfaction 
16 
This paper looks at the detenninants of the job satisfaction of a group of third level 
graduates working in the UK The key question we wish to answer is, what is the 
relationship between job satisfaction and earnings? In recent years there has been a 
resurgence of work into the usefulness of measures of subjective well being, and in 
particular self-reported job satisfaction, in economics. The initial work by economists 
in this area, in the late 1970s, was by Hamennesh (1977), Freeman (1978) and Borjas 
(1979). More recently, papers by Akerlof et al (1988), Clark and Oswald (1996), Clark et 
al (1996), Clark (1997), Groot and Van den Brink (1999), Shields and Ward (2001), 
Hamennesh (2001) and Uvy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004), have all shown the 
usefulness of job satisfaction measures for economists. 
The motivation for much of economic research into job satisfaction work comes from 
the fact that it has been shown to be a good predictor of real economic outcomes. 
Certain types of labour market behaviour, such as quitting, absenteeism and striking are 
all strongly correlated with job satisfaction. Additionally, job satisfaction is the most 
important criteria for the career choice of graduates (Chevalier, 2003). Hence 
economists have become interested in the individual determinants of job satisfaction. 
Economists have long been sceptical of the use of measures of self-reported job 
satisfaction (and other measures of subjective well being) in economic research for two 
reasons. Firstly, without a rigorous understanding of what these variables actually 
mean, that is how they relate to both observed behaviour and the standard utility 
maximisation framework, the use of such variables in economic analysis can be 
misleading; see the discussion Uvy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004). Secondly, 
and following on from the first point, without knowing whether or not asking someone 
17 
about their job satisfaction elicits a meaningful answer or not, has profound 
consequences for the use of job satisfaction in empirical analysis, either as dependent 
variable or as an explanatory variable; see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
This paper looks at the reported job satisfaction of two cohorts of graduates from a 
sample of UK universities. The data, described in more detail below, is unique in that it 
is both backward looking, and to a certain extent, forward-looking. Information on 
graduates' employment history at three points in time (the present and five/ten years in 
the past) is provided and we also have data on their beliefs regarding their past and 
future f111ancial situation. These features of our dataset allow us to answer some 
interesting questions about the relationship between expectations (past, present and 
future) and job satisfaction l . The empirical framework utilises the experienced preference 
hypothesis developed in Uvy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004). The framework, 
assumes that job satisfaction is an expression of an individual's experienced preference. 
In other words, asking a graduate about their job satisfaction is equivalent to asking 
them whether or not, given their expectations regarding the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary aspects of the job, and their experienced outcomes, they would chose the 
same job again. 
The modelling framework derived from the experienced preference hypothesis is 
appealing for three reasons. Firstly, the predictions of the model are consistent with 
some of the stylised facts in the economics literature on job satisfaction, and well being 
more generally; such as the fact that job satisfaction is U-shaped in age (Clark and 
Oswald, 1996) or that raising the income of all does not increase the happiness of all 
(Easterlin, 2001). Secondly, the framework does not represent a significant departure 
See also Eastlerlin (20(1l) on the relationship between past and future expectations and satisfaction. 
Easterlin argues that despite the positive expectations about the future, job satisfaction remains mostly 
constant over a lifetime, due to the fact that aspirations shift upwards as income increases. 
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from the conventional theory of choice and utility maximisation. And thirdly, the 
empirical specification of the framework that we estimate nests several of the more 
simple models already estimated in the literature. This means that we can use simple 
diagnostic tests in order to chose the best, or most parsimonious, model. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 summarises the previous 
economics literature on job satisfaction; section 3 presents the modelling framework; 
section 4 describes the data set on UK university graduates; section 5 presents the 
results from the estimation; and section 6 concludes. 
2.2. Job satisfaction as an economic variable 
Research by economists into job satisfaction can be broadly divided into two strands of 
work. Firstly, there are those papers that look at the relationship between job 
satisfaction and observed behaviour, such as quits, job search and strikes. Secondly, 
there is a significant amount of research that looks at the determinants of job 
satisfaction itself. Before summarising the main conclusions from each of these strands 
of the literature, we present a brief discussion of the possible pitfalls of using job 
satisfaction, and subjective data more generally, in empirical analysis. 
2.2.1. Measurement issues with subjective data 
The paper by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) outlines the possible pitfalls associated 
with using subjective, or 'attitude' data, including job satisfaction, in empirical research. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan adopt a measurement error perspective, assuming that 
reported job satisfaction equals actual job satisfaction plus some error term. There are 
several reasons as to why the latent variable (actual job satisfaction) may be different 
from its expression (self-reported job satisfaction). For example, the wording of the 
question, the range of the scale of possible answers, or even the ordering of the 
question in the survey as a whole may affect the answer provided. However, from a job 
19 
satisfaction perspective, perhaps the most significant issue is (ognitive dissonance - that is, 
respondents, when asked about their job satisfaction, may report (and even feeQ 
attitudes that are merely consistent with their past behaviour. For example, individuals 
who are paid very little for a tedious task may report high job satisfaction, relative to 
similar individuals who are paid lots to do the same task, otherwise, how can they be 
doing the task the first place, other than the fact that they like it. 
Regardless of the source of the measurement error in job satisfaction, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan show that the implications for empirical analysis differ depending on 
whether job satisfaction is used as an explanatory or dependent variable. \X'hen job 
satisfaction is used as an explanatory variable, the implications of the measurement 
error are similar to those of any other dependent variable measured with error: if the 
measurement error problems are not dominant, then subjective variables can be useful 
as control variables, however care must be taken when interpreting the results. 
The paper is more pessimistic regarding the implications of the measurement error 
when job satisfaction is used as a dependent variable. To use one of the examples from 
their paper - suppose we observe that people with higher earnings are more satisfied 
with their job, this could merely be a result of the fact that earning affects the way in 
which job satisfaction is reported. Any estimated correlation between earnings and job 
satisfaction will therefore be spurious. In this case, saying that earnings help predict job 
satisfaction is meaningless, if, in fact, all they are predicting are the error in the measure 
of job satisfaction. The usual approaches to dealing with measurement error, such as 
instrumental variables (IV), are not straightforward to implement in this case, as what is 
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required is an instrument that affects earnings but not the "porting or measurement of 
job satisfaction2• 
Although the measurement error framework presented in Bertrand and Mullainathan is 
convincing in theory, there are at least three reasons as to why their pessimism 
regarding the use of subjective data is unwarranted. Firstly, the empirical evidence they 
present to support their arguments, particularly on job satisfaction, is by no means 
conclusive. For example, they argue that changes attitudinal questions do not predict 
changes in the outcome of interest (earnings). This is true, but only for the attidunal 
questions they look at (and not for job satisfaction). The attitudinal questions they 
consider typically require a yes or no answer - it is no surprise, therefore, that changes 
in these variables are poor predictions of changes in the continuous variable earnings. 
As Dominitz and Manski (1997) point out, attitudinal questions of this kind will rarely 
elicit a meaningful response, as they can express little of the richness of uncertainty, or 
even perception, that underlies the decision or the unobserved latent variable. 
Secondly, the paper by Clark e/ at. (1998) has used panel data and first differences in job 
satisfaction to test whether the white noise error in the measurement of job satisfaction 
means that it cannot be used in empirical work. They fmd no evidence that indicates 
that this is the case. And thirdly, many cross-sectional and panel studies (see below) 
have found job satisfaction to be a consistently useful predictor of absenteeism, quitting 
and productivity. The very fact that this relationship exists provides significant 
justification for looking at the detenninants of self-reported job satisfaction. 
The problem becomes further complicated when one considers that both earnings and true job satisfaction 
are likely to be jointly dctenruned in any case. Section 5 has a further discussion of this problem 
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2.2.2. Job satisfaction as an explanatory variable 
There is a significant sociological and psychological literature on the relationship 
between job satisfaction and a whole range of behaviour. Job satisfaction in empirical 
economic research has mainly been used to look at the determinants of quit behaviour 
and worker turnover. Locke (1976) and Steel and Ovalle (1984) provide an extensive 
review of the sociological and psychological literature in this area. Among other things, 
they report that the survey evidence almost always reveals a strong negative correlation 
between job satisfaction and worker turnover. In the economics literature, Freeman 
(1978) has also looked at this issue. Using data on a sample of US workers Freeman 
found job satisfaction to be a significant determinant of labour market mobility, partly 
because it reflects aspects of the work environment that are not fully captured by other 
observable variables. Freeman finds that the impact of job satisfaction on quits is 
greater than that of earnings for older workers in particular. Akerlof,l aL (1988) also 
look at the relationship between quits and job satisfaction for a sample of US workers. 
They find similar results to Freeman (1978), concluding that the decision to quit 
depends on the sum of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, and job satisfaction is a 
monotonic, discrete sum function of this sum. More recently, Kristensen and 
Westergard-Nielsen (2004) have found a significant negative correlation between 
quitting and job satisfaction for a sample of Danish workers. 
One of the weaknesses of the work by Freeman (1978) and Akerlof ,1 aL (1988) is that 
they do not fully control for other labour market and non-labour market opportunities 
outside of the current job. The paper by Shields and Ward (2001) does exactly this and 
finds that job satisfaction remains a strong predictor of quit behaviour. Shields and 
Ward look at a sample of nurses working in the National Health Service (NHS), and 
include a range of controls, such as education and number of children, to proxy for 
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opportunities outside of the current job. There are several other studies that have 
looked at the job satisfaction of workers within an industry or sector, including: the 
airline industry (Cappelli, 1988), academics (Ward and Sloane, 2000) and lawyers 
(Lab and and Lentz, 1998). 
The papers discussed above all use cross-sectional data to estimate the relationship 
between quitting and job satisfaction. If the error terms of the job satisfaction and 
quitting models are correlated (unobserved individual heterogeneity), then the 
robustness of the findings in these studies is open to question. Clark el ill (1998) 
address this problem using panel data on job satisfaction and quits for a sample of 
German workers. They find the significant negative correlation between job 
satisfaction and quitting, identified in the cross-sectional studies, is robust to concerns 
about individual heterogeneity. In the analysis below, we attempt to control for the 
endogeneity of earnings in the job satisfaction equation by instrumenting earnings in 
the job satisfaction equation. 
2.2.3. The determinants of job satisfaction 
The second strand of the economics literature on job satisfaction takes it as a given that 
job satisfaction is a parameter of interest to economists, and estimates job satisfaction 
equations in order to find out what determines an individual's job satisfaction. The 
literature has typically found earnings to be an important determinant of job 
satisfaction, either directly (through individuals' own earnings) or indirectly (through 
relative or comparison earnings). Other significant factors are gender: women are more 
satisfied with their jobs than men (Hamermesh 1978,2001); age: job satisfaction is U-
shaped in age (Oswald and Clark, 1996); firm size: workers in smaller firms are more 
satisfied (Gardner, 2000) and (ldson, 1990); education: the less educated are more 
satisfied (Oswald and Clark, 1996; Groot and Maasen Van Den Brink, 1999). The 
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results we present below are largely consistent with those found in the previous 
litera ture. 
Battu et aL (1999) use the same survey of graduates used in this paper to look at the 
relationship between job satisfaction and job match. The quality of job match is 
measured by analysing respondent's answers to questions asking them whether their 
third level qualification was a requirement for the job they currently hold. Their 
findings suggest that mismatch affects earnings, and not job satisfaction per sel • 
Uvy-Garboua and Montmarquette (LGM, 2004) motivate the job satisfaction 
equations they estimate using a model of job satisfaction as experienced preference. That is, 
the job satisfaction reported in questionnaires is merely the respondent's judgement of 
whether he would wish to repeat his past career decisions. The main hypothesis they 
test is that job satisfaction is correlated with the earnings gaps experienced in the past 
and present. In the LGM modelling framework, satisfaction judgements are equivalent 
to utility comparisons under different expen'enced and expected scenarios. In this sense, 
their experienced preference framework can be thought of as being fairly similar to the 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) model ofloss aversion and regret. 
In this paper, we estimate the determinants of job satisfaction on a sample of third level 
graduates, and directly test several of the predictions of the LGM model. We focus on 
testing the LGM model as we believe the model represents one of the few attempts by 
economists to incorporate job satisfaction equations into a utility maximising 
framework. As such, it is important to test the model on real data. From an estimation 
perspective, the advantages to using the LGM model were already outlined in the 
introduction. 
The measure of 'mismatch' used by Battu ./ al. is questionable, because it shows that as workers gain 
experience, they are bs likely to say that their qualification was a requirement for the job. According the 
Battu definition of 'mismatch', this implies that quality of the match is decreasing in experience, which is 
contrary to standard human capital theory (Farber, 1999). 
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2.3. A model of job satisfaction as experienced preference 
For ease of presentation of the theoretical model, we present the model for two 
outcomes 1: "satisfied", 0: "not satisfied". The actual data we use has si.x possible 
responses ranging from 1 "very dissatisfied" to 6 ''very satisfied". As LGr..1 point out, 
the model is easily generalised to several job satisfaction responses. An individual will 
state their judgement of their job satisfaction as: 
J=I ifU{z»U(z.o) 
J=O ifU{z)sU(zo) 
(2) 
(3) 
where U is the individual's utility function, and z ° is an individual's expectations, or, 
as LGM put it, the "mentally experienced alternative". The latent variable underlying 
reported job satisfaction J is 
Inserting (4) into equations (2) and (3) we get 
J=l ifJo(z,zo»O 
J=O ifJo(z,zo)SO 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Assuming that an individual's utility from work consists of a pecuniary element Y, and 
a non-pecuniary element u, and utility from work is maximised over the working life, 
then he will express a level of satisfaction with a job at a given point in time I if he 
perceives that the present job has greater value than any jobs that he might have chosen 
in the past and that he still may take in the future. 
J, = 1 if Y, + u, > Y, 0 + u, ° (7) 
J, = 0 if Y, + u, S Y,o + u, 0 (8) 
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Pecuniary realisations and expectations, Y, and Y,., consist of both a backward and 
forward-looking element 
, T 
Y = '" w, + '" Wl+n = B + F 
, L..~l ' L..( )n , , 
,=1 V + r J n=1 I + r 
(9) 
We can write a similar equation for pecuniary aspirations (or the "mentally experienced 
alternative'') substituting expected earnings w,· for experienced earnings w,. Period 1 
represents the beginning of the working life (or it could be interpreted as the beginning 
of a new job) and period T retirement. The backward-looking component of equation 
(9) B" which is known with certainty, is the discounted sum of all past and current 
earnings, and the forward-looking part F, is the expected present value of the job (or 
outside opportunities) in the future. As we only observe job satisfaction at one point in 
time, we assume that the non-pecuniary realisations and comparisons are proxied for 
by individual ftxed effects, and we write u, = u. As in Shields and Ward (2001), we use 
the individual characteristics in the job satisfaction equation to control for non-
pecuniary outside opportunities. Substituting the equation (9) back into the equations 
(I) and (8), and setting u, = u , we get 
J, = I if B, - B,· + F, - F,. + u - u· > 0 (10) 
J, = 0 if B, - B,· + F, - F,. + u - u· ~ 0 (11) 
The LGM model is relatively simple in theory, however, without an unusually long 
panel, it is not straightforward to test empirically. One of the more significant issues is 
determining when exactly work starts - that is, when the discounting begins. Using the 
sample of UK university graduates in this paper gets around this problem to a certain 
extent. This is because we observe career choice and earnings immediately after 
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graduating, as well as job tenure on the current job and spells of employment or further 
study4. Another issue relates to the forward-looking element of equations (10) and 
(11), F, and F,.. The test of the model predictions in LG11 (2004) assumes that the 
present value of expected future earnings gaps are contained in the error term of the 
regression, which may result in biased estimates of the model parameters. The sample 
of graduates does not contain precise information on either F, or F,. , however it does 
have information on graduates' beliefs about their future fmancial situation, which we 
use as proxies for F, - F, •. We outline the approach in the empirical section below. 
2.3.1. The LGM model and stylised facts from the literature 
As was noted in the introduction, one of the appealing characteristics of the LGM 
model is that it is consistent with many of the stylised facts in the economics literature 
on job satisfaction. Firstly, the negative correlation between job satisfaction and 
quitting is consistent with the LGM model. Holding the non-pecuniary comparisons of 
the job constants, we can see that the forward-looking component in equations (10) 
and (11), F, - F,. , is the key determinant of whether or not to stay in the job. As the 
value of F, - F,. increases, so does the level of reported job satisfaction, while the 
probability of leaving the job declines. Secondly, Easterlin (2001) has observed that 
raising the incomes of all does not necessarily increase the happiness of all. This again 
is consistent with equations (10) and (11), as raising the incomes of all would hold all 
earnings gaps constant. Thirdly, many studies fmd that job satisfaction is either 
increasing or U-shaped in age; see, among others, Hamermesh (1977, 2001), Clark and 
According to the LGM model, we could also assume that work 'begins' when the graduate started the 
current job, or started working with the current firm. This is not a practical approach given the current data 
set, as we would have to identify earnings with the period when the graduate starring working Qn the current 
job or firm), which is not possible with this data. We include several controls in the estimation that gets 
around these problems, such as frequency/length of unemployment spells, speUs of further study, and 
current job tenure. 
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Oswald (1996), and Clark ,1 al. (1996, 1998). In the context of the LGM model, this 
implies that J, in equations (10) and (11) is rising with experience. If individuals have 
rational expectations, then they learn to make fewer 'mistakes', and the backward-
looking component B, - B,· becomes increasingly positive, and the forward-looking 
component F, - F,. goes to zeros 6. 
2.4. Data and Job Satisfaction Measures 
The data set we use for our analysis is taken from a sample of over 15,000 graduates of 
third level institutions in the United Kingdom. The Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (IIEFCE) commissioned the survey in the winter of 1996. Its primary aim 
was to study the employment patterns of people with degrees (undergraduate and 
postgraduate) and diplomas at different points during their careers. Battu ,1 al. (1999) 
and Chevalier (2003) have used this data set to analyse the extent of over-education 
among UK graduates, and Belfield ,1 al. (1997) have used it to trace the career choices 
and patterns of third level graduates in the UK. 
Two cohorts of graduates were contacted by postal survey; the frrst cohort gained 
qualifications in 1985 and the second in 1990, with approximately half the 
questionnaires being sent to each group. However, in practice, the older cohort were 
more difficult to contact, leading to an over representation of the younger cohort. This 
leads one to question the validity of the survey - however Belfield ,I al. (1996) have used 
nationally representative samples, such as the Labour Force Survey, to look at the issue 
Making fewer 'mistakes' could mean that individu:als either adjust their ""peetations/ aspirations according to 
their experience or continue searching unrilthL"y fUld a job that matches their eXpL'Ctations/aspirations. 
LGM also argue that the 1.'/'tritll.rJ .-hoi •• framL'Work is consistent with the obsc:r.-ation that people are, in 
general, satisfied with their jobs (sec: Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2(K)O). Again, they appL-al to the rational 
expectations explanation, "(Ulnder cenainty and stable preference., a rational person would always be 
satisfied with a deliberate decision made in the past. It is merely the occurrence of surprises in the outcomes 
and/or possibilities which makes the posterior preference de,·iate from the prior." (LGM 2004. page 139). 
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of representability and provide sufficient evidence to show that the survey is indeed 
representative. The survey asks graduates a variety of questions about their jobs at 
dated intervals that correspond to one, six and, for the 1985 cohort, eleven years after 
graduation. The job satisfaction measure is categorical and can take any integer value in 
the interval [1,6], with 1 labelled ''very dissatisfied" and 6 ''very satisfied". Job 
satisfaction is reported for the current job in 1996. 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of reported job satisfaction for each of the cohorts 
and separately for men and women. The figure shows the distribution for recipients of 
degrees (undergraduate or postgraduate, excluding the Open University); Figure 2.2 
shows the same distribution for graduates who studied for either a sub degree 
qualification ('diplomas,) or who gained their qualification from the Open University 
(OU)7. The figures show that, consistent with observations in previous studies 
(Easterlin, 2001; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000) majority of people are fairly 
satisfied with their jobs - about three quarters of the graduates report job satisfaction 
greater than 3, and around a quarter of graduates are not so happy in their jobs. 
Female graduates report higher levels of job satisfaction, across both cohorts. Figure 
2.2 shows that the gender effect is stronger for recipients of diplomas and OU 
graduates, with relatively large number of these female graduates claiming to be 'very 
satisfied' with their jobs - this could be because graduates who study for a vocational 
qualification have better job match. Overall, we find no significant geographical 
pattern in the reported job satisfaction of the graduates in the sample, either at the 
government office region (12 regions) or HEFCE regions (21) listed in the survey. We 
did fmd a weak negative correlation between job satisfaction and living in a 
The full sample i. 15,530 third level graduates. We drop graduates who are not working in 1996, or who do 
not report their job satisfaction. Furthermore, we only report the job satisfaction of those graduates who say 
that working (employee or self-employed) is their main activity in 1996. This k'1lves us with a total working 
sample of 12,846. 
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metropolitan area (o ther than London) for graduates with diplomas. However, the 
difference becomes insignificant when we include controls for occupation, industry and 
earrungs. 
Figure 2.1 Reported job satisfaction by cohort and gender - degree recipients 
(undergraduate & postgraduate) 
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Figure 2.2 Reported job satisfaction by cohort and gender - diplomas and Open 
University 
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The key ques tion in tIus paper is want to answer in this paper is what is the relationship 
between job sa tisfaction and earnings? Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 provide evidence that 
shows that tI1ere is a significant positive correlation between earnings and job 
satisfaction. T able 2.1 shows the average earnings for each category of job satisfaction 
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for 1985 graduates and Table 2.2 shows the same statistics for 1990 graduates. An 
interesting conclusion from both tables is that although there does not seem to be a 
significant difference between each of the cohorts, there is a significant difference 
between men and women in the effect of earnings on job satisfaction. The tables show 
that, proportionately, the difference in earnings levels across reported job satisfaction is 
quite similar for both cohorts. For example, for the older cohort of men (fable 2.1) 
the difference in average earnings between those who are either very dissatisfied 
(category 1) or dissatisfied (2) and those who are satisfied (5) or very satisfied (6) is 
around [J,790 per annum. This represents around 25% of average earnings (£31,100) 
for this cohort. For the younger cohort of men (fable 2.2) the same difference is 
around, £6,122, which represents about 26% of average earnings (£23,660) for the 
younger cohort, similar to the older cohort of men8• 
The differences for the female sample are much smaller, not only in levels, but also 
proportionately. For the older cohort, the difference in average earnings between 
dissatisfied (categories 1 and 2) and satisfied (categories 5 and 6) is £2,764, or 12% of 
average earnings for women who graduated in 1985. The difference for the younger 
cohort is £2,344, also 12% of average earnings. Similarly, Chevalier (2003) shows that 
women do not attach as much importance to the fmancial reward of their job as men 
do. 
Full summary statistics are provided in tables in the appendix. The average age of the older cohort with a 
degree is 34 (men and women). The average age of the younger cohort with a degree is around 30. For 
those with a diploma, the average age is 42 for the older cohort, and 38 for the younger cohort. 
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Table 2.1 Average annual earnings by reported job satisfaction,1985 graduates 
Men Women 
Job E(annual E(annual 
satisfaction earnings) N Std. Err. earnings) N Std. Err. 
Very 
dissatisfied £24.050 70 1515 £22,328 64 1459 
2 £26,480 176 824 £20,627 130 941 
3 £28,547 349 659 £21,737 342 531 
4 £30,346 781 483 £23,017 576 479 
5 £33,158 861 473 £24,510 644 477 
Very satisfied £34969 262 1020 £22,454 240 843 
Notes: We drop graduates who are not working in 1996, or who do not report their job satisfaction. 
Furthermore, we report the job satisfaction of those graduates where working (employee or self-
employed) is their main activity in 1996. Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 
1996 
Table 2.2 Average annual earnings by reported job satisfaction, 1990 graduates 
Men Women 
Job E(annual E(annual 
satisfaction earnings) N Std. Err. earnings) N Std. Err. 
Very 
dissatisfied £17,424 125 878 £16,066 137 882 
2 £20,006 268 498 £18,707 263 543 
3 £22,511 598 381 £18,519 654 306 
4 £23,446 1207 290 £19,394 1157 228 
5 £25,199 1282 306 £20,411 1269 235 
Very satisfied £25,683 363 703 £19,448 478 420 
Notes: See notes for Table 2.1 
The LGM model of job satisfaction as experienced preference also implies that that 
there will be a positive correlation between earnings growth and job satisfaction. 
Holding expectations/aspirations constant (and non-pecuniary aspects of the job), we 
would expect to observe job satisfaction increasing with earnings growth. 
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Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show average growth in earnings over the 1991 -1996 period 
for each cohort and for men and women separately9. Both tables show that earnings 
growth is important for job satisfaction. Furthermore, contrary to the summary 
statistics presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, there is a difference between both 
cohorts. Looking at 
Ideally, we would want to estimate average growth in real wages. However, although weekly and annual 
earnings are reported for 1986, 1991 and 1996, weekly hours are only reported for the current main job in 
1996. In order to at least partially control for changes in earnings associated with changes in hours, we 
restrict the sample to those graduates who were working full time in 1991 and 1996. 
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Table 2.3, there appears to be a V-shaped relationship between job satisfaction and 
earnings growth for women in the older cohort, however, the standard errors are large 
and the differences are not significant. 
In the younger cohort men and women look a lot more similar. The relatively higher 
earnings growth across job satisfaction categories in this cohort is probably only a 
reflection of the different position that younger and older cohorts occupy in the age-
earnings proftle. Another interesting result is the difference in the standard errors, 
within each job satisfaction category, between the older and younger cohort. 
Comparing 
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Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we see that almost without exception, the standard errors for 
the younger cohort are consistently larger than those for the older cohort - despite the 
fact that we have more observations of the younger cohort. This result is consistent 
with one of the main predictions of the model of job satisfaction as experienced prefmnce, 
namely that as people get older, they make fewer 'mistakes' and their job satisfaction 
becomes more consistent with their expectations of earnings (current, past and 
10 It could also be possible, that dissatisfied graduates revise their expectations in order to justify past and 
current choices, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). However, we do not believe that young graduates 
will not have (or take) the opportunity to improve their job match in order to increase their satisfaction. 
Table 2.3 
Job 
satisfaction 
Very 
dissatisfied 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Ve~ satisfied 
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Average growth real In annual earnings 1991-1996 by reported job 
satisfaction, 1985 graduates 
Men Women 
EIEarnings 
growth. 1991- E[Earnings 
1996] N Std. Err. growth, 1991-1996] N Std. Err. 
19.34% 56 5.59% 28.97% 47 6.37% 
26.36% 154 2.65% 29.02% 86 4.15% 
31.09% 311 2.02% 25.59% 242 2.36% 
37.77% 699 1.67% 31.04% 414 1.84% 
48.72% 766 2.26% 37.08% 445 2.41% 
48.36% 230 3.61% 35.21% 155 4.25% 
Notes: We drop graduates who are not working in 1996 and 1991, or who do not report their job 
satisfaction. Furthermore, INe report the job satisfaction of those graduates where working (employee 
or self-employed) is their main activity in 1996. All earnings are in £1991 and indexed using the RPI, the 
sample for earnings growth is restricted to full-time workers in 1991 and 1996. Source: The Careers of 
Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996 
Table 2.4 
Job 
satisfaction 
Very 
dissatisfied 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Ve~ satisfied 
Average growth In real annual earnings 1991-1996 by reported Job 
satisfaction, 1990 graduates 
Men Women 
E[Earnings E[Earnings 
growth,1991- growth,1991- Std. 
1996] N Std. Err. 1996] N Err. 
37.52% 68 6.71% 32.25% 75 5.52% 
36.76% 196 3.91% 44.34% 162 4.20% 
45.41% 433 3.12% 45.68% 414 3.51% 
57.98% 889 2.25% 54.01% 736 2.54% 
68.91% 948 2.38% 61.27% 777 2.76% 
67.10% 262 5.42% 62.45% 290 5.09% 
Notes: See notes for Table 2.3 
2.5. Estimating the determinants of job satisfaction 
The aim of analysis in this section is determine the empirical model that best explains 
reported job satisfaction. Of particular interest is the channel through which earnings 
affect job satisfaction. Three empirical models of the job satisfaction equation are 
estimated: (i) the basic model, which includes no controls for comparison earnings and is 
purely static; (ii) the alrrent earnings comparison model, which is the LGl\1 model with no 
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forward or backward looking elements; and (iii) a lifetimt tamings companson model, which 
is model (ii) with forward and backward looking elements. 
2.5.1. Estimates of the basic model 
The basic model, which follows the early work by Freeman (1978), involves estimating a 
linear regression where own earnings have a direct impact on job satisfaction 
i, =a+ X, PI + y,(J1 + &, (12) 
The matrix X, controls for individual characteristics, such as age, job tenure and 
occupation, y, is a measure of annual earnings and &, is a random disturbance term 
with the usual properties. The latent variable underlying the LGM model is additive in 
earnings comparisons, therefore, following LGM, earnings enter the job satisfaction 
equation in levels, not logs. Several econometric problems arise in the estimation of 
(12). The literature review has already discussed problems relating to measurement 
error in self-reported job satisfaction, however, here we will concentrate on other types 
of endogeneity related to earnings. The endogeneity may arise due to reasons relating 
to unobserved heterogeneity, which (potentially) could affect both job satisfaction and 
earnings; or from the fact the earnings and job satisfaction are a simultaneous system of 
equations. In order to take account of the endogeneity of earnings we instrument 
earnings in the job satisfaction equation. We discuss the approach below. 
The pecuniary determinants of job satisfaction 
Earnings are instrumented using the occupation (8 categories) of the head of the 
household at aged 14 and region of work (21 regions) in 1996. In using parental 
occupation aged 14 as an instrument we are making use of results in the literature that 
show a strong positive intergenerational correlation in earnings (Dearden tl aI., 1997, 
Solon, 1999 for a review). The results from estimating the reduced form earnings 
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equation are shown in the appendix. We estimate an earnings equation for each cohort 
of graduates by gender. The results show that, after controlling for a range of other 
characteristics, parental occupation is not a significant detenrunant of earnings for the 
older cohort of women. Additionally, we use region of work in 1996 as a further 
exclusion restriction. As in Shields and Ward (2001), we confum that region does not 
affect job satisfaction, after controlling for income - as compensating differentials 
would suggest. We confumed that the two sets of instruments are valid, since job 
satisfaction regressions based on a single set of exclusion variables, give the same 
results for the coefficient on pay. Thus, we believe that the instruments capture the 
exogenous components of pay. 
The full set of results from estimating equation (12) is shown in Table A2.11 at the 
end of the paper. A separate ordered probit of job satisfaction is estimated for each 
cohort of men and women. Table 2.5, shown below, reports the coefficients on 
earnings only from the ordered probit, the results for all other variables are shown in 
Table A2.11 Table 2.5 also shows the results from including the exogenous estimate 
of earnings from the earnings equation in the job satisfaction equation instead of 
reported earnings The IV-specification is estimated using limited information 
methods, that is, by a two-step procedure. Additionally, we bootstrap the estimation 
(1000 replications) in order to obtain efficient standard errors. 
The results show that earnings do affect job satisfaction directly, both in the non-
instrumented equation and instrumented equations. Surprisingly, this is one of the few 
results in the literature that consistentlY fll1ds such a significant effect of own earnings on 
job satisfaction, although it should be noted that this is our basic estimate of the job 
satisfaction equation and we have yet to include controls for relative earnings effects. 
The marginal effects that correspond to the coefficients on earnings in Table 2.5 are 
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shown in Table 2.6. The table shows the increase in the probability of an individual 
reporting job satisfaction of 5 or 6 ('satisfied,) when earnings are increased by £5,000. 
The third row in Table 2.6 shows the sample probability of being satisfied with the job. 
Although this is one of the few results in the literature to show a significant positive 
correlation between own earnings, the effect seems relatively smallll. For example, if 
we calculate a simple average elasticity on the basis of the marginal effect, in Table 2.6 
we see that for an average increase in earnings of 20% (£5,000 on top of £24,829), the 
probability of being satisfied only increases by around 7.5% (3.3% on top of 43.1%). 
In the next section we will interested to see whether the effect of relative earnings is 
any larger. 
Table 2.5 Coefficient on earnings In the basic Job satisfaction equation 
Cohort Female 1985 Male 1985 Female 1990 Male 1990 
Earnings not 0.0057 0.0088 0.0072 0.0111 Instrumented 
(1.83)+ (4.09)- (2.38)* (4.83)-
Earnings 0.014 0.0128 0.0243 0.0159 Instrumented 
(2.31)* (2.97)- (3.50)*· (3.00)** 
Observations 1462 1999 2466 2586 
Log likelihood -2229.28 -2936.04 -3790.40 -3832.94 
Chi2 99.08 155.92 97.88 125.76 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at 10%; (* )significant at 5%; (-) 
Significant at 1 %. The standard error for instrumented earnings is obtained by bootstrapping the 
estimation with 1000 replications. The regression also includes controls for a range of other 
characteristics, both work related and non-work related (see Table A2.11) 
Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996. 
II Ferrer-I-CamoneU and Frijters (2004) find similar srnal~ but significant, coefficients for the effect of earnings 
happiness. 
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Table 2.6 Marginal effect of earnings on job satisfaction 
Effect on probability of being satisfied [5,6J from Increasing annual earnings 
by £5,000 
Cohort Female 1985 Male 1985 Female 1990 Male 1990 
Earnings not 
Instrumented 1.08% 1.81% 1.44% 2.21% 
Earnings 
Instrumented 2.77% 2.54% 4.80% 3.11% 
Sample probability 
of being satisfied 
[5,6] 43.92% 44.72% 44.18% 43.13% 
Sample mean 
annual earnings £23,433 £31,324 £19,902 £24,659 
Notes: The marginal effects in the table are calculated from the regression results in Table A2.11. All 
marginal effects are calculated at the mean value of earnings, shown in the final row of the table. 
Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996. 
The negative bias we see on the earnings parameter could be indicative of a 
compensating differential storyl2. That is, the effect of earnings on job satisfaction 
would be biased downwards if people were paid more to take on more dangerous or 
risky jobs. In this case, we would see well-paid people reporting low levels of job 
satisfaction. Introducing independent variation in earnings, by instrumenting, should 
remove the bias. The ideal way to test the compensating differentials hypothesis 
would be to estimate the entire system of equations by instrumenting job satisfaction in 
an earnings equation. If the bias on job satisfaction in the earnings equation was 
positive, then we could say with more certainty that this is a compensating differentials 
story. However, full identification of the system of equations that determine job 
satisfaction and earnings is beyond the scope of the current paper. An interesting 
avenue for future work would be to use job satisfaction to fully quantify compensating 
differentials for different types of individuals and jobs. 
12 Alternatively, the negative bias could also reflect the fact then: is measurement error in the earnings variable, 
attenuating the coefficient to zero. 
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Non-pecuniary determinants of job satisfaction 
Apart from earnings, there are several other characteristics that affect job satisfaction, 
and, regardless of the specification of earnings in the job satisfaction equation, these 
factors remain significant throughout the analysis that follows. 
We fmd that for the older cohort of graduates, being married or living with a partner is 
correlated with higher levels of reported job satisfaction. To the extent that job 
satisfaction is positively correlated with overall feelings of well-being, this result is 
consistent with the economics literature on happiness (see Oswald, 1997 and 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). There is also some weak evidence that having 
children is correlated with higher levels of job satisfaction for women, although it is 
only significant for the younger cohort. Several studies have also found a negative 
correlation between job satisfaction and bad health outcomes (Clark and Oswald, 
1996). The only health related question in the graduate survey asks graduates whether 
or not they have a work-limiting disability. Disability is negatively correlated with job 
satisfaction; however, it is only significant for the younger cohort of women (at the 
10% leve~. When we exclude earnings from the job satisfaction equation, the disability 
is significantly negatively correlated with job satisfaction for all cohorts and genders, 
implying that most of the disability effect on job satisfaction is picked up by the 
relatively lower earnings associated with these individuals. 
The survey also asks the graduates whether the initial qualification gained in 1985 or 
1990 was specified as a job requirement for their current job. Graduates who answer 
'yes' to this question also report significantly higher levels of job satisfaction. As Battu 
al al (1999) point out, this could be interpreted as a job match effect, where those 
graduates who answer yes also have a better job match, which is positively correlated 
with job satisfaction. The impact of this proxy for job match differs significantly by 
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cohort. For the older cohort, the marginal effect on the probability on being satisfied 
(category 5 or 6) of this variable (going from 'No' to 'Yes,) is 4% for men and 3.6% for 
women. For the younger cohort, the marginal effect is significantly larger, 8.6% for 
men and 8.8% for women13• This implies that the effect of job match on job 
satisfaction, as me(J.fured I?Y whether the initial qualification is a requirement for the job, could be 
Another result that is entirely consistent with the previous job satisfaction literature is 
that the self-employed are significantly more satisfied with their jobs; see Hundley 
(2001) and Blanchflower et at. (2004)15. The marginal effect of being self employed on 
reporting job satisfaction of 5 or 6 ranges from around 9% to 13%. 
The coefficient on hours of work is difficult to interpret, not only because it fluctuates 
from negative (women, 1985 and 1990) to positive (men, 1985), but also because the 
assumption that hours of work are (weakly) exogenous is unlikely to hold. If you are 
dissatisfied with your job, then you are probably also likely to work (or at least prefer to 
work) fewer hours, which implies that true effect of hours in the job satisfaction is 
unlikely to be identified in the estimated job satisfaction equation. As with earnings, it 
would be ideal to instrument hours in the job satisfaction equation, however, it is not 
obvious what instrument could be used in the reduced form labour supply equation, 
and we do not attempt to do it in this paper We therefore do not wish to over-
emphasise the result for hours. 
13 
14 
15 
'Marginal' effects of categorical variables refer to the efft'Ct on the probability of reporting a certain job 
satisfaction level from moving from not having the characteristic to having the characteristic. 
As a graduate gains more experience in their chosen career, the initial qualification may no longer be an 
explicit requirement - so there is measurement error in this variable for the older cohort. The presence of 
measurement error may also go some way towards explaining the lower coefficient we observe. 
Hundley (2001) summarises the reasons as to why we might expect to observe a positive correlation between 
job satisfaction and self employment, these include: autonomy and variety in the workplace, full"r utilisation 
of skills (i.e. the self-employed are less likely to consider themselves overeducated), more flexible work 
schedules, and, outside options are likely to be more restricted for the self-employed and therefore thl1' value 
their current job more highly. 
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Workers in larger firms tend to report lower levels of job satisfaction, particularly in the 
younger cohort of graduates. The effects are fairly similar once you move beyond a 
finn size of 25 employees; that is, the effects are more-or-less the same regardless of 
whether a graduate is in a firm or 100 or 500 employees. Again, this is a common 
finding in job satisfaction studies; see Gardner (2001), Clark and Oswald (1996) and 
Idson (1990). The reasons cited for the negative correlation between finn size and job 
satisfaction are similar to those cited by psychologists for the positive correlation 
between self-employment and job satisfaction, such as autonomy, variety, responsibility 
in the workplace, etc. 
The regression model also included several other variables in order to more fully 
control for characteristics of the job not directly related to earnings. These include 
controls for profit sharing in the finn (insignificant), membership of a company health 
scheme (positive and significant for younger men only), and membership of company 
pension scheme (varying from positive to negative and significant to insignificant). The 
lack of any consistent pattern across cohorts in the effect of these variables on job 
satisfaction makes it hard to draw any finn conclusions regarding their relative 
importance. Clearly, several of the variables are correlated with other controls already 
included in the mode~ for example, we know that bigger firms are also more likely to 
offer company pensions, health programmes and profit sharing schemes. In fact, when 
we regress job satisfaction on controls for pension scheme membership, company car, 
health scheme membership and profit share in the finn, with no other controls, we fmd 
that all of these variables are signiflcantly positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
2.5.2. Current earnings comparison model 
The current earnings comparison model is the model that is estimated in much of the 
recent job satisfaction literature, including Oswald and Clark (1996) and Clark (1997). 
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The model is equivalent to the LGM model without any forward or backward looking 
components. The specification is a modification of the basic job satisfaction equation 
in (12) and includes a control for comparison or expected earnings y/', 
(13) 
Equation (13) is the specification estimated in Clark and Oswald (1996), among others. 
Assuming that either y/, or some combination of factors that directly determine y/, 
are used to estimate y/', then there are some potential collinearity problems in the 
estimation of (13). As an alternative to (13), we write ~/ = y/ - y,', and rewrite (13) as, 
j/ =a+X/p. +~/". +&,.' (14), 
thereby imposing the restriction "I = °1 = -°2 , In an extended version of the model in 
equation (14) we also relax the equality assumption. 
Measuring expected/comparison earnings 
The key to credibly testing the predictions of the LGM model in the setup of equation 
(13) or (14) is to find the right measure of expected/comparison earnings, and hence 
the 'earnings gap'. However, without asking graduates directly about their income 
expectations, this is no simple task. The survey does ask graduates about their relative 
fmancial position both in the past and the future; these questions are used in the 
estimation in section to proxy for future earnings. However, the survey does not 
contain any questions that ask graduates about their level of expected earnings, thereby 
allowing us to directly calculate y/ - y/' = ~/' 
In order to get around some of the debate surrounding inference of expectations based 
on realisations - which is summarised in detail in Dominitz and Manski (1997) - we 
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estimate equation (14) for several deftnitions of expected earnings, y,", and test to see 
which measure of expected earnings best explains the data. The ftrst estimate of 
expected earnings, y,' == y,.1 , is the fttted value from an earnings equation calculated in 
the current period. The residual from this regression then enters the job satisfaction 
equation as our estimation of the experience 'earnings gap'. This is the approach 
followed in ahnost all the literature that looks at the relationship between comparison 
income and job satisfaction, including LGM (2004), Clark and Oswald (1996) and Clark 
(1997). The assumption here is that graduates calculate expected earnings making full 
use of all the information available to them, as an econometrician would. The merits 
and pitfalls associated with using earnings regressions to estimate expected earnings are 
discussed in several papers by Manski; see Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski 
(1993a and 1993b). 
• .2 The second estimate of expected earnings, y, == y, , assumes workers form 
expectations about earnings growth and not necessarily earnings levels. The summary 
statistics presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 showed there was a positive correlation 
between earnings growth over the 1991 -1996 period and job satisfaction. Rather than 
estimate an equation that tries to explain earnings growth over this period, we simply 
estimate the average earnings growth by cohort, gender, current qualiftcations and 
subject studied for the initial degree in 1985/1990. The implicit assumption here is that 
graduates do not make comparisons with a narrowly deftned group of individuals (as in 
the regression), but rather compare themselves with other graduates who have broadly 
similar earnings related characteristics. The level of comparison/ expected earnings in 
this case are simply the earnings that the graduate would have had in 1996, had they 
experienced real earnings growth over the 1991-1996 period that waf in line with the average for other 
graduates with their characteristics. 
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The third and final estimate of expected earnings, y,' E y,d, embodies some of the 
forward-looking elements of the LGM model of job satisfaction. Rather than consider 
the earnings growth that graduates might have experienced in the past five years, we 
consider the earnings growth that they could expect in the next five years. This forward-
looking comparison of earnings is similar to the extensive psychological literature on 
upward comparisons (Collins, 199). However, in this case, rather than making comparisons 
with graduates who are better than them, we test to see whether graduates compare 
themselves with other similar graduates who have more work experience. In order to 
do this we make use of the cohort nature of the sample, 1990 graduates comparing 
their 1996 earnings with the 1996 earnings of similar graduates from the 1985 cohort. 
Results: earnings comparison model 
The discussion of the results in this section will focus on the effect of comparison 
earnings on job satisfaction only. The previous section on the basic model discussed in 
detail how other non-earnings variables affect job satisfaction. Furthermore, we do not 
re-present the full results for each of the samples, as the coefftcients on these are 
variables are unchanged when we estimate the earnings comparison model. We use 
the results in this section to test two of the central predictions of the LGM model: (~ 
that the effect of the earnings gap on job satisfaction declines as people get older; (ii) 
the effect of expected/comparison earnings on job satisfaction is offset by the effect of 
the earnings gap on job satisfaction. 
Table 2.7 below presents the results from the estimating the job satisfaction equation, 
for each of the measures of comparison earnings. The first column, Model (1), shows 
the results from estimating an ordered probit that includes the residual from the 
earnings equation as the measure of the earnings gap. The residual from the earnings 
equation are correlated with job satisfaction - but for men only. The residual is 
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insignificant for both cohorts of women. Furthermore, for all cohorts, including the 
residual from the earnings equation is no better at explaining the job satisfaction than 
simply including own earnings in the job satisfaction equation. If we compare the log 
likelihoods in Table 2.7 and Table 2.5, we can see that J\fodel (1) has no more 
explanatory power than the basic model of job satisfaction. This is also true of 110del 
(3), which uses potential earnings in five years time as a measure of comparison 
earnings. Of the three models presented in Table 2.7, Model (2) is the only one that 
consistently performs better than the basic model of job satisfaction without any 
earnings comparisons. The measure of comparison earnings used to estimate the 
earnings gap in Model (2) is the earnings that a graduate might have expected in 1996 
had he experienced earnings growth in line with graduates who have characteristics 
similar to their own. This measure of earning is the average earnings growth by gender, 
cohort and subject studied of the previous 5-years'6. Although Model (2) does have 
greater explanatory power than the basic model of job satisfaction, the evidence is not 
all that convincing. The difference between the log likelihoods is small, and it is 
unlikely that a test that does not rely on sample size (as the LR-test does) would reject 
one model in favour of the other. 
The prediction of the LGM mode~ that the effect of the earnings on job satisfaction 
declines as people get older, is not supported by the results in Table 2.7 - this 
contradicts the results presented in LGM (2004). The coefficient on the earnings gap 
for the younger cohort only exceeds the coefficient for the older cohort for men in 
Model (1), and a Wald test conftrms that the coefficients are not actually significantly 
different from one another. Apart from indicating that the LGM model of job 
16 Alternatively, we could estimate this using a wage growth equation. We have tried both approaches and find 
that the results are practically identical. She standard errors in tables presented are bootstrapped replications 
(1000). 
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satisfaction may not be a true model of behaviour, the predicted age effect may not be 
supported by our results for three other reasons. Firstly, we only look at one period, 
and ignore any earnings gaps in the past and future. Later on, we extend the earnings 
comparison model to include forward and backward looking elements. Secondly, if 
non-pecuniary characteristics that determine job satisfaction are different for both 
cohorts (as we might expect them to be, and as the results in Table A2.11 confirm) and 
are not fully controlled for in the estimation, then this could bias the coefficients on the 
earnings gap downwards. Thirdly, the average age gap between each of the cohorts is 
only around 5 years. This difference in ages may not be large enough to observe 
differences in the impact of the earnings gap - LGM compare 30-year olds with 40 
year-olds. 
Another prediction of the LGl\I model is that it is the earnings gap that matters in job 
satisfaction judgments, and expected/comparison earnings alone do not significantly 
affect job satisfaction (as argued in Clark and Oswald, 1996). That is, in equation (11) 
the effect of comparison earnings on job satisfaction is offset by the discounted sum of 
the experienced earnings gaps. We test this hypothesis by estimating job satisfaction 
equations that not only include the earnings gaps as in Table 2.7 but also control for 
expected/comparison earning. That is, we estimate the following job satisfaction 
equation for each measure of expected earnings: 
(14), 
The results are reported in Table 2.8, and, as before, we report the results for each of 
the three definitions of expected/comparison earnings. In Model (1), we find that the 
level of expected/comparison earnings on job satisfaction is not offset by the earnings 
gap, at least within the current period. In fact, for Model (1), where 
expected/ comparison earnings are estimated by an earnings regression, expected 
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earnings are consistently positive and significant. It is quite likely that the inclusion of 
expected earnings and the residual from the earnings regression introduces some 
collinearity problems. The results for Model (2) and Model (3) are consistent with the 
predictions of the LGM model. We find that expected! comparison earnings are 
insignificant in three of the samples, the one exception is the sample of 1990 male 
graduates. 
To summarise the results in this section - the results of the earnings comparison model 
that looks at earnings gaps in the current period are reasonably supportive of the 
predictions of the LGM model. The specifications that include the earnings gap in the 
job satisfaction equation do have greater explanatory power than the basic model of job 
satisfaction, however, the increased explanatory power is not very large. In the next 
section, we will test whether adding experienced earnings gaps in the past improves the 
explanatory power of the models. 
Table 2.7 
Sample 
Model 
~ 1 • el 
, =y, - y, 
~ 2 e e2 
, =y, - y, 
.; J e eJ 
, = y, - y, 
Observations 
Log likelihood 
Chi squared 
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Earnings comparison model, no controls for current comparison earnings 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male, 1990 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
0.0014 0.0069 0.003 0.0093 
(0.4) (2.77)- (0.85) (3.44)-
0.0067 0.015 0.0122 0.0113 
(1.68)+ (4.96)- (3·D4r (4.01)-
NA NA 0.0066 0.0086 
(2.06)* (3.73)-
1462 1462 NA 1999 1999 NA 2466 2466 2466 2586 2586 2586 
-2230.89 -2228.49 NA -2937.46 -2929.88 NA -3793.23 -3786.77 -3787.72 -3836.65 -3832.87 -3839.18 
95.85 99.90 NA 153.07 168.23 NA 92.22 105.14 98.98 118.34 119.90 117.14 
Notes: The coefficients in the table are the results of ordered pro bits of job satisfaction on the difference between own earnings and comparison/expected 
earnings and controls for workplace and personal characteristics (see Table A2.11). The sample of graduates for each gender-cohort is restricted to graduates 
who said that work was their main activity in 1996. Model (3) is not estimated for 1985 graduates, as comparison earnings for this model are the earnings that 
1990 graduates can expect in 5 years time, i.e. the average earnings of 1985 graduates in 1996. Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. (+) 
significant at 10% level, (**) 5% level, (*) 1% level. The standard errors on each of the measures of the earnings gap are obtained by bootstrapping the 
estimation with 1000 replications. Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996. 
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Table 2.8 Earnings comparison models, controlling for current comparison earnings 
Cohort Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male,1990 
Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
.. Y, 
J: 1 , ,1 
"" =Y, - Y, 
,2 
Y, 
J: 2 , d 
"" = Y, - Y, 
d Y, 
J: 3 • d 
"" = Y, - Y, 
Observations 
Log likelihood 
Chi squared 
0.0184 
(2.86)* 
0.0028 
(0.84) 
0.0039 
(0.95) 
0.0075 
(1.88)+ 
1462 1462 
-2225.19 -2229.03 
107.27 99.59 
NA 
NA 
1462 
NA 
NA 
0.0130 
(2.97)* 
0.0077 
(3.06)* 
1999 
-2935.99 
156.02 
0.0020 
(0.68) 
0.0152 
(5.02)* 
1999 
-2929.63 
168.74 
NA 
NA 
1999 
NA 
NA 
0.0258 
(3.21) 
0.0040 
(1.11 ) 
2466 
-3784.66 
109.36 
0.0001 
(0.039) 
0.0123 
(2.85)* 
0.0055 
(0.59) 
0.0072 
(2.06) 
2466 2466 
-3786.77 -3787.52 
105.15 99.39 
0.0171 
(3.00)* 
0.0099 
(3.66)* 
2586 
-3832.63 
126.38 
0.0087 
(2.38)** 
0.0127 
(4.40)* 
2586 
-3832.41 
126.83 
0.0152 
(2.9)* 
0.0107 
(4.4)* 
2586 
-3824.68 
126.13 
Notes: The coefficients in the table are the results of ordered probils of job satisfaction on the difference between own earnings and comparison/expected earnings, and 
comparison earnings themselves, as well as controls for workplace and personal characteristics. The sample of graduates for each gender-cohort is restricted to 
graduates who said that work was their main activity in 1996. Model (3) is not estimated for 1985 graduates, as comparison earnings for this model are the eamings that 
1990 graduates can expect in 5 years time, i.e. the average eamings of 1985 graduates in 1996. Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. (+) significant at 10% 
level, (, 5% level, (j 1 % level. The standard errors on each of the measures of the earnings gap, and expected eamings are obtained by bootstrapping the estimation 
with 1000 replications. Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996. 
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2.5.3. The LGM model with backward- and forward-looking comparisons 
The third specification of the job satisfaction equation that we estimate is our full 
empirical specification of the LGM mode~ with both forward and backward looking 
components. The job satisfaction equation we estimate is as follows 
j, = a + X, PI + ~A + qH02 + ql-l003 
+'1'1+104 +'1'1+505 +&, 
(15) 
The variables ~" q'-5 and q,-Io correspond to the earnings gap in 1996, 1991 and 1986 
respectively. For graduates who are not working in 1986 (including the 1990 cohort), 
the ';1-10 term falls out of the regression. For the older cohort, we assume that the 
working life 'begins' in 1986, and, for the younger cohort 1991 (the year of graduation). 
The estimates of the model in LGM (2004) only consider 2 periods and include no 
controls for forward-looking expectations of the earnings gap. Indeed, LGl\1 assume 
that expected future income gaps are contained in the error term of the regression. We 
include explicit controls for expected future income in the ordered probit, and, as such, 
the estimation in this section represents a more comprehensive test of the LGl\f model. 
The variables '1'1+1 and '1'1+5 in (15) use the answers to the questions in the survey that 
ask graduates about their future financial expectations. The precise wording of the 
question is "uoking ahead, how do YOII think YOII will be jinancialIY a year from now/jive years 
from now?'. There are four possible answers to this question: better t1f than now, worse t1f 
than now, abollt the same, and don ~ know. 
The coefficients on the answers to the future expectations questions need to be 
interpreted with some caution (to put it mildly). There are several reasons for this, not 
least of which is that they do not direcdy measure expectations of the future earnings 
gap. Firsdy, the comparison earnings the questions refer to are own earnings in the 
current period, not expected/comparison earnings as we defined them above (by any 
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deftnition in Table 2.7 or Table 2.8). Another potential problem with using the 
answers to these attitudinal questions is the fact that the answers they elicit from 
respondents may not accurately reflect the full range of uncertainty that people perceive 
when it comes to estimating both their own actual earnings in the future, as well as their 
expected/ comparison earningsl7• Bearing all these caveats in mind, we believe that in 
the absence of any other direct proxies for expectations of the future earnings gap, the 
answers to this question should be included in the estimation - however, we would 
refrain from placing any causal interpretation on the coefftcients. Furthennore, we also 
believe that including the answers to the questions is preferable to the approach in 
LGM (2004), which is to assume that the random disturbance tenn in their model also 
reflects the present value of earnings gaps in the future. In practice, both questions 
about future fmancial expectations are, un surprisingly, correlated. However, the 
correlation coefficient is not so large as to lead to estimation problems when both 
variables are included in the estimated job satisfaction equation. The correlation 
coefficients are 0.38 (female, 1985 cohort), 0.43 (male, 1985 cohort), 0.38 (female, 1990 
cohort) and 0.41 (male 1990 cohort). The qualitative fmdings presented below are not 
affected by the exclusion of one or other of the forward looking variables, and a 
comparison of the log likelihoods indicates that the model has more explanatory power 
when both variables are included. 
17 A further problem may also be that the question does not actual refer to the individual's earnings, but their 
general 'financial situation'. However, we believe that the fact that the earnings are the major component of 
an individual's financial situation mitigates this problem somewhat. If we compare the answers to the 
question asking them about their financial situation fi'~}taTS ago with the information we have on 1991- t 995 
earnings growth, we find that those individuals who say they were better off five years ago also experienced 
practically zero earnings growth in real terms, and also have a much bigger srandard deviation. Similarly, 
graduates who say they are financially better off now experienced positive earnings growth on average and 
have a much smaller standard deviation. 
53 
Results: full LGM model 
The full set of results from estimating the LGM model in (15) are shown in the 
appendix. We show the results from estimating an ordered probit of job satisfaction 
where the earnings gap is measured in two periods only, the current period (1996) and 
five years back., and Table A2.13 shows the results from estimating a three period 
model, including estimates of the earnings gap for 1986. This specification is estimated 
for the 1985 cohort only. The measure of comparison earnings we use in the 
specifications in this section is the earnings that a graduate might have expected, had he 
had earnings growth over the previous five years in line with similar individuals from 
his cohort - where 'similar' individuals are assumed to be the same gender, and have 
studied for the same qualification and subject. This is the same measure of comparison 
earnings used to construct the wage gap in Model (2) (fable 2.7 and Table 2.8). We 
use this measure of comparison earnings to construct the earnings gap because it the 
measure that produced results that were most consistent with our priors from the LGM 
model. We assume that graduates only start their 'current careers' when they graduate; 
therefore, wage growth in the first period of work (1991 for the younger cohort, 1986 
for the older cohort) is assumed to equal zero. The measure of comparison earnings in 
each of these periods for each cohort is just the mean earnings by gender, qualification 
studied for (ie. diploma, degree or diploma) and subject. The distribution of each of 
these characteristics is shown in the tables of summary statistics at the end of the paper. 
In this section we focus on interpreting the coefficients on the earnings gap, as well as 
the coefficients on future [mancia! expectations. For convenience, therefore, we 
reproduce the results for each of these variables in the tables below. As in the 
previous estimation, the standard errors for the coefficients on the estimated earnings 
gap are obtained by bootstrapping the estimation (1000 replications). 
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The fIrst key result from estimating our empirical specification of the full LGM 
experience preference model is that adding in the controls for wage gaps in the past and 
future fInancial expectations signifIcantly improves the model. Comparing the log 
likelihoods for all four samples (fable 2.7 compared with Table 2.9) we can see the 
estimated likelihood increases signifIcantly under the full model. For women in the 
1985 (1990) cohort, the likelihood increases from -2225 to -2200 (-3786 to -3732); and 
for men in the 1985 (1990) cohort, the likelihood increases from -2929 to -2841 (-3832 
to -3745). 
The second key result is that for three of the four cohorts, the earnings gaps in the past 
are largely insignificant in judgements of current job satisfaction (fable 2.9). The one 
exception is in the younger cohort of men, where the earnings gap in 1990 is 
significantly positive. However for this cohort, the effect of the CHrren/ earnings gaps 
continues to dominate, almost twice as large as the gaps experienced in the past 
(although the difference is not significant). With the exception of the younger cohort 
of women, these results are actually consistent with the LGM model. The model 
predicts that as workers get older, the effect of earnings gaps in the past declines. We 
fInd the same result when we look at the three period model for the older cohort only, 
wage gaps in the current period weight more heavily on job satisfaction than wage gaps 
in the past. 
Another key predictions of the LGl\f model is that the coefficient on the earnings gap 
decreases as workers get older - because expected earnings become more in line with 
realised earnings as workers get older. 'W'hen we compare the coefficient on the 
earnings gap (current or past) across cohorts, we fInd that for women, the coefficients 
are not significantly different from one another. For men in the 1990 cohort, however, 
we do ftnd that the earnings gap in 1991 is positively correlated with job satisfaction, 
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whereas the same variable is insignificant for men in the 1985 cohort. LGM (2004) 
actually ftnd little support for this hypothesis in their data. However, they argue that 
the estimated effect of the current earnings gap on job satisfaction is likely to be biased 
downwards. The bias arises because that the future earnings gap, which is an omitted 
variable in their analysis, is likely to be positively correlated with both the current 
earnings gap and current job satisfaction. Therefore, the fact that the size of the 
coefftcients on the earnings gap across the female cohorts are not signiftcantly different 
from one another should not be interpreted as a signiftcant reason to reject the LGM 
model of job satisfaction as experienced preference!8. Indeed, the signiftcant difference 
we do observe for men is consistent with predictions of the experienced preference 
model. 
The fourth key result we fmd in the full speciftcation is that future fmancial 
expectations are significantly positively correlated with job satisfaction - individuals 
who expect to be better off in the future are also more satisfied. In fact, the significant 
increases in the maximised log likelihood that we remarked on above are largely driven 
by the inclusion of these variables in the ordered probit. Looking at the coefftcients, 
the one consistent result is that graduates in all four groups share a strong dislike of 
Ilncertainty. The negative correlation between job satisfaction and those graduates who 
say they 'Don't know' whether they will be better off or worse off in the future is very 
strong, and in the older cohort, the effect is about the same as that observed for the 
group who say that they expect to IVom off in the next year (the 'Don't know' group 
II It could also be argued that the inclusion of the variables controlling for future financial expectations helps 
to remove some of the bias discussed above. However, a comparison of the coefficients on the current 
earnings gap in Table 2.9 with the coefficients on the earnings gap for Model (2) in Table 2.7 actually 
shows that the inclusion of the answers to the questions about future financial expectations dues little to 
change the coefficients on the current earnings gap. Another reason why we might not observe a difference 
in the coefficients for our sample is because the difference in the average age of the individuals in each 
cohort is not large enough for there to be any significant difference in expectations formation. 
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represents between about 10% and 20% of graduates - see the summary statistics in at 
the end of the paper). 
Interestingly, the results also seem to imply that, for the younger cohort in particular, 
the expected fmancial situation in the near future weighs more heavily on job 
satisfaction that the expected situation in the more distant future. This result stands 
even when we estimate all the separate ordered probits that do not include the answers 
to both questions at the same time . Overall, it would seem that the coefficients on the 
answers to the questions about future fmanciaI expectation are consistent with the 
LGM model - that is, if you expect to be better off in the future than you are now, 
then you are more satisfied. However, given the reservations that we expressed earlier 
about what the answers to these questions actuallY mean (in the context of the variables 
in the LGM experienced preference model), we stop short of saying that the results 
provide definitive evidence that the model of job satisfaction as experienced preference is 
supported by the data on the job satisfaction of UK third level graduates. 
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Table 2.9 Coefficients on the earnings gaps from estimating the LGM model of 
job satisfaction as experienced preference (equation 15), 2-perlod model 
Ordered probit: dependent Cohort 
variable job satisfaction [1,6] 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male, 1990 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1991) 0.0047 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0071 
(1.11 ) (0.09) (0.08) (1.96)* 
Estimated eamings gap (t=1996) 0.0061 0.0115 0.0099 0.0114 
(1.54) (3.80)** (2.39)* (3.85)** 
"Looking ahead, how do you think 
you will be financiallY a year from a 
year from now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.3801 -0.7274 -0.5850 -0.8239 
(3.37)** (6.59)** (6.46)** (8.26)** 
About the same -0.1440 -0.2518 -0.2836 -0.1929 
(2.10)* (4.46)** (5.82)** (3.92)** 
Don't know -0.3986 -0.7428 -0.4042 -0.4430 
(2.18)* (4.61)** (3.01 )** (2.76)** 
"Looking ahead, how doyou think 
you will be financiallY a year from five 
yearsfrom now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.4151 -0.6478 -0.3088 -0.4184 
(4.20)** (6.45)** (3.94)** (4.33)** 
About the same -0.1002 -0.0643 -0.1215 -0.1688 
(1.25) (0.90) (1.91)+ (2.13)* 
Don't know -0.2741 -0.2550 -0.1585 -0.3743 
(3.33)'* (3.09)** (2.37)* . (5.18)** 
Observations 1462 1999 2466 2586 
Log likelihood -2200.67 -2842.43 -3732.64 -3745.49 
Chi2 156.29 343.14 213.40 300.67 
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 % 
Table 2.10 Coefficients on the eamings gaps from estimating the LGM model of 
Job satisfaction as experienced preference (equation (15» - 3-period 
model 
Ordered probit: dependent variable job satisfaction 
[1,6] 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1986) 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1991) 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1996) 
"Looking ab.ad, how do JO" Ibink JO" wiD be jinan<ia/fy a ytar fro", a 
year fro", now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now 
About the same 
Don't know 
"Looking abead, bow do.yo" I"ink JO" wiD be jinantia/fy a year fro", 
jil,yearJ jro", now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now 
About the same 
Don't know 
Observations 
Log likelihood 
Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%;· significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Female, 1985 
0.0070 
(0.97) 
0.0029 
(0.49) 
0.0058 
(1.26) 
-0.4729 
(3.77)** 
-0.1372 
(1.78)+ 
-0.4149 
(2.14)* 
-0.4403 
(4.11r 
-0.0929 
(1.03) 
-0.2522 
(2.72)** 
1168 
-1768.80 
140.32 
0.04 
Cohort 
Male, 1985 
0.0017 
(0.29) 
-0.0013 
(0.34) 
0.0097 
(2.99)** 
-0.7516 
(6.29)** 
-0.2899 
(4.74)** 
-0.8217 
(4.63)** 
-0.5793 
(5.40)-
-0.0187 
(0.24) 
-0.2183 
(2.44)* 
1711 
-2431.06 
278.91 
0.05 
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2.6. Conclusion 
This paper makes two important contributions to the econOmlCS literature on the 
economics of job satisfaction. Firstly, the empirical evidence presented in the paper 
indicates that earnings have a significant positive effect on individuals' self reported job 
satisfaction. We show that when the endogeneity of earnings in the job satisfaction 
equation is controlled for, the effect of own earnings increases significantly. For some 
groups, the marginal effect of earnings on job satisfaction more than doubled when we 
included an IV estimate of own earnings in the job satisfaction regression. The fact 
that earnings are endogenous in the job satisfaction equation may go some way towards 
explaining why the previous studies in this area provide mixed results for the 
relationship between the two variables. One fruitful avenue for future research in this 
area might be to try and determine exactly why the endogeneity problem should lead to 
a negative bias (apart from the fact that earnings may be measured with error). 
Even though this is one of few the results in the literature to show such a persistent 
significant positive correlation between own earnings and job satisfaction, the effects 
we found were relatively small. This implies that there is a range of factors over and 
above earnings, both individual and job-related characteristics, which also determine 
self-reported job satisfaction. We include several such characteristics in the job 
satisfaction equations we estimate and the results we find are almost entirely consistent 
with those found elsewhere in the literature. 
The second contribution of this paper to the literature is that it provides formal tests of 
the model of job satisfaction as experienced preference as developed in Levy-Garboua 
and Montmarquette (2004). The experienced preference interpretation of self-reported 
job satisfaction is appealing in that it is consistent with standard economic theories of 
utility maximising behaviour as well as reference dependent behaviour. Furthermore, 
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the predictions of the model are intuitive and consistent with the observed patterns of 
job satisfaction across individuals with different characteristics. The evidence we 
presented is supportive of the model of job satisfaction as experienced preference, 
although the results are by no means definitive. The empirical tests of the experienced 
preference framework would be significantly improved if we able to include reliable 
data on expectations of future earnings and earnings gaps. It is not at all obvious how 
this could be achieved - however, if the experience preference framework is to be 
seriously as an economic model of job satisfaction, and then we would see this as the key 
weakness that needs to be addressed in any future empirical work. 
61 
Appendix - Summary statistics, and results from the probit estimation 
Table A2.11 Full results from estimating the basic model (equation (12» 
Order probit dependent 
variable: Job Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male 1990 
satisfaction [1,6] 
Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV 
Earnings 1996 ('000) 0.0057 0.0088 0.0072 0.0111 
(1.83)+ (4.09)** (2.38)* (4.83)** 
Earnings 1996 ('000) - 0.014 0.0128 0.0243 0.0159 instrumented 
(2.31) (2.97) (3.50) (3.00) 
1985/1990 qualification: Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Sub degree 
1985/1990 qualification: 
-0.1837 0.1662 0.0376 0.0527 1st Degree 
(1.29) (1.57) (0.52) (0.84) 
1985/1990 qualification: 
-0.2188 0.1518 0.0378 0.0763 Postgraduate 
(1.37) (1.18) (0.43) (0.87) 
1985/1990 qualification: 
-0.0558 0.0967 -0.0226 0.0261 Open University 
(0.36) (0.80) (0.24) (0.31 ) 
Married/Partner 0.1283 0.2028 -0.0150 -0.0539 
(1.93)+ (3.28)** (0.33) (1.15) 
Number of children 0.0570 -0.0103 0.0855 0.0336 
(1.52) (0.41) (2.38)* (1.21) 
Work limiting disability -0.1320 -0.0458 -0.2251 -0.1212 
(0.88) (0.36) (1.88)+ (1.03) 
First class degree, or 0.1257 0.1176 0.1698 0.0956 distinction 
(1.07) (1.21) (2.15)* (1.29) 
Currently have a PhD 0.1982 -0.0046 0.0834 -0.1715 
(1.16) (0.04) (0.51) (1.23) 
Currently have a masters -0.0692 -0.0720 0.0653 -0.0536 
(0.91) (1.11 ) (0.98) (0.85) 
Currently have a prof. 0.0108 -0.1873 -0.0218 0.0001 qual. 
(0.18) (3.61)** (0.45) (0.00) 
Qualification from 
1985/1990 is ajob 0.1198 0.0864 0.2125 0.2157 
requirement (current job) 
(1.95)+ (1.72)+ (4.46)** (4.88)** 
Self employed 0.3434 0.2353 0.2174 0.2078 
(2.73)** (2.50)* (1.98)* (2.18)* 
Hours of work 
-0.0071 0.0074 -0.0048 0.0013 
(2.68)** (2.92)- (2.35)* (0.65) 
Job tenure>4 years 0.0341 0.1475 -0.0164 -0.0399 
(0.38) (1.75)+ (0.27) (0.65) 
Firm size: <=25 
Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted employees 
62 
Order probit dependent 
variable: Job Female, 1985 Male,1985 Female, 1990 Male 1990 
satisfaction [1,6] 
Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV 
Firm size: 25 - 99 
-0.0039 -0.1404 -0.0935 -0.1984 employees 
(0.04) (1.58) (1.41 ) (2.49)* 
Firm size: 100 - 499 
-0.1235 -0.2085 -0.1887 -0.1374 
employees 
(1.26) (2.38)* (2.67)- (1.75)+ 
Firm size: 500+ 
-0.0081 -0.0982 -0.1584 -0.1346 
employees 
(0.09) (1.18) (2.45)* (1.83)+ 
Member of company 
-0.2315 -0.0042 0.1292 -0.0366 pension scheme 
(3.06)- (0.06) (2.39)* (0.67) 
Company health scheme -0.0431 0.0170 0.0523 0.1189 
(0.49) (0.27) (0.76) (2.26)* 
Company car scheme 0.2645 0.0032 0.1004 0.0460 
(2.85)- (0.05) (1.27) (0.81) 
Company profit share 
-0.0123 -0.0358 -0.0543 0.0510 
scheme 
(0.14) (0.58) (0.75) (0.98) 
Member of trade union 0.0362 -0.0981 -0.1101 -0.1405 
(0.53) (1.55) (2.13)* (2.58)-
Work in the public sector -0.1335 -0.1311 0.0231 0.1040 
(1.66)+ (1.92)+ (0.38) (1.83)+ 
Continuous unempl spell 
>=12 months in last 5/10 0.0693 -0.2281 -0.0441 0.0565 
years 
(0.52) (1.99)* (0.37) (0.52) 
Months employed since 0.0022 0.0018 0.0046 0.0005 first qualification 
(1.52) (1.14) (3.43)" (0.40) 
Squared -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.84) (1.04) (3.27)** (0.37) 
Observations 1462 1999 2466 2586 
Log likelihood -2229.28 -2936.04 -3790.40 -3832.94 
Chi2 99.08 155.92 97.88 125.76 
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
+ Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%;" significant at 1% 
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Table A2.12 Full results from estimating the LGM model of job satisfaction as 
experience preference (equation (15» - 2-period model 
Ordered probit: dependent Cohort 
variable job satisfaction [1,6] 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male, 1990 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1991) 0.0047 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0071 
(1.11 ) (0.09) (0.08) (1.96)* 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1996) 0.0061 0.0115 0.0099 0.0114 
(1.54) (3.80)** (2.39)* (3.85)** 
"Looking ahead, how do you think 
you will be financiallY a year from a 
year from now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.3801 -0.7274 -0.5850 -0.8239 
(3.37)** (6.59)** (6.46)** (8.26)** 
About the same -0.1440 -0.2518 -0.2836 -0.1929 
(2.10)* (4.46)** (5.82)** (3.92)** 
Don't know -0.3986 -0.7428 -0.4042 -0.4430 
(2.18)* (4.61)** (3.01 )** (2.76)** 
"Looking ahead, how do you think 
you will be financiallY a year from five 
years from now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.4151 -0.6478 -0.3088 -0.4184 
(4.20)** (6.45)** (3.94)** (4.33)** 
About the same -0.1002 -0.0643 -0.1215 -0.1688 
(1.25) (0.90) (1.91)+ (2.13)* 
Don't know -0.2741 -0.2550 -0.1585 -0.3743 
(3.33)** (3.09)** (2.37)* (5.18)** 
1985/1990 qualification: Sub Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted degree 
1985/1990 qualification: 1 st 
-0.1661 0.1736 0.0384 0.0297 Degree 
(1.16) (1.64) (0.54) (0.47) 
1985/1990 qualification: 
-0.1738 0.2013 0.0710 0.1466 Postgraduate 
(1.08) (1.56) (0.81) (1.67)+ 
1985/1990 qualification: Open 0.0305 0.2705 0.0528 0.1892 University 
(0.19) (2.20)* (0.56) (2.19)* 
Married/Partner 0.1413 0.2193 0.0090 -0.0513 
(2.11)* (3.52)** (0.19) (1.09) 
Number of children 0.0373 -0.0099 0.1005 0.0373 
(0.98) (0.39) (2.77)** (1.34) 
Work limiting disability 
-0.1050 0.0653 -0.1469 -0.1199 
(0.70) (0.51) (1.22) (1.02) 
First class degree, or distinction 0.1542 0.1698 0.1761 0.0967 
64 
Ordered probit: dependent Cohort 
variable job satisfaction [1,6) 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male, 1990 
(1.30) (1.74)+ (2.23)* (1.30) 
Currently have a PhD 0.1820 -0.0205 0.0713 -0.1533 
(1.06) (0.18) (0.43) (1.09) 
Currently have a masters -0.0470 -0.0554 0.0843 -0.0235 
(0.62) (0.85) (1.27) (0.37) 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 Female, 1990 Male, 1990 
Currently have a prof. qual. 0.0354 -0.1491 -0.0051 0.0276 
(0.60) (2.89)·· (0.11 ) (0.58) 
Qualification from 1985/1990 is a 0.1119 0.0667 0.1629 0.1715 job requirement (currently) 
(1.82)+ (1.32) (3.40)·* (3.84)*· 
Self employed 0.3863 0.3070 0.2670 0.2404 
(3.05)·· (3.25)·· (2.42)· (2.52)* 
Hours of work -0.0075 0.0072 -0.0045 0.0001 
(2.80)·· (2.83)** (2.22)* (0.07) 
Job tenure>4 years 0.0195 0.1403 -0.0308 -0.0781 
(0.22) (1.66)+ (0.51) (1.26) 
Firm size: <=25 employees Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Firm size: 25 - 99 employees 0.0021 -0.1406 -0.1219 -0.2060 
(0.02) (1.57) (1.84)+ (2.58)·· 
Firm size: 100 - 499 employees -0.1156 -0.1907 -0.1958 -0.1266 
(1.17) (2.16)· (2.76)·· (1.61) 
Firm size: 500+ employees 0.0082 -0.1221 -0.1791 -0.1574 
(0.09) (1.46) (2.76)*· (2.14)· 
Member of company pension 
-0.2420 0.0046 0.1107 -0.0295 
scheme 
(3.19)*· (0.07) (2.04)· (0.54) 
Member of company health 
-0.0434 -0.0051 -0.0005 0.0938 
scheme 
(0.49) (0.08) (0.01) (1.78)+ 
Member of company car scheme 0.2225 -0.0349 0.0788 0.0314 
(2.39)· (0.54) (0.99) (0.55) 
Company profit share scheme -0.0305 -0.0808 -0.0689 0.0381 
(0.33) (1.29) (0.96) (0.73) 
Member of trade union 0.0709 -0.0630 -0.0752 -0.0790 
(1.03) (0.98) (1.44) (1.44) 
Work in the public sector -0.0939 -0.0846 0.0690 0.1479 
(1.16) (1.23) (1.12) (2.58)*· 
Continuous unempl spell >=12 0.1153 -0.1364 -0.0575 0.1009 months in last 5/10 years 
(0.86) (1.18) (0.48) (0.92) 
Months employed since first 0.0029 0.0027 0.0049 0.0007 qualification 
(2.02)· (1.64) (3.69)·· (0.50) 
Months employed squared 
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(1.33) (1.65)+ (3.57)·· (0.52) 
Observations 1462 1999 2466 2586 
Log likelihood 
-2200.67 -2842.43 -3732.64 -3745.49 
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Ordered probit: dependent 
variable job satisfaction [1,6) Cohort 
Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
Female, 1985 
156.29 
0.03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Male, 1985 
343.14 
0.06 
+ significant at 10%; • significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 % 
Female,1990 Male,1990 
213.40 300.67 
0.03 0.04 
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Table A2.13 Full results from estimating the LGM model of job satisfaction as 
experience preference (equation (15» - 3-period model 
Ordered probit: dependent variable Job Cohort 
satisfaction [1,6] 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1986) 0.0070 0.0017 
(0.97) (0.29) 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1991) 0.0029 -0.0013 
(0.49) (0.34) 
Estimated earnings gap (t=1996) 0.0058 0.0097 
(1.26) (2.99)** 
"uoking ahead, how do YOII think YOII wiD be 
financiallY ayear from ayear from now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.4729 -0.7516 
(3.77)** (6.29)*· 
About the same -0.1372 -0.2899 
(1.78)+ (4.74)*· 
Don't know -0.4149 -0.8217 
(2.14)· (4.63)** 
"uoking ahead, how do YOIl thinkyoll wiD be 
financiallY a year from five years from now?'. 
Better off than now 
Worse off than now -0.4403 -0.5793 
(4.11)** (5.40)** 
About the same -0.0929 -0.0187 
(1.03) (0.24) 
Don't know -0.2522 -0.2183 
(2.72)** (2.44)* 
1985/1990 qualification: Sub degree 
1985/1990 qualification: 1st Degree -0.1084 0.2407 
(0.73) (2.19)* 
1985/1990 qualification: Postgraduate -0.1240 0.2604 
(0.73) (1.92)+ 
1985/1990 qualification: Open University 0.0936 0.2862 
(0.56) (2.23)* 
Married/Partner 0.1121 0.2432 
(1.50) (3.54)** 
Number of children 0.0290 -0.0005 
(0.68) (0.02) 
Work limiting disability -0.0919 0.0378 
(0.56) (0.28) 
First class degree, or distinction 0.1209 0.1216 
(0.88) (1.12) 
Currently have a PhD 0.1350 -0.1139 
(0.62) (0.78) 
Ordered probit: dependent variable Job 
satisfaction [1,6J Cohort 
Female, 1985 Male, 1985 
Currently have a masters 
Currently have a masters 
Currently have a prof. qual. 
Qualification from 1985/1990 is a job 
requirement (current job) 
Self employed 
Hours of work 
Job tenure>4 years 
Firm size: <=25 employees 
Firm size: 25 - 99 employees 
Firm size: 100 - 499 employees 
Firm size: 500+ employees 
Member of company pension scheme 
Member of company health scheme 
Member of company car scheme 
Member of company profit share scheme 
Member of trade union 
Work in the public sector 
Continuous unempl spell >=12 months in last 
5/10 years 
Months employed since first qualification 
Months employed squared 
Observations 
Log likelihood 
Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
-0.0369 
(0.41 ) 
-0.0369 
(0.41 ) 
0.0751 
(1.15) 
0.1061 
(1.56) 
0.4076 
(2.83)** 
-0.0085 
(2.81)** 
0.0124 
(0.12) 
Omitted 
-0.0700 
(0.70) 
-0.1409 
(1.28) 
-0.0033 
(0.03) 
-0.2891 
(3.30)** 
0.0320 
(0.33) 
0.2160 
(2.07)* 
-0.0543 
(0.53) 
0.0954 
(1.25) 
-0.0865 
(0.95) 
0.1013 
(0.47) 
0.0032 
(1.84)+ 
-0.0000 
(1.33) 
1168 
-1768.80 
140.32 
0.04 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; *. significant at 1% 
-0.0185 
(0.26) 
-0.0185 
(0.26) 
-0.1649 
(2.94)** 
0.0454 
(0.83) 
0.3075 
(2.97)** 
0.0068 
(2.49)* 
0.0898 
(0.95) 
Omitted 
-0.0495 
(0.51) 
-0.1140 
(1.18) 
-0.0402 
(0.44) 
-0.0962 
(1.32) 
-0.0179 
(0.27) 
-0.0380 
(0.55) 
-0.0606 
(0.91) 
-0.0655 
(0.94) 
-0.0886 
(1.17) 
-0.0216 
(0.14) 
0.0032 
(1.66)+ 
-0.0000 
(1.66)+ 
1711 
-2431.06 
278.91 
0.05 
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Table A2.14 Summary Statistics, Female Graduates 1985 
Female, 1985 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Sub degree, OU 
Personal characteristics Average Std. Err. Obs Average Std. Err. Obs 
Age 34.66 0.16 1167 45.65 0.46 285 
Married 57.53% 1.44% 1175 66.90% 2.78% 287 
Partner 14.47% 1.03% 1175 9.41% 1.73% 287 
Separated 4.94% 0.63% 1175 9.41% 1.73% 287 
Single 22.89% 1.23% 1175 14.29% 2.07% 287 
Number of children 1.54 3.20% 413 1.53 8.52% 73 
Current qualifications 
PhD 3.32% 0.52% 1175 0.70% 0.49% 287 
Masters 19.23% 1.15% 1175 11.50% 1.89% 287 
Degree 91.57% 0.81% 1175 81.53% 2.29% 287 
Professional 31.57% 1.36% 1175 41.46% 2.91% 287 
PGCE 18.04% 1.12% 1175 10.45% 1.81% 287 
PGDIP 15.74% 1.06% 1175 14.29% 2.07% 287 
Other qual 17.87% 1.12% 1175 41.81% 2.92% 287 
1990/1990 qualification 
length initial study (years) 3.20 0.03 1169 4.50 0.09 284 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 69.28% 1.35% 1175 36.93% 2.85% 287 in job specification (1996)? 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 68.62% 1.36% 1163 33.80% 2.81% 284 in job specification (1991)? 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 33.60% 2.11% 500 35.77% 4.34% 123 in job specification (1986)1 
Would do the same course 44.62% 1.45% 1172 52.96% 2.95% 287 
again 
Would do slightly different 29.52% 1.33% 
course 
1172 34.84% 2.82% 287 
Would do very different 
course 
25.09% 1.27% 1172 11.15% 1.86% 287 
Would not do a degree 0.43% 0.19% 1172 0.35% 0.35% 287 
Would not do a diploma 0.34% 0.17% 1172 0.70% 0.49% 287 
Employment history 122.94 1.58 1175 123.75 2.76 287 
Months employed since 
graduating (1990) 
Continuous spell of unempl.t 4.43% 0.60% 1175 5.57% 1.36% 287 for >=12 months 
Earnings 1991 £17,041.28 £208.77 1175 £16,114. £470.77 287 98 
Earnings 1986 £8,756.55 £160.61 916 £11,533. £404.98 252 73 
Did not work between 
73.25% 1.29% 1170 13.29% 2.01% 286 leaving school & 3rd level 
Worked for less than a year 10.17% 0.88% 1170 1.40% 0.70% 286 
Worked for 1-2 years 4.70% 0.62% 1170 4.20% 1.19% 286 
Worked for >2 years 11.88% 0.95% 1170 81.12% 2.32% 286 
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Female, 1985 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Sub degree, OU 
Current Job 
Earnings 1996 24108.09 333.87 1175 20668.99 594.82 287 
Weekly hours of work 1996 39.35 0.35 1175 39.00 0.77 287 
Job satisfaction 4.16 0.04 1175 4.20 0.07 287 
Member of a trade union 43.83% 1.45% 1175 57.14% 2.93% 287 
Work in the public sector 52.60% 1.46% 1175 72.82% 2.63% 287 
Less than 3 months 3.57% 0.54% 1175 2.09% 0.85% 287 
3-12 months 6.98% 0.74% 1175 3.83% 1.14% 287 
1-2 years 12.77% 0.97% 1175 8.36% 1.64% 287 
3-4 years 11.32% 0.92% 1175 7.67% 1.57% 287 
>4 years 65.02% 1.39% 1175 77.35% 2.47% 287 
Are you a member of profit 17.62% 1.11% 1175 7.67% 1.57% 287 
sharing scheme at work? 
Are you a member of a 
company car scheme at 16.17% 1.07% 1175 8.01% 1.61% 287 
work? 
Are you a member of the 74.47% 1.27% 1175 78.40% 2.43% 287 
work pension scheme? 
Are you a member of the 21.02% 1.19% 1175 10.80% 1.84% 287 company health scheme? 
Future financial expectations 
- 1 year ahead 
Better off 35.73% 1.40% 1170 24.56% 2.55% 285 
Worse off 8.80% 0.83% 1170 9.82% 1.77% 285 
About the same 52.48% 1.46% 1170 63.16% 2.86% 285 
Don't know 2.99% 0.50% 1170 2.46% 0.92% 285 
Future financial expectations 
- 5 years ahead 
Better off 53.62% 1.46% 1173 30.28% 2.73% 284 
Worse off 9.80% 0.87% 1173 19.37% 2.35% 284 
About the same 18.24% 1.13% 1173 30.99% 2.75% 284 
Don't know 18.33% 1.13% 1173 19.37% 2.35% 284 
Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996 
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Table A2.15 Summary Statistics, Male Graduates 1985 
Male, 1985 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Sub degree, OU 
Personal characteristics Average Std. Err. Obs Average Std. Err. Obs 
Age 34.60 0.12 1614 44.57 0.44 380 
Married 64.83% 1.19% 1618 74.80% 2.23% 381 
Partner 11.37% 0.79% 1618 7.87% 1.38% 381 
Separated 2.72% 0.40% 1618 4.46% 1.06% 381 
Single 20.52% 1.00% 1618 12.60% 1.70% 381 
Number of children 1.78 2.67% 770 1.85 6.67% 158 
Current qualifications 
PhD 5.93% 0.59% 1618 1.57% 0.64% 381 
Masters 21.94% 1.03% 1618 14.44% 1.80% 381 
Degree 91.16% 0.71% 1618 72.70% 2.29% 381 
Professional 32.01% 1.16% 1618 28.87% 2.32% 381 
PGCE 8.90% 0.71% 1618 8.66% 1.44% 381 
PGDIP 12.73% 0.83% 1618 11.55% 1.64% 381 
Other qual 10.07% 0.75% 1618 54.33% 2.56% 381 
1990/1990 qualification 
Length initial study (years) 3.10 0.02 1610 4.31 0.08 377 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 64.59% 1.19% 1618 38.58% 2.50% 381 
specification (1996)1 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 67.31% 1.17% 1600 35.36% 2.46% 379 
specification (1991)1 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 37.06% 1.72% 788 38.51% 3.85% 161 
specification (1986)1 
Would do the same 42.35% 1.23% 1615 44.97% 2.56% 378 
course again 
Would do slightly different 32.32% 1.16% 1615 39.95% 2.52% 378 
course 
Would do very different 
course 
23.90% 1.06% 1615 11.90% 1.67% 378 
Would not do a degree 1.24% 0.28% 1615 1.59% 0.64% 378 
Would not do a diploma 0.19% 0.11% 1615 1.59% 0.64% 378 
Employment history 123.76 0.92 1618 132.35 3.14 381 
Months employed since 
graduating (1990) 
Continuous spell of 5.19% 0.55% 1618 2.62% 0.82% 381 unempl.l for >:12 months 
Eamings 1991 £20,218.79 £213.32 1618 £20,885.83 £499.20 381 
Eamings 1986 £9,786.56 £143.07 1347 £15,027.47 £452.02 364 
Did not work between 66.46% 1.18% 1604 16.36% 1.90% 379 leaving school & 3rd level 
Worked for less than a 15.15% 0.90% 1604 4.75% 1.09% 379 year 
Worked for 1-2 years 4.74% 0.53% 1604 4.75% 1.09% 379 
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Male, 1985 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Sub degree, OU 
Worked for >2 years 13.65% 0.86% 1604 74.14% 2.25% 379 
Current Job 
Eamings 1996 32303.1 341.92 1618 27166.6 599.92 381 
Weekly hours of work 45.59 0.25 1618 44.43 0.54 381 1996 
Job satisfaction 4.24 0.03 1618 4.02 0.07 381 
Member of a trade union 25.90% 1.09% 1618 45.14% 2.55% 381 
Work in the public sector 30.84% 1.15% 1618 45.67% 2.56% 381 
Less than 3 months 3.34% 0.45% 1618 1.57% 0.64% 381 
3-12 months 7.54% 0.66% 1618 3.41% 0.93% 381 
1-2 years 13.91% 0.86% 1618 5.25% 1.14% 381 
3-4 years 9.83% 0.74% 1618 5.25% 1.14% 381 
>4 years 64.96% 1.19% 1618 83.46% 1.91% 381 
Are you a member of 
profit sharing scheme at 29.98% 1.14% 1618 20.73% 2.08% 381 
work? 
Are you a member of a 
company car scheme at 30.53% 1.15% 1618 19.95% 2.05% 381 
work? 
Are you a member of the 75.65% 1.07% 1618 81.89% 1.98% 381 
work pension scheme? 
Are you a member of the 36.59% 1.20% 1618 24.93% 2.22% 381 
company health scheme? 
Future financial 
expectations· 1 year 
ahead 
Betleroff 46.12% 1.24% 1611 32.98% 2.42% 379 
Worse off 6.33% 0.61% 1611 8.97% 1.47% 379 
About the same 44.63% 1.24% 1611 56.20% 2.55% 379 
Don't know 2.92% 0.42% 1611 1.85% 0.69% 379 
Future financial 
expectations· 5 years 
ahead 
Betleroff 67.78% 1.16% 1614 44.41% 2.57% 376 
Worse off 6.07% 0.59% 1614 19.41% 2.04% 376 
About the same 15.24% 0.89% 1614 19.95% 2.06% 376 
Don't know 10.90% 0.78% 1614 16.22% 1.90% 376 
Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996 
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Table A2.16 Summary Statistics, Female Graduates 1990 
Female, 1990 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Subdegree, OU 
Personal characteristics Average Std. Err. Obs Average Std. Err. Obs 
Age 31.38 0.16 1931 40.19 0.45 519 
Married 41.42% 1.12% 1941 55.43% 2.17% 525 
Partner 23.49% 0.96% 1941 14.86% 1.55% 525 
Separated 3.86% 0.44% 1941 10.86% 1.36% 525 
Single 30.96% 1.05% 1941 18.67% 1.70% 525 
Number of children 1.44 3.73% 308 1.52 6.04% 129 
Current qualifications 
PhD 2.01% 0.32% 1941 0.76% 0.38% 525 
Masters 14.68% 0.80% 1941 5.71% 1.01% 525 
Degree 90.57% 0.66% 1941 53.33% 2.18% 525 
Professional 26.69% 1.00% 1941 39.81% 2.14% 525 
PGCE 13.96% 0.79% 1941 5.71% 1.01% 525 
PGDIP 16.33% 0.84% 1941 11.62% 1.40% 525 
Other qual 20.20% 0.91% 1941 49.33% 2.18% 525 
1990/1990 qualification 
length initial study (years) 3.19 0.02 1929 3.69 0.08 521 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 70.48% 1.04% 1941 41.52% 2.15% 525 in job specification (1996)? 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 64.18% 1.10% 1904 34.50% 2.09% 516 in job specification (1991)? 
Was 1990 qual. requirement 37.88% 1.66% 858 38.53% 3.30% 218 in job specification (1986)? 
Would do the same course 49.46% 1.14% 1933 56.32% 2.17% 522 again 
Would do slightly different 30.68% 1.05% 
course 
1933 31.03% 2.03% 522 
Would do very different 
course 
18.83% 0.89% 1933 9.96% 1.31% 522 
Would not do a degree 0.62% 0.18% 1933 0.57% 0.33% 522 
Would not do a diploma 0.41% 0.15% 1933 2.11% 0.63% 522 
Employment history 88.40 2.69 1941 100.72 6.14 525 
Months employed since 
graduating (1990) 
Continuous spell of unempl,t 2.99% 0.39% 1941 4.19% 0.88% 525 for >=12 months 
Eamings 1991 £12,393.61 £127.95 1941 £12,707.62 £281.38 525 
Eamings 1986 £9,783.49 £338.06 418 £9,916.93 £333.09 319 
Did not work between 62.38% 1.10% 1930 19.35% 1.73% 522 leaving school & 3rd level 
Worked for less than a year 11.09% 0.71% 1930 4.02% 0.86% 522 
Worked for 1-2 years 5.54% 0.52% 1930 6.32% 1.07% 522 
Worked for >2 years 20.98% 0.93% 1930 70.31% 2.00% 522 
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Female, 1990 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Subdegree, au 
Current Job 
Earnings 1996 20436.6 190.98 1941 17922.8 329.81 525 
Weekly hours of work 1996 41.76 0.25 1941 38.18 0.54 525 
Job satisfaction 4.21 0.03 1941 4.09 0.05 525 
Member of a trade union 43.59% 1.13% 1941 47.81% 2.18% 525 
Work in the public sector 57.39% 1.12% 1941 63.81% 2.10% 525 
Less than 3 months 4.74% 0.48% 1941 3.05% 0.75% 525 
3-12 months 10.92% 0.71% 1941 5.33% 0.98% 525 
1-2 years 21.48% 0.93% 1941 12.95% 1.47% 525 
3-4 years 15.51% 0.82% 1941 9.71% 1.29% 525 
>4 years 46.57% 1.13% 1941 68.38% 2.03% 525 
Are you a member of profit 15.46% 0.82% 1941 11.62% 1.40% 525 
sharing scheme at work? 
Are you a member of a 
company car scheme at 9.22% 0.66% 1941 8.19% 1.20% 525 
work? 
Are you a member of the 73.00% 1.01% 1941 72.76% 1.94% 525 
work pension scheme? 
Are you a member of the 15.71% 0.83% 1941 12.95% 1.47% 525 
company health scheme? 
Future financial expectations 
• 1 year ahead 
Better off 45.05% 1.13% 1929 35.69% 2.09% 524 
Worse off 6.48% 0.56% 1929 8.59% 1.23% 524 
About the same 45.52% 1.13% 1929 52.10% 2.18% 524 
Don't know 2.95% 0.39% 1929 3.63% 0.82% 524 
Future financial expectations 
• 5 years ahead 
Better off 61.79% 1.11% 1934 52.68% 2.19% 522 
Worse off 8.48% 0.63% 1934 12.84% 1.47% 522 
About the same 15.15% 0.82% 1934 18.58% 1.70% 522 
Don't know 14.58% 0.80% 1934 15.90% 1.60% 522 
Source: The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996 
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Table A2.17 Summary Statistics, Male Graduates 1990 
Male, 1990 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Subdegree, OU 
Personal Average Std. Err. Obs Average Std. Err. Obs characteristics 
Age 30.90 0.14 1878 38.17 0.37 695 
Married 42.60% 1.14% 1885 63.48% 1.82% 701 
Partner 19.10% 0.91% 1885 12.55% 1.25% 701 
Separated 1.86% 0.31% 1885 4.14% 0.75% 701 
Single 36.07% 1.11% 1885 19.69% 1.50% 701 
Number of children 1.58 3.40% 413 1.76 4.75% 257 
Current qualifications 
PhD 2.76% 0.38% 1885 1.28% 0.43% 701 
Masters 19.42% 0.91% 1885 5.71% 0.88% 701 
Degree 91.30% 0.65% 1885 52.92% 1.89% 701 
Professional 27.37% 1.03% 1885 25.39% 1.65% 701 
PGCE 5.99% 0.55% 1885 4.42% 0.78% 701 
PGDIP 11.46% 0.73% 1885 8.70% 1.07% 701 
Other qual 17.82% 0.88% 1885 69.19% 1.75% 701 
1990/1990 
qualification 
Length initial study 3.27 0.02 1880 3.81 0.07 700 (years) 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 66.10% 1.09% 1885 42.94% 1.87% 701 
specification (1996)? 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 66.29% 1.10% 1842 36.68% 1.84% 687 
specification (1991)? 
Was 1990 qual. 
requirement in job 46.99% 1.67°,4 896 34.87% 2.56% 347 
specification (1986)? 
Would do the same 47.82% 1.15% 1878 46.78% 1.89% 699 
course again 
Would do slightly 31.52% 1.07% 1878 36.62% 1.82% 699 different course 
Would do very 19.49% 0.91% 1878 12.73% 1.26% 699 different course 
Would not do a 0.96% 0.22% 1878 0.86% 0.35% 699 degree 
Would not do a 0.21% 0.11% 1878 3.00% 0.65% 699 diploma 
Employment history 93.43 2.91 1885 94.23 4.71 701 
Months employed 
since graduating 
(1990) 
Continuous spell of 
unempl.t for >=12 3.77% 0.44% 1885 3.57% 0.70% 701 
months 
Earnings 1991 £13,863.93 £138.41 1885 £17,168.33 £339.14 701 
Earnings 1986 £10,840.57 £299.76 530 £13,458.96 £331.44 536 
Did not work between 
56.34% 1.14% 1878 14.57% 1.33% 700 leaving school & 3rd 
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Male, 1990 graduates 
Degree (UG, PG) Subdegree, OU 
level 
Worked for less than 
a year 13.90% 0.80% 1878 7.86% 1.02% 700 
Worked for 1-2 years 7.14% 0.59% 1878 7.14% 0.97% 700 
Worked for >2 years 22.63% 0.97% 1878 70.43% 1.73% 700 
Current Job 
Eamings 1996 24807.9 241.61 1885 24257.4 417.89 701 
Weekly hours of work 45.41 0.25 1885 44.38 0.39 701 1996 
Job satisfaction 4.21 0.03 1885 4.08 0.05 701 
Member of a trade 25.09% 1.00% 1885 38.52% 1.84% 701 
union 
Work in the public 31.46% 1.07% 1885 31.95% 1.76% 701 
sector 
Less than 3 months 4.99% 0.50% 1885 3.28% 0.67% 701 
3-12 months 11.35% 0.73% 1885 8.27% 1.04% 701 
1-2 years 18.36% 0.89% 1885 11.70% 1.21% 701 
3-4 years 14.48% 0.81% 1885 9.56% 1.11% 701 
>4 years 50.40% 1.15% 1885 66.90% 1.78% 701 
Are you a member of 
profit sharing scheme 28.54% 1.04% 1885 25.25% 1.64% 701 
at work? 
Are you a member of 
a company car 20.16% 0.92% 1885 18.83% 1.48% 701 
scheme at work? 
Are you a member of 
the work pension 73.47% 1.02% 1885 72.47% 1.69% 701 
scheme? 
Are you a member of 
the company health 30.13% 1.06% 1885 25.53% 1.65% 701 
scheme? 
Future financial 
expectations - 1 year 
ahead 
Belter off 58.99% 1.14% 1875 42.20% 1.87% 699 
Worse off 5.28% 0.52% 1875 7.44% 0.99% 699 
About the same 34.08% 1.09% 1875 47.78% 1.89% 699 
Don't know 1.65% 0.29% 1875 2.58% 0.60% 699 
Future financial 
expectations - 5 years 
ahead 
Belter off 78.12% 0.95% 1878 61.14% 1.84% 700 
Worse off 4.47% 0.48% 1878 10.86% 1.18% 700 
About the same 7.67% 0.61% 1878 12.71% 1.26% 700 
Don't know 9.74% 0.68% 1878 15.29% 1.36% 700 
SouI'CC':The Careers of Highly Qualified Workers, HEFCE 1996 
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Table A2.18 Reduced form earnings equation 
Female, Male, Female, Male, 
Earnings eguation ~OLS~ 1985 1985 1990 1990 
Occupation of main wage-earner aged 14 
Manager & administrator 
Professional & assoc. professional -0.3720 -0.1023 0.1208 -0.0487 
(0.50) (0.14) (0.28) (0.09) 
Clerical -1.7581 -1.7904 -0.8703 -0.2065 
(1.30) (1.46) (1.36) (0.23) 
Manufacturing -1.2185 0.0777 -0.0642 -0.9127 
(1.44) (0.09) (0.13) (1.65)+ 
Personal & protective -1.0877 -2.4620 0.9278 0.7953 
(0.82) (2.08)* (1.02) (0.78) 
Sales -1.1694 0.3558 0.1404 -0.4676 
(0.93) (0.30) (0.21) (0.54) 
Plant & machine operatives -0.7523 -0.8547 0.2656 -1.9321 
(0.74) (1.65)+ (0.43) (3.07)** 
Qualification in 1985, 1990 
Diploma 
First degree 2.7095 4.0449 2.7444 2.0561 
(1.93)+ (3.10)** (4.50)** (2.98)** 
Postrgraduate degree 0.5977 1.4750 2.4033 2.6038 
(0.38) (0.96) (3.35)** (3.11)** 
Open university 0.4211 0.6440 1.6846 4.3806 
(0.28) (0.43) (2.18)* (4.67)** 
First class degree or distinction 1.9363 3.4892 1.6773 3.0154 
(1.55) (3.39)** (3.05)** (4.26)** 
Subject studied (1985/1990 qualification) 
Medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, etc 
Biological sciences -2.0785 -12.0484 -3.5052 -6.3220 
(1.63) (6.60)** (4.75)** (4.75)** 
Agriculture & related -2.9775 -12.3487 -3.2923 -8.7668 
(1.80)+ (4.41 )*. (3.01 )** (4.73)** 
Physical Sciences -0.9168 -10.7399 -1.7328 -4.6863 
(0.71) (6.30)** (2.30)* (4.04)** 
Mathematical Sciences 1.0175 -7.4934 0.2968 -1.9160 
(0.69) (4.42)** (0.33) (1.58) 
Engineering & Technology 1.7494 -8.3972 0.2229 -3.0668 
(0.67) (5.10)*· (0.25) (2.78)** 
Architecture & town planning 2.0725 -17.6406 -4.3386 -7.3742 
(0.40) (9.00)** (2.91)*· (6.52)** 
Social, Economic & Political 0.0763 -7.7189 -1.9678 -3.4113 
(0.06) (4.50)** (2.86)** (2.78)** 
Business & administrative 
-2.4118 -8.2190 -0.6835 -2.5954 
(2.01 )* (4.55)** (0.99) (2.23)* 
Languages 
-0.7926 -11.4592 -2.9660 -7.0135 
(0.61) (5.02)** (3.68)** (4.35)** 
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Female, Male, Female, Male, 
Earnings eguation ~OLSl 1985 1985 1990 1990 
Humanities -3.5250 -14.0166 -3.2972 -7.4145 
(2.66)** (7.61)** (4.38)"* (5.44)"* 
Education -0.3171 -12.2040 0.1725 -3.0917 
(0.25) (6.96)** (0.25) (2.25)* 
Current qualifications (1996) 
PhD 2.1544 -0.5848 3.0170 0.9535 
(1.50) (0.54) (2.18)* (0.63) 
Masters 0.9384 1.8704 1.7574 1.1933 
(1.12) (2.61 )** (3.12)** (1.98)* 
Degree -0.2147 0.5315 0.1582 0.2302 
(0.24) (0.59) (0.29) (0.35) 
Professional qualification 2.7641 3.8094 2.5566 3.0200 
(4.55)** (6.28)** (6.89)** (6.47)** 
Months employed since 1985/90 0.0426 0.1085 0.0303 0.0258 
(2.70)** (5.06)** (2.94)** (1.91)+ 
Months employed squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(3.16)** (4.89)** (2.83)** (1.85)+ 
Current job characteristics 
Job tenure <=1 year 
Job tenure 1-2 years 1.0619 0.1198 -0.6085 -0.5372 
(0.91) (0.10) (1.13) (0.80) 
Job tenure 3-4 years 1.0915 0.2528 -0.0241 0.4044 
(0.92) (0.19) (0.04) (0.52) 
Job tenure> 4 years 1.8055 -0.0576 1.1123 -0.1760 
(2.04)* (0.06) (2.23)* (0.30) 
Employees in firm <25 
Employees in firm 25 - 99 2.0852 3.6747 1.0851 1.7518 
(2.34)* (3.82)** (2.35)* (2.28)* 
Employees in firm 100 - 499 2.7778 4.6463 1.8571 2.4048 
(3.04)** (4.87)** (3.90)** (3.32)** 
Employees in firm >=500 4.2317 5.8537 2.9200 4.2580 
(4.99)** (6.35)** (6.43)** (5.85)** 
Self employed 3.3016 6.9484 2.0289 5.9687 
(1.97)* (5.41 )** (1.58) (4.88)** 
Occupation 
Manager & administrator 
Professional & assoc. professional -2.0464 -1.9559 -1.5611 -2.5181 
(2.68)** (3.09)** (3.35)** (4.72)** 
Clerical -11.2691 -13.1328 -7.5174 -10.2298 
(11.45)** (8.05)** (12.41)** (9.84)** 
Manufacturing -5.5600 -9.0321 -5.2144 -6.5317 
(2.04)* (2.88)** (5.48)** (6.45)** 
Personal & protective -9.5793 -5.8520 -4.7055 -5.7408 
(6.93)** (2.93)** (4.14)** (4.90)** 
Sales 
-5.2140 1.2710 -1.6681 -0.4263 
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Female, Male, Female, Male, 
Earnings eguation {OLS~ 1985 1985 1990 1990 
(3.54)** (0.60) (1.07) (0.32) 
Plant & machine operatives -10.4051 -11.0648 2.5446 -6.3395 
(2.83)** (6.68)** (0.61 ) (3.11)** 
Personal characteristics 
Married or partnered 0.2086 1.5968 -0.0130 2.0778 
(0.34) (2.37)* (0.04) (5.12)** 
Number of children -1.6656 1.2136 -1.2136 0.9053 
(4.55)** (4.43)** (4.64)** (3.70)** 
Region of work 
Tyne & Wear Metropolitan Districts 
Rest of Northern Region 0.2558 4.3381 0.2757 1.8451 
(0.15) (1.91)+ (0.28) (1.56) 
South Yorkshire Metropolitan Districts -0.8249 4.6726 0.9534 0.9421 
(0.38) (1.66)+ (0.68) (0.71) 
West Yorkshire Metropolitan Districts 1.4025 2.1023 0.5735 1.4140 
(0.77) (0.89) (0.59) (1.33) 
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside region -0.2929 1.6607 -1.2366 4.1014 
(0.14) (0.72) (1.05) (2.55)* 
East Midlands region 1.0073 2.7314 0.6022 0.9600 
(0.58) (1.25) (0.62) (0.98) 
East Anglia 0.5764 6.3588 3.6181 3.4373 
(0.30) (2.54)* (2.21)* (2.54)* 
Outer London 5.3060 8.1318 2.2422 4.0205 
(2.85)*- (3.62)** (2.28)* (3.56)** 
Inner London 11.2833 14.4243 6.1836 8.3161 
(6.38)*- (6.S8)** (6.35)** (7.62)** 
South East 2.9646 6.7955 1.6428 3.9730 
(1.89)+ (3.46)** (1.96)+ (4.59)** 
South West 0.5396 2.2249 -0.4262 0.8423 
(0.30) (1.07) (0.48) (0.90) 
West Midlands Metropolitan dsitricts 2.5224 4.2135 0.5548 2.2009 
(1.46) (1.96)* (0.61) (2.00)* 
Rest of West Midlands 1.2245 4.4816 0.6207 1.4224 
(0.67) (1.97)* (0.62) (1.39) 
Greater Manchester Metropolitan districts 0.5158 3.6092 0.1149 2.5498 
(0.26) (1.68)+ (0.12) (1.97)* 
Merseyside Metropolitan districts 1.2637 6.9307 0.2295 4.6876 
(0.51) (2.45)* (0.14) (2.32)* 
Rest of North West region 0.5453 3.6991 -0.3653 1.1868 
(0.29) (1.69)+ (0.38) (1.10) 
Wales 0.5770 0.7413 1.1314 -0.0854 
(0.30) (0.34) (0.86) (0.07) 
Central belt 2.5717 2.8855 0.7372 3.0233 
(1.41) (1.30) (0.64) (2.45)* 
Rest of Scotland 3.9888 3.9290 0.6954 4.3010 
(1.70)+ (1.71)+ (0.61 ) (3.40)** 
Northern Ireland 0.2003 0.2783 -2.3531 0.6198 
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Female, Male, Female, Male, 
Earnings eguation !OLSl 1985 1985 1990 1990 
(0.12) (0.13) (2.22)* (0.43) 
Outside UK 4.2816 15.2421 2.6185 11.1824 
(1.63) (6.30)*· (1.65)+ (7.37)*· 
Constant 13.2418 12.4716 14.2166 17.6168 
(4.42)** (3.24)·· (10.05)·* (9.44)*· 
Observations 1462 1999 2466 2586 
R-squared 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.27 
F-test 9.26 18.77 13.83 15.44 
Robust t statistics in parentheses, (**) significant at 1% level, (*) significant at 5% level, (+) 
significant at the 10% level. 
3. Cross Country Evidence on the Returns to 
Education: Patterns and Explanations 
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There are few if any models in labour economics that explicitly try to predict how the 
returns to schooling might vary with the characteristics of an economy. In this paper 
we analyse the detenninants of the private returns to education for a sample of forty-
five countries over a number of years. The measure of the private return to education 
used is the coefficient on schooling from a standard Mincerian regression framework. 
We consider two candidates as possible explanations for differences in the return that 
we observe between countries and over time. The first explanation relates the return to 
investing in education to the level of technology bias in the economy. The second 
explanation tests whether the complementarity between skills and capital equipment in 
production is associated with a higher return to education. Both explanations are 
closely related, in that one possible definition of capital equipment is, that it is capital 
used in production that has a strong technology component, such as computers for 
example. 
The first part of this paper presents the estimates of the return to education that we use 
in the empirical analysis. We are particularly interested in whether the stylised facts 
from the data set we construct are consistent with those noted elsewhere in the 
literature, such as Psacharopoulos (1994, 2002), Trostel (2002) and Ashenfelter ,1 01. 
(1999). The second part of the paper relates the private return to education to more 
commonly used measures of the skill premium found in the literature on changes in the 
wage structure over time. It is standard practice in this literature to define the level of 
labour skill on the basis of workers' education. For example, in much of the US 
literature that looks at the changes in the wage structure since the 1960s skilled labour is 
defined as requiring college completion or better (at least 16 years of schooling in the 
US); see Krusell,t 01. (2000) and Freeman and Katz (1995). 
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As in Acemoglu (2003), by implicitly identifying this measure of the skill premium with 
the r.1incerian return to education we are able to draw on models that explain patterns 
of skill premia over time and across countries. With regard to explaining the observed 
cross-country differences in the return to education, we test two hypotheses. Firstly, in 
those countries where there is a greater technolo!J bias in production, the return to 
education will also be higher (Acemoglu, 2003). Secondly, and related to the flrst 
hypothesis, countries with greater stocks of capital equipment, such as computers, will 
also have a higher return to education. The second hypothesis draws on the models 
developed initially by Griliches (1969), and subsequently the models of capital-skill 
complementarity developed in Krusell et aI., (2000) and Plug and Hercowitz (2000), 
among others. We are also interested in the effects of trade and globalisation on the 
return to education. The technology-bias and capital-skill complementarity models 
make some predictions about the effect of trade on the return to education. These trade 
effects differ from more traditional models of trade and the wage structure, such as 
those in Findlay and Kierkowski (1983) or Katz and Murphy (1992), in that trade does 
not directly affect the wage structure by changing the relative price of skill-intensive and 
labour-intensive goods. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: section 2 presents the data set we use in our 
analysis. Section 3 presents the stylised facts and compares them with those noted 
elsewhere in the literature. Section 4 presents the models that we use to explain the 
observed patterns in the return to education, and tests the theoretical predictions of 
these models using the sample of returns to education collected for this paper. Section 
5 summarises and concludes. 
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3.2. Data 
In this section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis in Section 3 and 
Section 4. We ftrst present the data we use as a dependent variable - the private return 
to education - and then describe the data we use as explanatory variables, i.e. stocks of 
education, capital equipment, etc. 
3.2.1. The private return to education 
The variable of interest in this paper is the private return to education as estimated by 
Mincer's empirical approximation of the human capital theoretical framework 
developed by Becker; Mincer (1974). Mincer showed that if the cost of attending school 
for an additional year was only the opportunity cost of the students' time, and if the 
proportional increase in earnings was constant over the lifetime, then the log earnings 
could be shown to be linearly related to an individual's years of schooling. In this paper 
we use the slope of this relationship as our measure of the private return to schooling. 
The measure of private return to education is obtained via least squares estimates of the 
following equation: 
(1) 
where log WI is the log of earnings for individual ;, and SI is a measure of their 
schooling, eXPI is a measure of experience and ul is a disturbance term
l9
• 
The return to education is measured by the parameter r in equation (1). The 
coefftcient on schooling is essentially the average individual discount rate for the 
population. This arises directly out of the Mincer model where schooling decisions are 
made by equating the net present values of the earnings streams of two different 
19 The inclusion of the quadratic in work experience was originally to aUow for returns to on-the-job training or 
other factors that accrue with work experience. See Hannon II al (2000) for a detailed review. 
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schooling choices. From the perspective of the current paper, where we wish to 
compare the returns to education across countries with different educational systems, 
this is a useful feature of Mincer's model, as it implies that it is time spent in school and 
not qualifications obtained that is the key determinant of earnings. Ease of estimation, 
due extensive improvements in data collection and computing power, has resulted in 
hundreds of estimates of the return to education for a large number of countries; see, 
for example, Psacharopoulos (1994, 2002) and Trostel et at. (2002). 
Critics of the l'Yfincerian approach argue that some caution must be taken in interpreting 
the education slope in equation (1) as a private return to education; see the review 
paper by Card (2001). Perhaps the most widely known criticism is the fact that 
unobserved measures of ability and other characteristics are likely to be correlated with 
education. This problem of omitted variable bias has resulted in a large number of 
instrumental variable estimates of the return to education, which in turn has led to 
further debate over instrument validity; Kling (2001). There are other problems with 
the Mincerian approach such as measurement error (from both the left and the right) 
and selection biases due to the fact that we only observe wages for those individuals in 
employment. Some researchers have also dismissed the idea of an educational 
production function, thereby removing the causal link in Mincer's approach, and 
instead claim that education is merely a signal of innate ability. 
There is no definitive answer to the questions surrounding the ]'yfincerian approach. 
However the bulk of the evidence would seem to suggest that education is not merely a 
proxy for unobserved ability20. While recognising that there are potential problems with 
OLS estimates of a Mincer earnings equation, it remains the only model that provides 
20 The two main survey papers of the Mincer model, Griliches (1971) and Card (2001), both provide evidence 
in support of the estimatable form in e<Juation (1). Griliches found that after controlling for the positive 
ability bias and negative measurement error bias in the Mincer approach, the net bias was zero. 
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us with a significant number of estimates of the return to education for a large number 
of years and countries. Psacharopoulos (1994) notes that in drawing cross-country 
comparisons of the returns to schooling there is a trade-off between quantity and 
quality - while wanting to obtain as many estimates of the return so as to make the 
analysis interesting, we also want to ensure that the quality of the estimates is such that 
the analysis is credible. 
In order to provide some cross-checks on the quality of the estimates of the return to 
education that we use for the multivariate modelling, we compare our estimates with 
the estimates collected in two other independent sources. The first set of estimates of 
the return to education is taken from Psacharopoulos (1994) and consists largely of 
estimates for developing countries. The estimates are for a single year only, and there 
are 57 countries in the sample. The second set of estimates is from the meta-analysis 
paper by Ashefelter e/ aL (1999). The estimates of the return to education in this study 
are from over 80 different sources, and for 16 developed countries. The Ashenfelter 
sample includes estimates of the return regardless of the estimation method used. As 
we noted, above, for the purposes of the current paper, we have also constructed our 
own sample of estimates consisting of 387 observations of the return to education for 
45 different countries. The returns are available for a variety of different years for each 
country. A particularly useful feature of the data set constructed for the current paper is 
that we include separate estimates for men and women. 
In the empirical section that tests the models outlined in the introduction, we use the 
set of estimates collected for the current study. There are two reasons for this. The 
first reason is that it contains estimates of the returns for both men and women, and we 
wish to explore some reasons for the significant differences we observe between them. 
The second reason is that in constructing our own sample of estimates we are better 
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able to monitor data quality, a particularly important concern, given that we plan to use 
the estimates of the return as dependent variables in a regression. We specify three 
criteria in order for an estimate of the return to education to be included our own data 
set. 
Firstly, estimates of the return to education must be the coefficients on schooling from 
a Mincer log earnings equation. The main reason for this is that we want to be able to 
attribute observed differences in the return to characteristics of a given economy, not 
to the estimation strategy itself. Including instrumental variable or selection corrected 
estimates of the return would introduce further dimension to the analysis of cross-
country variations. 
Secondly, estimates must be obtained using the similar specifications. The specification 
is equivalent to that of equation (1) above, where the dependent variable is the log of 
net earnings. We do include estimates for some countries that also include controls for 
union membership or marital status in the regression. We do not believe that this raises 
serious problems for our analysis. As has been remarked elsewhere, Deardon (1998), 
estimates of the return to education obtained from a log earnings equation are 
remarkably robust to the inclusion of further controls on the right hand side. 
Thirdly, the estimates must be obtained using internationally recognised and used data 
sets: the reason for this is that it gives some indication as to the reliability of the 
estimates, whether they were obtained using robust data sources and whether the data 
set was representative of the population at a point in time in a country. For some 
countries, the less developed ones in particular, the number of observations used to 
obtain the estimate of the return to schooling is small. In such cases we use sample size 
as weights in the OLS regression. That said, the estimates we have of the return to 
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education in many of the developing countries in the sample compare favourably with 
those published elsewhere; see Psacharopoulos (1994, 2002). 
Using the sample we construct for the current paper, Table 3.1 reports the average 
returns for men and women, in ascending order for men, for each of the countries in 
the sample. The ftnal two columns of the table show the years for which we observe 
the return to education, as well as the data sources. The returns are not observed for 
every year of the time interval reported in Table 1. We use three sources to obtain 
estimates of the returns to education for the 45 countries in our own sample of the 
cross-country returns to education. 
The ftrst source is the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data set. This is the 
same data set used by Trostel et al (2002) in their analysis of the cross-country 
differences in the return to education. The Trostel el al. paper is concerned with 
estimating the economic returns to schooling for a sample of 28 countries, and they 
provide few explanations as to the patterns they observe. In this paper we take the 
work a step further by estimating the return to education by year over the period 1985-
1995. The ISSP data set has the unique advantage of having used a common 
questionnaire in each of the countries, therefore removing one possible source of error 
when using the data to compare the returns to education across countries. The 
estimates are calculated for a sample of employed men and women aged 21-59 years in 
the year of interview. 
The second source is the volume edited by Harmon It al. (2001), which has drawn 
together the results of research in ftfteen European countries. The estimates are the 
results of a research program entitled "Public Funding and Private Returns to 
Education" (PURE). The major advantage of using the PURE estimates is that all the 
countries in the research network adopted a common estimation framework similar to 
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that of equation (1). Comparisons of the estimates in the PURE sample with those in 
the ISSP sample, along with those obtained by Trostel et aL (2002), shows very similar 
trends and stylised facts. 
The PURE sample and ISSP data accounts for 30 of the 45 countries in the sample. 
Estimates of the returns to education for a further fifteen, largely developing, countries 
were obtained using the World Vallie! SlIrvey (WVS, 1990 and 1997). The WVS contains 
micro data from household surveys that were conducted in approximately 40 countries 
between 1990 and 1997. Krueger and Lindahl (2000) have used the WVS, which was 
designed to be comparable across countries, to calculate average schooling levels 
internationally. The WVS was a face-to-face survey in each country that asks individuals 
the following question: "At what age did YOII complete YOllr formal edllcation either at s,·hoo/ or at 
an institlltion of higher edllcation (please exclude apprenticeships)?' The main purpose of the 
WVS was to compare political values and social norms across different societies, 
however questions about income and schooling were also included. The coding of the 
schooling and income variables in the WVS vary by both country and year, for example, 
in some countries, the coding of the income variable is restricted to a few categorical 
data points. We therefore restrict our sample to fifteen countries that have consistent 
coding for both schooling and income variables21 • We have compared the estimates of 
the return to education for the countries in the WVS, and find they are very similar to 
the estimates for the same countries in Psacharopoulos (1994, 2002). 
21 The data appendix in Krueger and Lindahl (2000) goes into far greater detail about this issue. They use the 
full sample of countries in the WVS; therefore the problems relating to the coding of questions prove to be a 
more significant problem for their work. 
Table 3.1 Cross-country evidence on the returns to schooling 
Ranking (men) Country 
45 Venezuela 
44 Croatia 
43 Ukmine 
42 Estonia 
41 Belarus 
40 Lithuania 
39 Latvia 
38 Canada 
37 Georgia 
36 Bulgaria 
35 Czech Republic 
34 New Zealand 
33 Italy 
32 Norway 
31 Slovakia 
30 Sweden 
29 Russian Fedemtion 
28 Denmark 
27 India 
26 Argcntina 
25 Greece 
24 Nigcria 
23 United Kingdom 
22 Netherlands 
21 Turkey 
20 Austmlia 
19 Belgium 
18 Spain 
17 Is .... l 
16 France 
IS Germany 
14 Poland 
13 Switzerbnd 
12 Chile 
11 Finland 
10 Austria 
9 Hungary 
8 Slovenia 
7 United Sllltes 
6 Japan 
5 Ireland 
4 Mexico 
3 Portugal 
2 Philippines 
Brazil 
A,,,,,«' (1995) 
Male Return 
0.0109 
0.0140 
0.0222 
0.0230 
0.0298 
0.0308 
0.0363 
0.0367 
0.0390 
0.0416 
0.0420 
0.0449 
0.0455 
0.0490 
0.0496 
0.0498 
0.0514 
0.0523 
0.0537 
0.0554 
0.0567 
0.0580 
0.0589 
0.()5n 
0.0608 
0.0631 
0.0697 
0.0706 
0.0750 
0.0759 
0.0799 
0.0800 
0.0887 
0.0899 
0.0903 
0.0914 
0.0929 
0.0930 
0.0977 
0.0998 
0.1010 
0.1015 
0.1056 
0.1194 
0.1773 
0.0679 
St Error 
0.0028 
0.0049 
0.0043 
0.0043 
0.0078 
0.0075 
0.0140 
0.0070 
0.0074 
0.0133 
0.IX199 
0.0112 
0.0014 
0.0030 
0.0120 
0.0026 
0.0113 
0.0020 
0.0110 
0.lX188 
0.0027 
0.0118 
0.0037 
0.0027 
0.0071 
0.0091 
0.0080 
0.0047 
0.0109 
O.IXIII 
0.0030 
0.0110 
0.0025 
0.0117 
0.0040 
0.0043 
0.0154 
0.0125 
0.0158 
0.0121 
0.0073 
0.0144 
0.0009 
0.0210 
0.0239 
0.0060 
Female Return 
0.0075 
0.0311 
0.0287 
0.0122 
0.0387 
0.0309 
0.0482 
0.0498 
0.0518 
0.0624 
0.0516 
0.0367 
0.0561 
0.0554 
0.0482 
0.0463 
0.0625 
0.0325 
0.0751 
0.0679 
0.0757 
0.0428 
0.0977 
0.0572 
0.0698 
0.0858 
0.0600 
0.0783 
0.0836 
0.0734 
0.1004 
0.1127 
0.0821 
0.0926 
0.0855 
0.0982 
0.0875 
0.1127 
0.1199 
0.1201 
0.1300 
0.0991 
0.1085 
0.2086 
0.1735 
0.0774 
Notes: Sources (A) ISSP; (8) PURE, (C) World Values SUNey. 
St Error 
0.0029 
0.0103 
0.0041 
0.0035 
0.0068 
0.0108 
0.0110 
0.0090 
0.0079 
0.0143 
0.0106 
0.0135 
0.IX127 
0.0037 
0.IXl9O 
0.<KI75 
0.0119 
0.0020 
0.0139 
0.0091 
0.0047 
0.0112 
0.IJ051 
0.11045 
0.0094 
0.0185 
0.0078 
0.lX133 
0.0117 
0.IJ019 
0.IX156 
0.0113 
0.0039 
0.IX196 
0.0043 
0.0029 
0.0126 
0.0127 
0.0190 
0.0272 
0.0090 
0.0157 
0.0011 
0.0450 
0.0284 
0.0076 
Yellr(s) 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1990,1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1992-1993 
1994-1995 
1991-1995 
1977-1995 
1980-1995 
1995 
1970-1996 
1991-1995 
1981-1995 
1990 
1990,1995 
1974-1994 
1990,1995 
1978-1995 
1985-1996 
1995 
1986-1990 
1990 
1995 
1993-1994 
1970-1993 
1984-19'17 
1991-1995 
1992-1998 
1990,19')5 
1984-1995 
1981-1997 
1990,1995 
1993 
1985-1995 
1993-1995 
1987-1995 
1990,19')5 
1982-1995 
1992 
1990 
1995 
Source 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
A 
A 
C 
A 
A 
A 
A,B 
A,B 
A 
A,B 
A 
B 
C 
C 
B 
C 
A,B 
A,B 
C 
A 
C 
A,B 
A 
B 
A,B 
A 
A,B 
C 
B 
A,B 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
C 
B 
A 
C 
BB 
B9 
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
This section briefly presents the explanatory variables used in the multivariate analysis 
in section that follows. We ftrst describe schooling data we use (stock measures), and 
then describe the other characteristics of the (macro) economy that we use as 
explanatory variables. 
Aggregate Schooling Data 
The main data-source for international schooling data is the Barro and Lee (1997) data 
set, which was further updated in Barro and Lee (2000). Barro and Lee measure average 
years of schooling and average levels of schooling attainment in the population using 
survey and census based data as reported by the United Nations Educational, Scientiftc 
and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO)22. For missing observations Barro and Lee 
impute the mean years of schooling in the population using historical enrolment data 
and a perpetual inventory method. This method updates average schooling attainment 
and average years of schooling using census based estimates for an anchor year and 
enrolment and graduation data for subsequent years. 
A possible problem with the measure of schooling we use is that international measures 
of average schooling are likely to be measured with some degree of error. The errors 
are to some extent unavoidable as the enrolment rates, as measured by UNESCO, are 
of a low quality in many developing countries in particular. The paper by Krueger and 
Lindahl (2000) describes the problems associated with the measurement error in great 
detail. The appendix to this chapter also has an in-depth discussion of the implications 
of such measurement error for our analysis. Here, we summarise the key results. We 
22 See the UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(http://www.ujs.uncs!J.!&!g/cycn.php.ID=28G7 20r &ID::!=DO TOPIC). 
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fInd that OLS estimates of the effect of average schooling on the return to education 
could be downward biased by between 12% and 35% when we use the Barro-Lee data. 
However, if we use differenced schooling data, as in Krueger and Lindahl (2000), the 
problem is much more severe, with coeffIcient estimates likely to be biased downward 
by up to 50%. 
The Macroeconomy 
The bulk of the macroeconomic variables come from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2003). The other main data source is the Penn World Tables (Summers 
et aL 1995), which we use to construct measures of the capital stock for a sub-sample of 
countries in the data set. In the section below, where we formally test the predictions 
of the capital skill complementarity model, we go into greater on the measures of the 
capital stock we construct. 
3.3. 
3.3.1. 
Stylised Facts 
Gender Differences 
Table 3.1 presents estimates of the rate of return to education collected from the data 
sources described in the previous section. The results (sorted in order of magnitude for 
men) show signifIcant variation in the returns to education across countries. Brazil and 
the Philippines stand out in terms of the male returns to education. However, the 
results are very similar to the only comparable source, Psacharopoulos (1994). He fInds 
returns to education in Brazil of about 15% (1989), and in the Philippines of about 9% 
(1988). 
In a number of countries the education premium is considerably higher for women 
than it is for men. The returns are, on average, 1 % higher for women than for men. 
Both the magnitude and direction of the gender differential are consistent with the 
previous evidence in Psacharopoulos (1994) and Trostel et aL (2002). Part of this 
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difference in the education premium may be driven by the fact that estimates of the 
return to education for women may be contaminated by upwards selection bias; see 
Card (2001). However, recent studies of the effect of selection bias on the estimates of 
the female return to education conclude that OLS estimates are robust to controls for 
selectivity; see the Harmon et aL (2002). Other studies compare the OLS results with 
those from a median regression and also find no significant selection biases. 
It is possible to explain at least part of the gender difference in the education premium 
by appealing to the literature on the gender pay gap. One of the observations in this 
literature is that the female-male wage gap is decreasing in skills or education; see Blau 
and Kahn (1997, 2003). Given that the slope of the earnings-education profUe is 
equivalent to the return to education, then this implies that over a certain range of the 
schooling distribution the wage profUe of women should be steeper than that of men, 
with the difference in slopes declining both as education increases and as the wage gap 
falls. Such an empirical relationship should also be observable in our data set on the 
returns to education. In particular, we can propose the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There if a negative correlation between the female-male d(fference in the return to 
education and the average year! of fchooling of women,' and 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative correlation between the female-male d(fference in the return and 
the female-male wage gap. 
We first test the empirical observation, as suggested by Blau and Kahn (1997, 2003), 
that the female-male wage gap is decreasing in education for a sub-sample of countries 
in our dataset. We look at four countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Ireland. Figure 3.1 shows the non-parametric regression lines from a 
regression of log wages on schooling for four of the each of the four countries. 
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The female-male wage gap is clearly decreasing in education, the one exception is 
Ireland, where the gap narrows and then widens again after 14 years of schooling, 
although the precision of the estimates after this point is questionable due to a large 
drop in the number of observations of women in Ireland with more than 14 years of 
education (at least in 1994, the year of the household data set we use). 
Table 3.2 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in a simple bivariate 
regression, the dependent variable in each regression is the difference in the female-
male return to education. The first three columns test Hypothesis 2 that the difference in 
the return is declining in the female-male wage gap. In the first column the explanatory 
variable is the average wage of women in manufacturing as a percentage of the average 
male wage in manufacturing ~DI, 2003). Columns two and three use the ratio of 
wages in agriculture and non-agricultural activities respectively. All three regressions are 
supportive of Hypothesis 2, showing a clear negative correlation between the wage gap 
and gender differences in the return to education. 
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Figure 3.1 Log wages by schooling: USA, UK, Germany and Ireland 
United Kingdom, 1991 
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Notes: Each of the curves is the fitted value from a non-parametric regression of log wages on years 
of schooling. For the UK we use micro-data on from the General Household Survey (1991); for Ireland 
the Intemational Adult Weraey Survey (1994). for USA and Germany the Intemational Social Survey 
Program (1995). 
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Table 3.2 The gender pay gap and the female-male difference in the return to schooling 
Dependent variable in each regression is the female-male (I) (II) (III) (IV) M (VI) difference in the return to schooling for each country and year 
Female wage in manufacturing as a percentage of male wage(a) -0.079 
Female wages in agriculture as a percentage of male wages(a) 
(1.936)** 
-0.059 
(1.803)+ 
Female wages in non- agricultural activity as a percentage of male 
wages(a) -0.127 
Average schooling years in the population aged ~ 15 years(b) 
(2.932)** 
-0.003 
Average schooling years in the population aged ~ 25 years(b) 
(1.989)* 
-0.003 
(2.078)* 
Labour force participation of women (%)(a) -0.054 
(2.542)** 
N 102 88 98 185 182 189 
Mean of explanatory variable 0.737 0.870 0.812 8.451 8.223 0.611 
Standard Error of explanatory variable 0.103 0.092 0.130 2.063 2.130 0.117 
Notes: All regressions include controls for country fixed effects. The absolute ,·a1ues of the I-Jill/ish" are shown in parentheses. (+) significant at the 10o;.leve~ (") significant at the 5% Ie-.·e~ (*,,) significant 
at the t % level Data60urcelT. (a) World Development indicators (World Bank). (b) Barm and Lee (2000). 
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The sample size for the ftrst three regressions is somewhat smaller than we might have 
expected. At most we would expect approximately 190 observations (the dependent 
variable is the difference in the female-male return, so the sample is halved), however, 
data on the wage gap (WDI) is only available for about 100 of these year country 
observations. 
Columns IV and V test Hypothesis 1 by regressing the difference in the wage premium 
on the average number of schooling years of women in the population (Barro and Lee, 
1997,2000). The ftrst regression considers the population aged 15 years or older, and 
the second the population aged 25 or older. The results from both regressions are 
strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1; the female-male difference in the return to 
education is lower in those countries where women have higher average years of 
schooling. 
As an alternative way to test Hypothesis 1 we also consider how the female-male 
difference in the return to education varies with the labour force participation of 
women. Educational attainment is a reliable predictor of labour force participation, due 
to the fact that it increases wage offers more quickly than the reservation wage. 
Therefore, we would expect those countries with higher female labour force 
participation also to have higher average schooling levels for these women, ceteris 
paribus. Our prior is that there should be a negative correlation between the labour force 
participation of women and the female-male difference in the education premium. The 
last column of Table 3.2 conf1rl11s our priors; there is indeed a strong negative 
correlation between labour force participation and the female-male difference in the 
return to education. 
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3.3.2. Time trends in the return to education 
In this section we consider how the returns to education have varied over time. This is 
particularly relevant to theories such as increased globalisation or technological change 
as a cause of changing returns to skills. In this section we also use the data on returns to 
schooling from PsacharopouIos (1994) and Ashenfelter et aL (1999). The paper by 
Psacharopoulos (1994) builds on a series of studies that collected estimates of schooling 
returns from around the world. Here, we take the estimates of the Mincer model in 
Psacharopoulos' 1994 paper and examine the trends in the data. The information from 
each study (there are 57 usable data points) is relatively sparse: the Mincer coefficient, 
average level of schooling, the year of the data and the country on which it is based. 
The data set from Ashenfelter el al (1999) contains over 1,000 observations on the 
return to education from over 80 studies. This information in this data is richer than 
that in PsacharopouIos (1994) in that we have details on the sample size and the 
estimation method used to generate the different estimates. Moreover, unlike the 
Psacharopoulos estimates, we have multiple estimates for many the countries, for 
example there are 47 separate estimates for the USA (consisting of 13 years of estimates 
between 1970 and 1998, 26 OLS estimates, 13 IV estimates, and 8 estimates from 
samples of twins). This allows us to do some simple meta analysis taking into account 
the fact the series we are modelling is a set of estimated parameters. The countries 
included in the Ashenfelter sample are also different from those in the Psacharopoulos 
sample. %ereas the latter contains a number of developing countries, all of the 
countries in the Ashenfelter sample are western economies21• 
The countries included in the Psacharopoulos sample are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EI 
Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, lIong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
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In Table 3.3 we present the results from three regressions where the dependent 
variable is the estimated rate of return from the Psacharopoulos study. The fIrst 
specification explains the rate of return with year and the year squared. The results 
indicate that the rate of return follows a quadratic trend falling initially and then rising. 
The only data on the economy available to us for this data is the average years of 
schooling completed. The second specification includes average schooling years as a 
regressor and it can be seen that this has the immediate effect of making the time trend 
statistically insignificant. The most obvious interpretation of the negative coefficient on 
schooling is a supply side one: a higher level of human capital depresses the return. In 
the section below, where we test the prediction of the technology-bias model, we reflOe 
this model to account for endogenous technological development. 
Table 3.3 Time variation in the returns to schOOling 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Year -0.0697 -0.0359 0.0209 
(2.44)* (1.24) (0.73) 
Year squared 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 
(2.43)* (1.27) (0.77) 
Schooling -0.0074 -0.0041 
(3.27)- (2.15)* 
OECD countries (17) 
South & Central America (19) 0.0597 
(3.95)-
Africa (7) 0.0499 
(2.01)* 
Asia (14) 0.0117 
(1.15) 
Constant 2.8894 1.5736 -0.6877 
(2.53)* (1.37) (0.60) 
Observations 57 57 57 
R-sguared 0.08 0.27 0.41 
Notes: The 57 data points are taken from Psacharopoulos (1994). The countries included in the 
Psacharopoulos sample are listed in footnote 5. Absolute value of t-statistics are parentheses. (+) 
significant at the 10% level (*) significant at 5% (j 1 % level 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
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The third specification includes dummy variables for the continent of the country. The 
results show that the quadratic trend from the fIrst specifIcation is no longer present 
given these controls. Figure 3.2 graphs the trend in the estimated returns based on the 
fIrst and second specifIcations reported above. 
Figure 3.2 Return to Schooling 1965-1993: Psacharopoulos data (1994) 
Return to education 1 ___ No controls lor average school ...... C?n!oIling lor average Schooliri] 
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Data source: Psacharopoulos (1994). 
The estimates of the return to education based on the Psacharopoulos data are available 
only up to 1990. A richer, and more up-to-date, data set is that used by Ashenfelter at 
at. (1999). We use this data to check on the robustness of the results from the 
Psacharopoulos data. The first column of Table 3.4 replicates the simple quadratic 
trend estimated in Table 3.3 and fInds essentially the same pattern: the rate of return 
falling until the beginning of the 1980's and rising thereafter. 
A useful feature of this data set is that we have details of the estimation of the 
parameters from the original studies, including, the number of observations, method of 
estimation and the standard error of the estimate. This allows us to do a simple meta-
analysis of the data. The motivation for the meta-analysis is that the data we are 
analysing is neither based on population statistics or a simple random draw but is 
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derived from a set of independent econometric estimates. We therefore wish to take 
into account the uncertainty associated with these estimates. The simplest way to do 
this is use weighted least squares with the weight being the reciprocal of the standard 
error of the estimated return from the original study. The results of this exercise are 
shown in column 2, and they prove to be fairly close to the unweighted. 
In the third specification we include a set of dummies to control for the use of different 
estimation methods since there is a view in the literature that particular techniques tend 
to give rise to higher or lower estimates. As noted in the Ashenfelter e/ al paper, there 
is a tendency for there to be trends in the use of particular econometric techniques, 
with say Instrumental Variables and Heckman type sample selection correction 
becoming more common. Consequently, we want to ensure that trends in the return do 
not represent trends in econometric practice. However, as column 3 shows, controls 
for estimation methods have little impact on the estimated trend in the rate of return. 
In column 4 we include country dummies. There are 16 different countries in the data 
and, unlike the Psacharopoulos data; they are all relatively advanced western economies. 
The broad picture remains the same - the returns follow a quadratic trend falling until 
the early 1980's and rising thereafter. 
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Figure 3.3 plots the trends in the rate of return for the US, Scandinavia and Europe 
(excluding Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway). We include a separate trend line 
for Scandinavian countries, as there is some weak evidence that the returns in 
Scandinavia are lower. The lines are drawn using the coefficients from a regression of 
the schooling return on year, year squared, and controls for the estimation method. 
While the US rate of return starts off lower and falls at a similar rate it starts to rise 
earlier and does so at a faster rate than in Europe so that by the end of the period 
(1997) the rate of return to a years schooling is about 2 percentage points higher. 
Table 3.4 Time variation In the return to schooling: Meta-analysis 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (S) 
Year -0.0144 -0.0142 -0.0137 -0.0196 -0.0194 
(S.86)** (7.39)** (7.27)** (12.83)** (13.02)-
Year squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(5.96)- (7.49)** (7.37)- (12.81)- (12.99)** 
OLS Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Instrumental Variables 0.0209 0.0228 
(S.07)- (7.43)-
Twins Studies 0.0042 0.0138 
(0.21) (0.92) 
Selection corrected (Heckman) -0.007S -0.0036 
(2.21 )* (1.41) 
Fixed Effects, random effects models 0.0328 O.017S 
(3.41 )- (2.41)* 
Austria Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Denmark -0.0340 -0.0342 
(8.39)- (8.68)-
Finland 0.0020 0.0018 
(0.49) (0.46) 
France 
-0.0103 -0.0122 
(2.92)** (3.54)-
United Kingdom 0.0131 0.0094 
(3.46)- (2.53)* 
Germany 0.0008 -0.0001 
(0.22) (0.04) 
Greece 
-0.0231 -0.0233 
(5.22)** (S.43)** 
Ireland 0.0188 0.0184 
(2.87)** (2.90)-
SpeCification 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
Spain 
United States 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
Summary statistics 
Average return to schooling - All countries 
Standard error 
Average return to schooling - United States 
Standard error 
Average return to schooling - Europe (excl. 
Scandinavia) 
Standard error 
Average return to schooling - Scandinavia 
Standard error 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0.0266 -0.0281 
(7.53)- (B.17)-
-0.0256 -0.0263 
(5.75)- (6.10)-
-0.0207 -0.0215 
(3.97)- (4.24)-
0.0047 0.0044 
(1.46) (1.39) 
-0.0013 -0.0009 
(0.33) (0.24) 
-0.0318 -0.0321 
(B.92r (9.26)-
-0.0087 -0.0086 
(2.34)* (2.37)* 
-0.0067 -0.0079 
(1.72)+ (2.08)* 
0.6587 0.6535 0.6325 0.8982 0.8887 
(6.43)** (8.11)- (8.00r (13.98)- (14.22)-
1010 
0.04 
0.0707 
0.0009 
0.OB10 
0.0049 
0.0749 
0.0011 
0.0563 
0.0012 
969 
0.06 
969 969 969 
0.10 0.50 0.53 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at 10% level; (*) significant at 5%; (-) 
significant at 1% Specifications (1) Basic regression. (2) Weighted regression - weights given by the 
standard error of the estimate of the returns to schooling. (3) As (2) but additional estimation method fixed 
effects controls included. (4) As (2) but additional country fixed effects included. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
Figure 3.3 Time variation In returns: 1960 -1998 
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Data source: Ashenfelter et al (1999). 
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Two explanations that have been frequently proposed for the U-shape in the returns 
over time are trade union membership and changes in productivity. Trade unions may 
affect the rate of return to education by compressing the wage structure. A long time 
series of trade union membership across countries is difficult to construct, as the data is 
not easily available. Instead we use the data on strike behaviour, which can be 
considered a proxy for not only union membership but also the how active a trade 
union is. The data, from the International Labour Organisation (ILO)2\ counts the 
total number of workers striking in a given country and year. The results from a 
regression of the return to education on the proportion of workers striking in a country 
in a given year are shown in Table 3.5. The correlation between the proportion of the 
workers striking and the return to education is negative, as we might expect given the 
wage compression argument outlined above - however, the relationship is not 
particularly strong. Furthermore, once we include controls for country ftxed effects the 
24 Various years, see (http://www.ilo.org/public/cnglish/burcau/stat/child/actrcp/yearbook.htm). 
The ILO docs provide data on trade union membership, however this is available only from 1990 
onwards. 
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t-statistic on the strike variable falls significantly. There is not a huge amount of 
variation in the strike variable over time within countries, hence the inclusion of the 
country ftxed effects tends to render the strike variable insignificant. The results in the 
table, however indicative they might by, are supportive of the hypothesis that the 
presence of a stronger union compresses the wage structure in such a way that lowers 
the return to education. 
As we mentioned above, another possible explanation for changes in the returns to 
education over time (as well as differences in the return across countries) is changes in 
productivity over time. In Figure 3.4 we plot the returns to education for a sub-
sample of countries against an index of multi-factor productivity. The return to 
education is for men only, and the index of multi-factor productivity is taken from the 
OEeD productivity database (May, 2004)25. The relationship is plotted for a subsample 
of countries for which we have a reasonably long time series of returns to education, as 
well as measures of MFP. The figure shows that, for almost all of the countries, there 
is a strong positive correlation between the return to education and productivity 
growth. The major exception is Gennany, which seems to exhibit a negative 
correlation between productivity growth and the return to education. The cross plots 
in Figure 3.4 ignore the possibility that the supply of skills may have been increasing 
while productivity was increasing - this could have offset any corresponding increase in 
the return to education. Indeed, the average years of schooling in the population (aged 
15+) in (West) Gennany increased by 7.3% (from 9.64 years to 10.34 years) over the 
period for which Figure 3.4 is drawn (1984 - 1997), over roughly the same time period 
in Denmark (1981 - 1995), where we observe a strong positive relationship in Figure 
Details of how the productivity index is calculated can be found at 
Iu.tp;L1www.vccd.orgili.lliruar~pmtal/O ~"47.rn 28:5 304SY)I)6 ! ! 1 1 I (I(Lhtml#1(l4~· basically 
Mlip is measured as difference between output and input change for all factors in the economy. 
104 
3.4, the same increase was only 3.2% (9.25 years of schooling on average to 9.65 years, 
all data from Barro and Lee, 1997 and 2000). 
The key conclusions from the analysis of data in this section are as follows. Firstly, 
across countries, we consistently observe a higher return to education for women than 
men. The difference is decreasing in the average schooling of women in the population 
and labour force participation. Secondly, the return to education tends to follow a U-
shape over time, declining slowing up to the early 1980s and rising thereafter. We 
tested two possible explanations for this observed U-shape. The first was unionisation, 
which we found to explain little of the U-shape in the returns, although our proxy for 
unionisation is probably not that great. The second explanation we considered was 
changes in productivity over time. Cross-plots of indices of multi-factor productivity 
revealed a very strong positive correlation with the return to education. The data 
supports the hypothesis that much of the increase we have seen in the return to 
education since the early 1980s is due to skill-bias technological change which has fed 
through into productivity growth. This leads us nicely onto the next two sections. We 
will now try to explain the major differences in the return to education be/ween countries 
by using models that relate the return dinc/!y to differences in technologies between 
countries as well as to differences in the type of capital employed in production. 
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Table 3.5 Relationship between Union Activity and return to education 
Sample Sample constructed Ashenfelter et al. (1999) for this paper 
Dependent variable is the return to (1) (2) (3) (4) 
education 
Striking workers (% total labour force) -0.1035 -0.0662 -0.1080 -0.0751 
(3.51 )** (1.54) (3.51 )** (1.41 ) 
Constant 0.0766 0.0800 0.0713 0.0803 
(37.27)** (7.74)** (43.38)** (28.60)** 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Estimation methods fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 273 273 515 515 
R-squared 0.02 0.75 0.02 0.50 
Average proportion of workers striking 0.02480 0.0260 
Standard error 0.0024 0.0019 
E(beta) 0.07405 0.0685 
A verage return to education 0.0017 0.0014 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at 10% level; (*) significant at 5%; 
(-) significant at 1 % Specifications (2) and (4) indude controls for county fixed effects. 
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Figure 3.4 The return to educat ion and changes in mult i-factor productivity 
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Notes: The data on Multi-factor productivity growth is taken from the OEeD Productivity Database 
(May 2004). The MFP measure is indexed to 1995=100, and is calculated using constant prices. The 
measures of the return to education are taken from the database constructed for the current paper. 
3.4. Explaining the observed differences in the return to education 
In this section we tes t the predictions of two models that provide a framework for 
analysulg the cross-country patterns that we observe in the returns to education. As in 
cemoglu (2003) we identify the wage-premium or skill-premium, often used in studies 
that seek to e.xplain changes in the wage-structure, with estimates of the return to 
education or schooling. 
Recent studies that have tried to explaio changes in relative wages, in the U U1 
particular, have concentrated on two alternative but not mutually exclusive tran mission 
mechanisms: skill-bias technological change (see cemoglu (2003) and the Katz et al. 
(1995) volwne) and capital-skill complementarity (Krusell at al. (2000) and Flug and 
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Hercowitz (2000)). In the theoretical work the two mechanisms have often been treated 
in isolation. Empirically, however, it is not easy to separately identify the effect of the 
two mechanisms. For example, tests of the capital skill complementarity explanation 
often look at the effects of changes in capital equipment on the skill premium; see 
Autor el aL (2003) and Levy and Murnane (1996). However, it is also likely that 
technological change, or upgrading that impacts on the skill premium, will be associated 
with changes in capital equipment. Both models of changes in the wage structure also 
suggest different ways through which trade can affect the wage structure. That said, for 
developed countries in particular, the overall predictions of the models regarding the 
impact trade effects are similar, in that trade reinforces a country's comparative 
advantage. 
3.4.1. Technological Change and the return to education: technology leaders 
and followers 
The paper by Acemoglu (2003) is relevant for the current paper, not least because 
Acemoglu identifies the skill- or wage-premium, used in the vast literature on 
determinants of changes in the wage structure, with the return to education. The 
Acemoglu paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse how skill premia differ 
both over time and across countries. The relative simplicity of the model is appealing as 
it means that equations can be easily transformed into estimatable forms. 
Skill premia are modelled as a function of technology and relative quantity effects. An 
increase in the supply of skills over time induces a technological improvement that 
ultimately leads to an increase in the demand for skills. The key point in the model is that 
the skill bias of technology is itself an endogenous function of the relative supply of 
skilled workers in the economy. 
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One of the major differences between Acemoglu's work and more traditional models of 
changes in the wages structure is in the effects of trade opening on relative wages. The 
effect of trade on the relative demand for labour, and therefore on the skill premium, 
usually operates through the effect it has on relative prices. In the technology bias 
model, however, trade affects the skill premium by changing the level of skill bias in the 
economy. 
The simplest case is one where the world is divided into technology leaders and 
technology followers. Technology leaders invent all the technology used in production 
in the world. Technology followers can only import technologies from technology 
leaders. Assume there is one technology leader (the 'leader,), and a group of less 
developed countries (IDes) that are technology followers ('followers,). The demand 
for skilled labour amongst the followers is a conItant technology demand, as the technology 
used in these countries will not be developed within the countries themselves. The 
leader develops its own technologies; therefore the demand for skilled labour will be an 
mdogenollI technology demand, which may be increasing in the relative supply of skills. The 
endogenous and constant technology demand curves are illustrated in Figure 3.5 
below. The downward sloping constant technology demand curve is consistent with 
the negative correlation that we observed between the return to education and average 
schooling years in the economy in the Psacharopoulos data (see Table 3.3). 
Defme the return to education in country c as r., and assume that we only observe 
individuals with years of schooling equal to h or / , i.e. high (skilled) or low (unskilled), 
the model posits the return as a function of technology and product prices 
(2) 
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where r C is the return to education (read 'skill premium) in country c, (w/ / w/) is 
the ratio of high skilled workers' wages to low skilled wages, pC is the relative price of 
skill intensive goods (all other prices are normalised to one), and T C indicates the level 
of technology bias in country c. 
Holding technology constant, T C = Tk c, the function l(pc, T C ) has the following 
property: I'(pc t'=r: > 0, ie. across countries with the same technology, we would 
expect the skill premia to be increasing in the relative price of skill intensive goods. 
Figure 3.5 The demand for skills In the technology bias model 
Skill Premium I Return to education 
Notes: This figure is reproduced from Acemoglu (2003) 
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Assuming that the relative price of skill-intensive goods is inversely related to the 
relative supply of skilled labour, we can re-write equation (2) as 
C (HC ) rC == Wh = g _ TC 
• Te ' WI L 
(3) 
where (He / L.) IS the supply of skilled labour to unskilled labour in country c. 
Holding technology constant, the function g( ~c 'TC) has the following property: 
g,(H
e
e
) < O. This is illustrated by the constant technology demand curve facing 
£ T'=T( 
technology followers in Figure 3.5. 
In the simple specification above, the level of technology is taken as a given because 
these countries do not develop their own technologies. However, the technology leader 
can respond to changes in the relative supply of skilled labour with innovations, and the 
development of more skill-bias technology. There are two opposing factors that 
influence the direction of technological change, both relating to the expected flow of 
profits that comes from developing new technology. The first is a simple a price effect, 
where technologies that produce more expensive goods will be updated more quickly. 
Assuming that goods using scarce factors have higher prices, then innovation will be 
directed at the scarce factor, i.e. the lower the relative supply of skills, the more 
innovation there will be in technology leader's economy. 
The second factor that influences the direction of technological change is a quantity or 
market size effect. In the model, the market for the technology is just the workers that use 
it, the more workers there are who will use the technology the greater the flow of 
profits from a given innovation. This encourages innovation for the more abundant 
factor. It is worth noting here that Acemoglu initially only considers the impact of the 
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market size effect in the leader's country alone. This is because it is assumed initially 
that intellectual property rights are not enforced in the technology follower countries, 
i.e. no patents, royalties, etc are paid. The overall preclictions of the model are 
unchanged when intellectual property rights are included. 
If we assume that the market size effect dominates the price effect, which seems 
reasonable at least among technology leaders, then this implies the following: in 
countries that that develop their own technologies, we will observe a positive correlation 
between the relative supply of skills and the return to education26. As a test of the 
preclictions of the model of skill-biased technological change, we estimate the following 
regression for technology followers with a given level of technological know how, T C = Tk 
(4) 
where & is a white noise error term with the usual properties. According to the 
technology bias mode~ for technology followers the coefficient P should be less than 
zero. We can estimate a similar equation for technology leaders, i.e. countries that use 
technology developed locally. The expectation is that the coefficient on the relative 
supply of skilled labour would be greater than P above, and perhaps positive, 
corresponding to the endogenous technology demand curves in Figure 3.5. 
The key to being able to properly test the preclictions of the technology bias model is to 
accurately define the countries that are technology leaders and those that are technology 
followers. The usual approach is to assume that LDCs are technology followers, 
whereas more developed countries are the technology leaders. Given the 
26 As Acemoglu points out, the assumed dominance of the market size effect relics on there being a 
positive elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive outputs and labour-intensive outputs. 
Interestingly, the same condition is also imposed in the capital skill complementarity model of 
Krusell below. 
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heterogeneous sample of countries for which we have data on the returns to education, 
we provide some evidence (fable 3.6) in support of our categorisation of countries 
into technology leaders and technology followers. Table 3.6 presents several indicators 
of each country's potential to develop new technologies in response to a rising relative 
supply of skilled labour. The indicators are royalty and licence fees payments 
received/paid (as a proportion of GDP), expenditure on research and development (R 
& D) as a percentage of GDP, and patent applications flied27• The figures in the table 
are the averages over the 1995 - 1996 period. Technology leaders clearly stand out as 
those countries the receive a relatively large amount of royalty payments, spend a 
significant amount on R&D, and where we see a relatively large number of patents 
being flied each year. 
rI All of the data in Table 3.6 is taken from the WDI (2003). Variables are defined by the World Bank as 
follows: (a) Royalty and license fces an: payments and receipts between residents for the authorized use of 
intangible, non-produced, non-financial assets and proprietaty rights (such as patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, industrial processes, and franchises) and for the use, through licensing agrecments, of produced 
originals of prototypes (such as ftlms and manuscripts). (b) Expenditures for research and dL'Veiopment are 
current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative, systematic activity that increases the 
stock of knowledge. Included are fundamental and applied research and experimental development work 
leading to new devices, products, or processes. (c) Patent applications are applications filed with a national 
patent office for exclusive rights for an invention--a product or process that provides a new way of doing 
something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A patent provides protection for the invention to 
the owner of the patent for a limited period, generally 20 years. 
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Table 3.6 Technology leaders and technology followers: WDI data 1995-1996 
Royalties 
received ~% Royalties paid R&D Patent applications LeaderlF 
GDP~ (8 !%GDP1 (8) ~%GDP1 (b) ~2er 1 million 20 2.1 (c) ollower 
Netherlands 0.58% 0.72% 2.01% 315 Leader 
United Kingdom 0.55% 0.50% 1.90% 433 Leader 
United States 0.42% 0.10% 2.55% 417 Leader 
Sweden 0.36% 0.39% 4.03% 800 Leader 
Belgium 0.23% 0.43% 1.81% 139 Leader 
Ireland 0.17% 4.38% 1.32% 255 Leader 
Israel 0.15% 0.18% 2.96% 239 Leader 
Germany 0.13% 0.24% 2.26% 665 Leader 
Japan 0.13% 0.19% 2.77% 2705 Leader 
France 0.12% 0.16% 2.30% 287 Leader 
Canada 0.10% 0.32% 1.68% 108 Leader 
Hungary 0.09% 0.22% 0.65% 82 Follower 
Norway 0.07% 0.22% 1.66% 354 Follower 
Slovak Republic 0.07% 0.41% 1.03% 37 Follower 
Austria 0.07% 0.26% 1.60% 310 Follower 
Australia 0.06% 0.26% 1.65% 509 Follower 
Czech Republic 0.05% 0.14% 1.03% 61 Follower 
Finland 0.05% 0.33% 2.54% 566 Follower 
Mexico 0.04% 0.14% 0.31% 4 Follower 
Italy 0.04% 0.10% 1.01% 154 Follower 
Spain 0.03% 0.23% 0.83% 68 Follower 
Slovenia 0.03% 0.13% 1.44% 151 Follower 
Estonia 0.03% 0.05% 0.57% 10 Follower 
Russia 0.02% 0.01% 0.90% 123 Follower 
New Zealand 0.02% 0.33% 1.08% 381 Follower 
Portugal 0.02% 0.25% 0.75% 11 Follower 
Croatia 0.01% 0.21% 0.45% 57 Follower 
Poland 0.01% 0.07% 0.71% 63 Follower 
Chile 0.01% 0.12% 0.58% 13 Follower 
Brazil 0.01% 0.09% 0.77% 17 Follower 
Argentina 0.00% 0.15% 0.42% 18 Follower 
Philippines 0.00% 0.12% 1.71% 2 Follower 
India 0.00% 0.03% 2.46% 2 Follower 
Latvia 0.00% 0.01% 0.46% 79 Follower 
Bulgaria 0.00% 0.00% 0.52% 41 Follower 
Greece 0.00% 0.05% 0.59% 42 Follower 
Nigeria 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Follower 
Turkey 0.00% 0.03% 0.45% 6 Follower 
Lithuania 0.00% 0.04% 0.52% 28 Follower 
Switzerland 2.73% 382 Follower 
Denmark 1.85% 449 Follower 
Belarus 0.00% 65 Follower 
Ukraine 1.07% 71 Follower 
Georgia 0.33% 54 Follower 
Notes: AI! data is taken from the World Bank WDI (2003). (a), (b), (c) a full list of variable definitions are provided 
in the footnote above. Blank cells indicate no data for a particular country. 
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Table 3.7 (technology leaders) Table 3.8 (technology followers) show the results from 
estimating equation (4). The dependent variable in each regression is the return to 
schooling28; each specification includes a different control for the relative supply of 
skills. In specification (1) the definition of the relative supply of skilled labour is the 
average years of schooling in the population aged 25 or older. The skills variable in 
specification (2) is the same, only this time it is for the population aged 15 or older. 
Specifications (3), (4), (5) and (6) all use measures of attainment to control for the 
relative supply of skills. Define TERr" is the proportion of the population who have 
third level (or equivalent) qualifications, and SECe as the proportion with second level 
(or equivalent) qualifications. The defmition of the relative supply of skills, (~: ), in 
specifications (3) and (4) is as follows: 
(He) = SEC +TERr" Le 1-SEC - TERTe (5). 
In specification (3) both TERr" and SECe are measured as a proportion of the 
population aged 25 plus - in specification (4) as a proportion of the population aged 15 
plus. The defmition of the relative supply of skills in specifications (5) and (6), with a 
similar distinction by age threshold, is: 
(He) TERr 4 = I-TERr" (6). 
For technology leaders, we fUld a positive relationship between the relative supply of 
skills and the return to schooling, consistent with the idea of an upward sloping 
21 Estimates of the return for women and men for the same country and year are treated as separate dependent 
variables. The explanatory variables (average schooling and labour force participation) are also gender 
specific. The ratio of the proportion of the population with second and/or third level education to the 
proportion without is not gender specific. 
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endogenous technology demand curve. For technology followers, we find the opposite 
result - a negative relationship, which is also consistent with a downward sloping 
exogenous technology demand curve. Both results hold regardless of the measure of 
the relative supply of skills that we use. All the specifications include a control for 
labour force participation of men and women in order to control for gender differences 
in the return to education. Despite the fact that the predictions of the technology bias 
model are supported by the data, a considerable amount of variation in the data remains 
unexplained. For technology leaders the R-squared in Table 3.7 does not exceed 0.34 
(specification 1), and for technology followers the highest R-squared is 0.12 
(specification 4). The question is, therefore, what other factors are causing the cross-
country differences we observe in the return to education? In the technology bias 
model, the other key determinant of the skill premium is the flow of trade. In the 
technology bias model trade induces changes in the level of skill bias of the economy, 
thereby altering the slope of the endogenous (exogenous) technology demand curves in 
the technology leader (follower) countries. As was the case for the model without 
trade, there are two opposing trade-effects on the direction of innovation, the price effect 
and the market size effect. 
Table 3.7 Skilled biased technological change and the returns to education -
Technology leaders 
Dependent variable: (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
return to schooling 
Average schooling (25 plus) 0.0081 
(5.62)* 
Average schooling (15 plus) 0.0071 
(4.38)* 
Secondary and post-
secondary (25 plus) 0.0118 
(4.79)* 
Post-secondary (25 plus) 0.0309 
(3.85)* 
Secondary and post-
secondary (15 plus) 0.0118 
(3.15)* 
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Post-secondary (15 plus) 0.0322 
(2.98)-
Labour force participation -0.1042 -0.0943 -0.0918 -0.0959 -0.0891 -0.0927 
(7.14)- (6.30)- (6.29)- (6.09)- (5.98)- (5.88)-
Year 0.1149 0.0728 0.1374 0.1467 0.1531 0.1551 
(0.71) (0.46) (0.89) (0.93) (0.98) (0.98) 
Year squared -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 
(0.72) (0.46) (0.89) (0.93) (0.97) (0.98) 
Constant -113.7 -71.8 -136.3 -145.5 -152.8 -153.1 
(0.71) (0.46) (0.89) (0.93) (0.98) (0.98) 
R-squared 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.27 
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Averages of variables 
E(return to schooling) 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 
Standard 9"Or 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 
E(relative supply of skills) 9.3393 9.4645 0.8376 0.2802 0.7489 0.2581 
Standard 9"Or 0.1243 0.1179 0.0614 0.0227 0.0497 0.0201 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at the 10% level; (-) significant at 
5%; (*) significant at 1 %. The dependent variable is a coefficient from an earnings equation; therefore 
all estimates are bootstrapped (500 replications) in order to obtain standard errors. The data on the 
relative supply of skills is taken from Barro and Lee (1997, 2000). 
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Table 3.8 Skilled biased technological change and the returns to education -
Technology followers 
OLS: Dependent variable (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
return to schooling 
Average schooling (25 plus) -0.0022 
(2.11) 
Average schOOling (15 plus) -0.0031 
(2.43) 
Secondary and post-secondary 
-0.0025 (25 plus) 
(2.33) 
Post-secondary (25 plus) -0.0618 
(4.60) 
Secondary and post-secondary 
-0.0142 (15 plus) 
(3.74) 
Post-secondary (15 plus) -0.0579 
(4.37) 
Labour force participation -0.0183 -0.0173 -0.0246 -0.0153 -0.0187 -0.0199 
(1.28) (1.24) (1.80) (1.13) (1.38) (1.49) 
Year 0.2645 0.2857 0.2773 0.3158 0.3079 0.2819 
(1.16) (1.25) (1.20) (1.38) (1.33) (1.23) 
Year squared -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00007 
(1.15) (1.24) (1.20) (1.37) (1.32) (1.22) 
Constant -263.8856 -285.0677 -276.3453 -314.9832 -307.0408 -281. 3074 
(1.16) (1.25) (1.20) (1.38) (1.33) (1.23) 
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.10 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 
Averages of variables 
E(return to schooling) 0.0681 0.0681 0.0681 0.0681 0.0681 0.0681 
Standard error 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 
E(control for relative supply of 8.1246 8.1766 0.7848 0.1666 0.5400 0.1496 
skills) 
Standard error 0.1539 0.1417 0.0695 0.0088 0.0276 0.0080 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at the 10% level; (-) significant at 
5%; (*) significant at 1 %. The dependent variable is a coefficient from an earnings equation; therefore 
all estimates are bootstrapped (500 replications) in order to obtain standard errors. The data on the 
relative supply of skills is taken from Barro and Lee (1997, 2000). The Barro-Lee data is reported at 5-
year intervals from 1960, we use measure for the year that is closest to that for which we have an 
estimate of the return to education. 
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For technology leaders, who we assume trade primarily with technology followers, the 
price effect leads to further innovation. This is because the relative price of skill 
intensive goods rises as labour-intensive goods are imported from the technology 
followers' countries, as in standard trade models. The price effect on its own should 
therefore lead to a more positively sloped endogenous technology demand curve. 
The extent of the market size effect due to the opening-up of trade depends on 
whether intellectual property rights are enforced or not. If trade does not affect the 
diffusion of technology from leaders to followers, then the market size is unchanged. 
Similarly if the enforcement of property rights is unaffected by trade opening, then the 
market size effect is also unchanged. However, if trade opening leads to the opening 
up of new markets for technology or leads to a greater enforcement of intellectual 
property rights then the market size effect changes. The extreme case is one where the 
opening up of trade coincides with the full enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
The pre-trade market for technology and innovation is just the relative supply of skilled 
labour in the leader's country, (Hc / LC). However, with the opening-up of trade, the 
market for skill-bias technology is now the world relative supply of skills, (H w / L"). If 
(Hw / L") < (H c / LC ) then the market size effect will induce the creation and 
development of more labour-intensive not skill intensive technologies, leading to a 
relatively flatter endogenous technology demand curve. 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to how trade will change the market for a given 
technology, although the presumption in the Acemoglu paper is that, for technology 
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leaders, the price effect will dominate, meaning a steeper endogenous technology 
demand curve29• 
The effect of trade opening on technology followers is similar to that for technology 
leaders - it all depends on the technology or skills inherent in the goods they 
import/ export. An added effect for the technology followers is that the exogenous 
technology demand curve (which is downward sloping) could become more positively 
sloped as the skill-biased technology developed in the technology leader's country ftlters 
down to technology followers. If, however, the market size effect dominates, then 
increased trade may induce labour-biased technological change that lowers the skill 
premia for technology followers. 
Table 3.9 shows the results from estimating a regression of the return to education on 
the same controls used in Table 3.7 and some trade variables in specification. The 
table shows the results for technology leaders only; the results for technology followers 
are shown in Table 3.10. The control for the relative supply of skills is the average 
number of years of schooling in the country for the population aged 25 or older 
(specification (1) from Table 3.7). The regression includes a control for agricultural 
imports as a proportion of total merchandise importslO• This is used as a proxy for the 
extent to which each technology leader trades in labour intensive goods. As discussed 
above, greater trade in labour intensive good should, through the price effect in the 
technology-bias modeL be correlated with a higher return to education or skills. This is 
exactly what the regression shows. We also estimated regressions with different 
controls for trade in labour intensive goods, such as imports of ore, metals and other 
29 
30 
There is a significant trade literature on the relationship between trade, innovation, imitation and knowledge 
spill overs; see for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1995). In future work it would be useful to incorporate 
more of the insights from this literature into the model presented here. 
A full description of the variables use, as defmed in the WDI, is shown in the notes to Table 3.9. 
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primary products. These other variables were also positively correlated with the return 
to education, though the correlation was not always significant. 
The regression results in Table 3.9 also show the coefficients on the variables we use 
as proxies for the market size effect (on innovation). The first specification includes 
exports of fUlancial services and other similar products; the second specification 
includes exports of high technology products; both variables are from the WDI (2003). 
The hypothesis underlying the market size effect is that the more skill intensive exports 
a technology leader has, and assuming intellectual property rights are enforced, the 
greater the market for innovation or the development of skill intensive technologies, 
and therefore the greater the return to education. The results in Table 3.9 are 
consistent with the market size hypothesis; exports of skill intensive products are 
positively correlated with the return to education in our sample of technology leaders. 
The results in Table 3.10 show the relationship between the trade variables and the 
returns to education amongst the group of technology followers. In order to control 
for the supply of skills we include the relative supply of workers with third level 
education in the populationll. The two specifications in Table 3.10 include different 
controls for the imports of what we classify as skill intensive goods: computer related 
products and fUlancial services productsl2. According to the market size hypothesis, 
the greater the market for a given technology (i.e. the workers who use the technology) 
the greater the return to skills. Thus we would expect to observe a positive correlation 
between imports of these variables and the return to education amongst technology 
followers - this is exactly what we observe in Table 3.10, both the coefficients are 
significant and positive. In general the results in Table 3.10 are consistent with the 
31 
32 
We use the relative supply of workers with third level education to control for the relative supply of skills 
because the previous regression results showed that the variable that produced the highest R2 in the 
regression. 
The precise definitions are given at the bottom of Table 3.10. 
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predicted effects of trade from the technology bias model. We now go on to consider 
an alternative model that can explain the differences we observe in the return to 
education - the capital skill complementarity model. 
Table 3.9 Impact of trade In the technology-bias model, technology leaders 
OLS: Dependent variable return to schooling 
Average schooling (25 plus) 
Labour force participation rate 
Agricultural imports (% imports) (a) 
Financial services exports (% exports) (b) 
High-technology exports (% exports) (c) 
Constant 
R-squared 
Observations 
A verages of variables in the regression 
Return to schooling (25 plus) 
Standard error 
Average schooling (25 plus) 
Standard error 
Labour force participation rate 
Standard error 
Agricultural imports (% imports) (a) 
Standard error 
Financial services exports (% exports) (b) 
Standard error 
High-technology exports (c) 
Standard error 
(1) 
0.0097 
(4.89)* 
-0.1075 
(7.13)* 
1.0282 
(3.94)* 
0.0675 
(2.41)** 
0.0227 
(4.09)** 
0.59 
110 
0.0805 
0..0.0.24 
9.6551 
0..1365 
0.7401 
0..0.116 
2.6163 
0..0.823 
6.2388 
0..5580. 
(2) 
0.0069 
(3.65)* 
-0.1033 
(5.90)* 
0.9414 
(2.93)* 
0.11481 
(4.19)* 
0.0433 
(2.00)** 
0.49 
80 
0.0826 
0..0.0.28 
9.7655 
0..1458 
0.7358 
0..0.141 
2.4281 
0..0.997 
0.2151 
0.0.10.4 
Notes: The dependent variable in the regression is the coefficient on schooling from an 
eamings regression; the results in the table are bootstrapped (500 replications) in order to 
obtain the standard errors. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at the 
10% level (**) significant at the 5% level; (*) significant at the 1% level. Variable definitions 
(WDI, 2003): (a) Agricultural raw materials imports (% of merchandise imports): Agricultural 
raw materials comprise SITC section 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding divisions 22, 
27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 
(metalliferous ores and scrap). (b) Insurance and financial services (% of commercial service 
exports): Insurance and financial services cover freight insurance on goods exported and other 
direct insurance such as life insurance; financial intermediation services such as commissions, 
foreign exchange transactions, and brokerage services; and auxiliary services such as 
financial market operational and regulatory services. (c) High-technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports): High-technology exports are products with high R&D intenSity, such as 
in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. 
Table 3.10 Impact of trade in the technology-bias model, technologv followers 
OLS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE RETURN TO 
SCHOOLING 
Relative supply 3rd level graduates 
Labour force participation rate 
Agricultural imports (% imports) (a) 
Computer imports (% imports) (b) 
Financial services imports (% imports) (b) 
Constant 
R-squared 
Observations 
Averages of variables in the regression 
Beta 
Standard error 
Rei supply 
Standard e"or 
Ups 
Standard e"or 
Ag imports 
Standard e"or 
Camp imports 
Standard e"or 
FS imports 
Standard e"or 
(1 ) 
-0.0859 
(4.96)* 
-0.0193 
(1.43) 
-0.5066 
(2.37)** 
0.0368 
(2.32)** 
0.1057 
(9.24)* 
0.24 
217 
0.0691 
0.0020 
0.1691 
0.0093 
0.7290 
0.0106 
0.0342 
0.0011 
0.3089 
0.0074 
(2) 
-0.0892 
(4.77)* 
-0.0154 
(1.00) 
-0.5831 
(2.62)** 
0.1535 
(2.47)** 
0.1114 
(9.17)* 
0.24 
205 
0.0700 
0.0021 
0.1668 
0.0098 
0.7257 
0.0109 
0.0344 
0.0011 
0.0544 
0.0028 
Notes: The dependent variable in the regression is the coefficient on schooling from an earnings 
regression; the results in the table are bootstrapped (500 replications) in order to obtain the 
standard errors. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. (+) significant at the 10% level (-) 
significant at the 5% level; (*) significant at the 1 % level. 
Variable definitions (WDI, 2003): (a), (c) see notes from Tabla 3.9. (b) Computer, 
communications and other services (% of commercial service imports): Computer, 
communications and other services (% of commercial service imports) include such activities as 
international telecommunications, and postal and courier services; computer data; news-related 
service transactions between residents and nonresidents; construction services; royalties and 
license fees; miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services; and personal, 
cultural, and recreational services. 
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3.4.2. CapitalskiU complementarity and the return to education 
The relationship between the capital stock and the demand for skills has been 
investigated in a variety of papers. Using the broadest possible defmition of capital, 
several authors have estimated the correlation between changes in the overall capital 
stock and the demand for skills; Goldin and Katz (1996), Flug and Hercowitz (2000). 
Other studies have used a narrower defmition of capital, examining the relationship 
between changes in capital equipment and the demand for skills; see, for example, 
Krusell It at. (2000). The papers by Levy and Murnane (1996) and Autor It at. (2003) 
look at particular types of capital equipment - computers. They ftnd computers have 
increased the demand for skilled labour, and in particular college-trained labour. 
The estimating equations presented below are motivated by an aggregate production 
function with four inputs, capital structures, capital equipment, skilled labour and 
unskilled labour. In the model, capital equipment and skilled labour are complements. 
The estimating model builds on the work in in Krusell II at. (2000), which itself is a 
modiftcation of the earlier work by Griliches (1969). The aggregate production function 
is given by 
y = AG(k.,k.,u,s) (5) 
where y is output, A is neutral technological change, k. is the stock of capital 
infrastructure and k. is the stock of capital equipment, u is the unskilled labour input 
and s is the skilled labour input. The main characteristic of the production function is 
that equipment and skilled labour are complements, whereas equipment and unskilled 
labour are substitutes. Hence, countries that invest a lot in their capital equipment stock 
should also generate a higher relative demand for skilled labour. The production 
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function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas over capital structures and a CES function of 
the three other inputs: 
y=k.a(k.,u,sr-a (6) 
The second function in (6), (k., u, s), enters the production function as a constant 
elasticity of substation (CES) aggregation of capital equipment (k.), unskilled labour 
(u) and skilled labour (s): 
a • 
(k.,u,s) = 'I'.(u, 'I'2(k.,s)) = [mu a +(I-m)(»C/ + (1- 2)sp )P];; (T) 
where the variables '1'1 and '1'2 represent the CES aggregators, and (p, 0") < I . The 
nesting '1'. (u, '1'2 (k. ,s)) in (T) makes more sense than the alternative nesting 
'1'. (s,'I'2(k.,u)). However, both fonnulations impose restrictions on the implied 
elasticities. The form used in (1) assumes that the elasticity of substitution from 
unskilled labour to capital equipment is the same as that from unskilled labour to skilled 
labour. For the alternative fonnulation '1'. (s, '1'2 (k., u)) the elasticity of substitution 
between skilled labour and capital equipment is the same as that between skilled labour 
and unskilled labour, which is inconsistent with the data and therefore a less credible 
assumption. Combining equations (6) and (1) we can write the production function as 
I-a 
Y = k:([ "",p +(1- ",XJ.k: +(I-l}sp); J), (8). 
Capital skill complementarity requires the elasticity of substitution between capital 
equipment and unskilled labour to be greater than that between capital equipment and 
skilled labour. The elasticity of substitution between equipment and unskilled labour is 
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I/(I - 0"), and the elasticity between equipment and skilled labour is 1/(1- p). 
Therefore, we say there is capital skill complementarity when 0" > P . 
Assuming workers are paid their marginal products, then taking the ratio of the 
marginal product of skilled labour to unskilled labour gives us the skill premium, as in 
the technology bias model from the previous section. Once again, we assume that the 
skill premium in the model is equivalent to our estimate of the return to education. 
Therefore the comparative statics from (8), which tell us how the skill premium 
changes according the factors used in production, also apply to the return to education. 
The marginal product of skilled and unskilled labour can be obtained by taking the ftrst 
differential of equation (8). The ratio of these marginal products is the skill premium: 
tS-p 
r= dy/ds = (1-,uXI-A)[Ak/ +(I_A)]P(~)I-tS 
dy/du ,u sP S 
(9) 
The testable predictions of this simple model, in the context of our sample of cross-
country returns to education, are given by log linearising equation (9): 
Inr:: H + (1- O")ln(~) + (0" - p)ln( k; ) (10) 
( (1- .uXl- A)) where H = In .u . Ignoring the constant, the ftrst component of equation 
(10) is a simple relative quantity iffict (Krusell tl at., 2000). Given that the CES parameter 
(j < 1, then countries with a greater supply of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour 
will have a lower return to educationll• The second component of equation (10) is the 
capital-skill complementarity effect. Capital-skill complementarity requires 0" > p, 
3l In the model in KruseU ,I aI (2000). the stock of skilled and unskilled labour is measured in efficiency units. 
Their estimatable fonn. therefore includes a trial;,,, t/fiduI'Y ljJM also. They show that assuming a positive 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour. then an increase in the relative efficiency of 
skilled labour will also lead to an increase in the skill premium. 
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therefore if capital equipment and skilled labour are complements, then the return to 
education should be larger for those countries with a greater stock of capital equipment 
relative to skilled labour. 
The most consistent source of data on capital stocks for a variety of countries and years 
is available from the Penn World Tables (PWT Mark 5.6a, Summers It aI., 1995). This 
data is only available for 9 of the countries in our sample and provides data on capital 
stocks up to 1992. The methods used to calculate capital stocks are outlined in the 
PWT codebook. Briefly, the authors have benchmark estimates of the capital stocks in 
each country at various points in time; they fill in the missing years by using investment 
data and making assumptions about the depreciation rates of different types of capital. 
The measure of capital equipment we use is total non-residential capital stock minus 
non-residential construction capital and other types of construction capital. The 
reduced sample consists of 132 year-country observations of returns to education, the 
stock of skills and the stock of capital equipment. Table 3.11 shows the average value 
of the capital stocks for each of the countries in the sample. The capital stock is 
measured in 1985 US dollars and the figures in Table 3.11 are averaged for each year 
we observe the return to education. 
Figure 3.6 plots the relationship between the return to schooling and the ratio of the 
stock of capital equipment to the stock of skilled workers (post-secondary education, 
aged 25 or older) in the sample14• The cross plot shows a clear positive correlation 
between the two variables, as predicted by the model. Table 3.12 presents the 
estimates from an OLS regression of equation (10). In order to avoid problems with 
In the context of the capital-skill complementarity model, we have experimented with defining skilled labour 
as having secondary education or better, however, we found that the definition used in the text (post-
secondary) better explains the observed returns to education. 
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collinearity, we define the relative stock of unskilled labour, (~), as the average 
schooling in the population aged 25 or older. The definition of the ratio of the stock 
of capital equipment to skilled labour is as per Figure 3.6. The results from estimating 
equation (10) are exactly as the capital skill complementarity model suggest. The return 
to education is decreasing in the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labour, but 
increasing as the stock of capital equipment increases relative to the stock of skilled 
labour. The estimates are consistent with the theory that capital equipment and skilled 
labour are complements: (j > p. The estimated substitution elasticity between 
unskilled labour and skilled labour is 1.86, a similar elasticity to that found in Krusell et 
al. (2000) and other papers referenced therein. The estimated elasticity between skilled 
labour and capital equipment is 0.72, which is again consistent with the results from 
other studies. The regression results presented in Table 3.12 include a dummy 
variable for the USA, as a graphical analysis of the distribution of capital per worker 
showed that it was clearly an outlier. The relatively low stock of capital equipment per 
worker in the US is difficult to explain, and it probably reflects the fact that the PWT 
data is not of a very high quality for some countries. The analysis in the Krusell paper 
does not use PWT measures of the stock of capital equipment per worker, and they also 
adjust the capital stock for changes and differences in quality - which we do not do 
here. This may be one of the reasons for the fact that the US is an outlier. That said, 
when we re-estimate equation (10) excluding the US, the results are practically 
unchanged. To summarise, we believe that the US-effect is probably a reflection of 
poor data rather than the fact that the model does not apply equally to the US returns 
to education 
128 
Table 3.11 Stocks of capital equipment 
Capital equipment per Total stock of capital Years oberved 
skilled worker e9ui~ment {£millionl 
Germany £72,606 £429,100 1985 - 1992 
United Kingdom £48,851 £238,200 1978 - 1992 
USA £21,556 £1,397,000 1985 - 1992 
Austria £92,667 £30,320 1983 - 1991 
Netherlands £51,780 £75,560 1986 - 1992 
Norway £60,835 £22,490 1980 - 1991 
Sweden £47,370 £44,130 1981 -1991 
Denmark £37,002 £23,860 1981 -1992 
Finland £54,814 £26,500 1984 -1991 
Notes: The data on capital stocks is taken from the Penn World Tables (Summers et al., 1995). 
Capital equipment is defined as total non-residential capital stock minus non-residential construction 
capital and other types of construction capital. Skilled workers are workers who have acquired at 
least some post-secondary education or related training (Barro and Lee, 2000). 
Figure 3.6 The relationship between the return to schooling and the ratio of capital 
equipment to skilled labour 
Retum to education 
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Notes: (*) The data on capital stocks is taken from the Penn World Tables (Summers at al., 1995). 
Capital equipment is defined as total non-residential capital stock minus non-residential 
construction capital and other types of construction capital. Skilled workers are workers who have 
acquired at least some post-secondary education or related training (Barro and Lee, 2000). The 
USA is omitted from this figure because it is an outlier in the figure: the regression includes a 
dummy variable for the USA. 
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Table 3.12 
model 
Estimates of the parameters from the capital skill complementarity 
OLS regression: dependent variable is the 
log of the return to schooling 
Log (average schooiing in population aged 25 
plus) (8) 
Log (Stock of Capital equipment (b)/Stock of 
workers with post-secondary education (b) ) 
Dummy variable for USA 
Constant 
R-squared 
Observations 
Elasticities between labour and capital 
equipment 
1/(1 - CT), unskilled 
1/(1- p), skilled 
Coefficients from the capital-skill 
complementarity model 
0.5378 
(2.45)** 
0.8529 
(7.59)* 
1.4596 
(4.70)* 
-10.8039 
(7.16)* 
0.50 
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1.86 
0.72 
Notes: The dependent variable in the regression is the coefficient on schooling from an earnings 
regression; the results in the table are bootstrapped (500 replications) in order to obtain the 
standard errors. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. (-) significant at the 5% level; (*) 
Significant at the 1% level. (a) The data on the stock of skills and average schooling is taken from 
Barra and Lee (2000). Skilled workers are workers who have acquired at least some post-
secondary education or related training. (b) The data on capital stocks is taken from the Penn 
World Tables (Summers fit a/., 1995). Capital equipment is defined as total non-residential 
capital stock minus non-residential construction capital and other types of construction capital. 
We include a dummy variable for the USA in the sample because the graphical analysis of the 
relationship between the stock of capital equipment, skills and the return to education showed 
that it was a clear outlier. One reason for this could be data. The Krusell at al. (2000) paper uses 
data from Gordon (1990), which is a quality-adjusted, sector specific measure of the stock of 
capital equipment. 
As was the case for the technology bias mode~ the opening-up of international trade 
also has implications for the effects of capital-skill complementarity. Flug and 
Hercowitz (2000) and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) both recognise the fact that 
international trade is likely to be one of the main sources of new capital equipment, 
particularly in developing countries where the initial stock of capital equipment is low. 
We do not report the results here, but we also ftnd that for less developed countries in 
our sample, imports of capital equipment are indeed a significant source of capital 
equipment for less developed countries. We have also looked at the correlation between 
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R&D expenditure and the stock of capital equipment in a country, and ftnd that 
countries that invest a lot in R&D also have higher stocks of capital equipment. 
To conclude this section, we ftnd that the capital-skill complementarity explanation of 
cross-country patterns in the return to education is not rejected in our sample of 9 
countries. The estimated substitution elasticities are consistent with capital equipment 
and skilled labour being complements. The results are also close to other results that 
have been found in several other studies, and for the US in particular. 
3.5. Conclusion 
We set out to do two things with this paper. Firstly, we wanted to document the cross-
country and cross-time differences in the return to education. We showed that the 
retum to education has changed over time, following a U-shape that reached a trough 
in the 1980s, and has been increasing since then. We also showed that the increase in 
the return was strongly correlated with changes in productivity over time. 
In the multivariate analysis we estimated two models that both relate the return to 
education to changes in technology - one directly, via technology bias in the demand 
for skills, and the other indirectly, through changes in capital equipment stocks. Both 
models explain a significant proportion of the differences we observe in the return 
across countries. 
One of the implications of the results we present is that developing countries that wish 
to increase the stock of skills in the economy could do a lot worse than by opening up 
their trade with countries that are technology leaders. Not only will the increased 
imports of capital equipment raise the return to education (and therefore the demand 
for schooling) through capital skill complementarity but it will also increase the return 
to education through the market size effect as predicted by the technology bias model-
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the snag is, of course, what happens to the level of exports of labollr inten!ivt products as 
they trade more with the world's technology leaders. 
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Appendix: Measurement error in schooling attainment 
Measurements of the stock of human capital in the economy play a key role in the 
empirical estimation in this chapter. It is therefore important to consider the reliability 
of the measures of the average schooling and stock of human capital that we use. This 
section extends the work in Krueger and Lindahl (2000), which looked at the 
measurement error in the Barro Lee (1993) estimates of schooling attainment. 
Barro and Lee (1997, 2000) impute measures of schooling attainment and average 
schooling using the perpetual inventory method and historical information on the 
stocks and flows of enrolments. The use of historical information means that any errors 
in the variables are likely to be correlated over time. Suppose for a given country we 
observe average measures of schooling SI and S2 for two periods. Average schooling 
in each period is measured with error equal to e" If the measurement error is 
uncorrelated over time, E(e" eJ = 0, then the proportion of the variation in SI due to 
the measurement error is given by 
RI is often referred to as the reliability ratio for S I' and it has a corresponding 
probability limit equal to -r---.-:-~~~~, where S· is the true measure of average 
schooling in the country. If we assume constant variances then the change in the 
reliability ratio, RbS" will be lower than the cross sectional reliability if the serial 
correlation of the true variable is higher than the serial correlation of the measurement 
errors. This becomes clear when we write the full expression for the reliability ratio 
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where r, is the serial correlation of the error tenus and p s. the serial correlation of the 
true average schooling in the population. The expression for RAS, above is not easily 
estimated and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) have proposed a more practical version, 
which is the one we use here 
R =(COV(~I'~2)) 
AS, var(~I) 
Estimating the reliability ratios 
In order to provide some benchmark for the quality of the data we use on average 
schooling and attainment in the population (Barro and Lee, 2000), we look at the 
reliability of three possible measures of average schooling in the population. The first 
source is, of course, the Barro and Lee (2000) (Barro-Lee) data. The second measure we 
have of average schooling in the population is derived from Kyriacou (1991). Kyriacou 
regressed point estimates of average schooling in the 1970s on enrolment rates for 
primary, secondary and post-secondary schooling. Coefficient estimates from this 
model were then used to predict average schooling for 1985 and 1965. Both the Barro-
Lee data and the Kyriacou-type estimates of average schooling are based on the same 
enrolment rates (UNESCO). The measurement error in the estimates is therefore likely 
to be positively correlated. Therefore, following Krueger and Lindahl (2000), we would 
propose that the reliability ratios for these two measures are an upper bound on the 
true reliability of the data. It would informative, therefore, to look at estimates of 
average schooling that do not use these enrolment rates. Our third estimate of average 
schooling in the population uses the Kyriacou approach with 1980 as the starting year, 
and extrapolating to average schooling for 1985, 1990 and 1995. The dataset we use to 
134 
do this is the world values survey for 1990 and 1995. The sample of countries varies 
both by source and time-period. 
Table A2 presents the reliability ratios for the measures of schooling, the first panel 
compares the Barro-Lee estimates with the Kyriacou-type estimates, and the second 
panel compares the Barra-Lee estimates with the WVS. The reliability ratios are 
calculated by regressing one measure of schooling on the other, the notes at the foot of 
each table provide further explanations. The reliability ratios in panel A are 
encouraging, ranging from about 0.609 to 0.889 for both the Barro-Lee and Kyriacou-
type data. However, when we consider differences, the results are somewhat worse. 
The signal in the Kyriacou-type data falls dramatically to 0.096, a very similar result to 
that in Krueger and Lindahl. The results for the reliability of changes in the Barro-Lee 
data are not nearly as bad, 0.498, though the fall is still quite large. Using the results 
discussed in the previous section we can put some interpretation on this result. If we 
used changes in the average years of schooling in an OLS framework to try and explain 
international differences in the return to schooling, then the results would be biased 
downwards by 50% or 90% depending on whether we were using Barra-Lee or 
Kyriacou-type measures of average schooling. Panel B of Table A2 presents the 
reliability ratios of the WVS and Barro-Lee data. We noted above that the positive 
correlation in the errors of both the Barro-Lee and Kyriacou data was likely to bias the 
estimates of the reliability ratios upwards. We can use the estimates of the reliability 
ratio obtained using the WVS to test this. However, looking at the fllst column of 
Table A2, panel B, it would seem that this is not such a serious problem. For 1990 the 
reliability ratio of the Barra-Lee estimates of average schooling are actually higher 
(though within a standard deviation) than when we used the Kyriacou type data. For 
1995, the estimates are lower when we use the WVS to calculate the reliability of the 
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Barro-Lee data, implying that the previous estimate could indeed be an upper bound 
estimate of the true reliability ratio. 
Table A3.13 Correlation matrix for Barro-Lee and Kyrlacou-type measures of 
average schooling (Panal A) 
S BL S BL S BL K S K 
S9/ M 85- 95 
BL M 85- 95 
K 
85 90 95 S85 90 
S BL 
85 
S BL 
90 0.969 
(68) 
S BL 
95 0.960 0.983 
(68) [16) 
S85 
K 0.764 0.761 0.727 
(59) (59) (59) 
S90
K 0.747 0.739 0.738 0.967 
(65) [13) (69) (59) 
S95 
K 0.722 0.725 0.732 0.824 0.892 
(63) (69) (69) (57) (67) 
M 85- 95 
BL 
-0.407 -0.217 -0.132 -0.305 -0.228 -0.166 0.195 
(68) (68) (68) (65) (65) (65) (57) 
M 85- 95 
K 0.154 0.177 0.232 0.063 0.196 0.618 0.195 
(57) (57) (57) 15?l Jill l~ J~ 
Notes: The numbers in the table are for average schooling in the population aged 15 or over. Super-
scripts refer to data sources K, Kyriacou; Bl, Barro-lee. Subscripts refer to years. The figures were 
also calculated for the population aged 25 or over and the results were practically the same. 
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Panel A1 (cont.) [Covariance matrix for Barro-Lee and Kyriacou-type measures 
of average schooling 
S BL S BL S BL K S K K llSas-9s 
BL llSas-9s 
K 
a5 90 9S Sas 90 S9S 
S BL 
as 
S BL 
90 5.14 
(68) 
S BL 95 4.87 4.61 
(68) (16) 
Sas
K 3.36 3.28 4.14 
(59) (59) (59) 
S K 
90 3.83 3.43 3.43 3.85 
(65) (13) (69) (59) 
S9S
K 2.98 3.91 3.76 3.76 4.83 
(63) (69) (69) (57) (67) 
llSas-9s 
BL 
-0.631 -0.325 -0.194 -0.191 -0.335 -0.282 0.179 
(68) (68) (68) (65) (65) (65) (57) 
llSa5-9s K 0.467 0.522 0.646 0.1626 0.543 2.03 0.179 
(57) (57) (57) (57) (57) (57) (57) 
Notes: See notes for Panel A 
Reliability of three different measures of average schooling (1985 - 1990) 
A. 
1985 
1990 
1995 
Changes 
1985-1995 
B. 
1990 
1995 
Reliability of Barro-Lee 
data (1985-1995) 
0.656 
0.073 
(59) 
0.720 
0.078 
(73) 
0.879 
0.100 
(69) 
0.498 
0.200 
(57) 
Reliability of Barro-Lee 
data (1990 - 1995) 
0.853 
0.091 
(26) 
0.617 
0.053 
(38) 
Reliability of Kyriacou-type data 
(1985-1990)* 
0.889 
0.099 
(59) 
0.759 
0.082 
(73) 
0.609 
0.069 
(69) 
0.096 
0.065 
(57) 
Reliability of World Values Suroey Data 
(1990 - 1995) 
0.919 
0.098 
(26) 
0.762 
0.220 
(38) 
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Notes: The numbers are for average schooling in the population aged 15 or over. The figures were also 
calculated for the population aged 25 or over and the results were practically the same. *The Kyraicou-
type estimators of average schooling are based on mt.'3sures of average schooling and gross enrolment by 
levels for 1980. Gross enrolment data was taken from the World Ve/lt/opl1ltflt indica/on provided by the 
World Bank. Gross (as opposed to Net) data refers to the number of individuals acfIIalfy enrolled in 
school as a ratio of those who you would expect to be enrolled in schoo~ given the population of a given 
age and the characteristics of the schooling system. 
The estimated reliability ratios are the slope coefficients from a bivariate regression of one measure of 
average schooling on another (the statistical motivation for the analysis is given in Appendix 1). For 
example, the 0.656 coefficient in the first column of the first row is the result of a regression of the 
Kyriacou-type measure of average schooling on Barro-Lee measures of average schooling. The 0.889 
coefficient in the next column is the result of the reverse regression. Similar calculations were carried out 
for the World Vollies Jllrvry and the Barro-Lee data in panel B. Samples sizes are in parentheses and 
standard errors are in italics. 
4. The impact of income support 
programmes in the United Kingdom on 
wage growth 
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This paper attempts to uncover the effects of a welfare-to-work programme, which acts 
as a wage subsidy, on wage growth by exploiting an expansion to this welfare 
programme in the UK. The conventional wisdom is that such programmes trap 
recipients into low wage, low quality work - this comes from the simple argument that 
the poverty trap, which a wage subsidy for low income workers induces, reduces the 
benefits to on-the-job training or job search and so reduces wage growth. In fact, it is 
also possible that a wage subsidy will also reduce the costs of general training because 
we would normally expect workers to pay for their own general training in the form of 
lower gross wages. So a wage subsidy is a way of sharing these costs with the taxpayer. 
Wage growth can also come about through on-the-job search, the incentives for which 
are also affected by the wage subsidy. This is because the taper off welfare induces a 
higher marginal tax rate for individuals on the programme. Thus, the net effect on 
wage progression depends on whether it reduces costs by more or less than the 
benefits. 
Tax credit programmes form the core of the UK government's policy to 'make work 
pay', the primary aim being to provide support for low-wage families with children who 
are working'S, The goal of the system of tax credits is to improve the work incentives 
of people with low attachment to the labour force, and to encourage them to move into 
employment. Therefore, understanding the effect of programmes such as FC/WFTC 
on wage growth is clearly an important question. 
35 Since this paper was rltst written the Government has extended the tax credit programme to individuals 
without children, and the overaU system of tax credits has been renamed the 'Working Tax Credit' (WTq. 
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Economic assessments of tax credit programmes in the UK have focused on the labour 
supply effects, see Blundell ,t 01. (2000) and Blundell and Walker (2001), or the 
incentives to take up the wage subsidy, see Brewer tI 01. (2003a, 2003b). This is the first 
paper to consider how such wage subsidy programmes in the UK affect an individual's 
wage growth36• The paper uses Labour Force Survey panel data to look at wage levels 
and growth before and after Working Families' Tax Credit (WFTq replaced Family 
Credit (Fq in the UK We exploit the shape of the FC/WFfC budget constraint, as 
well as the nature of the reform in order to estimate the effect of tax credits on wage 
growth. FC/WFfC had a structure that theoretically provided negative incentives for 
investments that promote wage growth for some (people receiving the maximum 
amount of the credit) and positive incentives for others (people close to the point 
where they come off the credit). The data we use in this paper, the UK Labour Force 
Survey, for 1997-2003, bridges the Fe and WFTC periods. We discuss the differences 
between each of the programmes in the following sections. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: section 2 gives the background to the 
income support programmes in the United Kingdom, and also presents the relevant 
literature; section 3 presents the data use in the analysis, the quarterly rolling panel from 
the UK Labour Force Surveys (LFS); section 4 summarises the wage growth of welfare 
recipients according to certain characteristics including the relevance of job mobility. 
Finally, in Section 5 we present results of the multivariate analysis, which exploits the 
"natural experiment" that the FC to WFTC reform provides. Section 6 concludes with 
some observations for future research. 
There are a small number of studies that have looked at the impact of such programs in the US; see 
Burtless (1998), Card tl aI. (2001), Connolly and Gottschalk (2001) and Connolly tl aL (2002). Almost all 
of these papers use welfare experiments, with tn:alment and control groups, to estimate the impact of the 
programmes on wage growth. As far as we are aware, the current paper is the only one to use welfare 
reform to identify the eff<'Ct of a wage subsidy on wage growth. 
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4.2. Background on welfare-to-work programs in the United Kingdom 
Tax credits form a core part of the UK government's overall welfare strategy to "make 
work pay", but their proximate aim was to provide earnings supplementation for 
working low-wage families with children and so reduce child poverty37. In the UK, 
there has been a system of wage subsidies in place for working families since the early 
1970s, and, in the US, the Earned Income Tax Credit introduced in 1975 plays a similar 
role. The Family Income Supplement (FIS) was introduced as a means-tested benefit in 
the UK in 1971. In 1988, the hours and earnings thresholds for eligibility for the FIS 
were relaxed and the programme was renamed Family Credit (FC). In October 1999, 
Family Credit was restructured and renamed the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). 
In April 2003, tax credits were extended to families without children, and the 
programme was re-branded as the Working Tax Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax 
Credit (CTC). Given that a lengthy time series of information on the WTC and CTC is 
not yet available, we focus in this paper on FC and \'\'FTc. However, we believe that 
the evidence we present on the wage growth effects of WFTC also applies to \WC, as 
the means testing, and hence the incentive effects, of each of the programmes is very 
similar. 
4.2.1. The Structure of Family Credit and the Working Families' Tax Credit 
In order to be eligible for FC or WFTC a family with dependent children needed to 
have one adult working a minimum of 16 hours per week38• A family was eligible for a 
maximum amount depending on the number of dependent children in the family, plus 
a small bonus if at least one of the parents was working full-time (greater than or equal 
37 Blundell (Z001) has in depth discussion of how in-work welfare programs fit in the government's so called 
'iron triangle' of welfare refoon, that is, the three goals of: raising the living standards of those on low 
incomes; encouraging work and self-sufficiency; and keeping fiscal costs down. 
A dependent child is one who is under 16 years of age, or under 19 if in full-time education up to A-level 
or equivalent standard. . 
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to 30 hours per week). Under FC the maximum amount was payable if the family's net 
income was lower than a threshold amount, which was £80.65 per week prior to the 
changeover to WFfC in October 1999. The taper for net income in excess of the 
threshold amount was 70 pence for every £1 in excess of threshold income. The value 
of the credit also depended on household savings: savings over £3,000 would reduce 
the award, while savings over £8,000 rendered the family ineligible for any tax credit. 
FC was payable at a flat rate for six months, regardless of changes in the family's 
circumstances in the intervening period. This fIxing of the payment period for FC was 
set so as to avoid prohibitive administrative and compliance costs. FC was also paid to 
mothers (if requested) even if eligibility was in respect of the father's earned income19• 
Using data from the Labour Force Survey, we fInd an average (real) payment over the 
January 1997 - October 1999 period of about £56 and the average of the last quarter 
was close to £63. We estimate the take-up rate for FC for the same period to be 54%40. 
Starting in October 1999, FC was replaced with WFfC. The reformed program was 
substantially more generous. In August 2001 there were 1,269 thousand families 
receiving \,\'FfC, compared with 784 thousand families receiving FC in August 1999. 
As well as this, the average reward had increased to £82 per week by August 20014\ 
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The structure of FC and WITC created some perverse incentives. For example, there is clearly an 
incentive for an individual to get a relatively low-paying job in order to get FC/WfTC, and then in the 
intervening 6 months get a much better job while continuing to receive the wage subsidy. We attempt to 
control for this in the analysis by separating out those individuals who change jobs and those who remain 
in the same job. 
The take-up rate is defined as the proportion of families who are eligible and who take up the tax credit. 
Eligibility is calculated using the tax benefit model described below. lbis is lower than the published take-
up rates of 69%. However, it is consistent with other estimates of the take-up rate obtained using the 
Labour Force Survey; see Brewer, tl al (2003b). The Brewer paper considers several explanations for the 
difference in estimated take-up rates, the most obvious being that fact that they are measures of take-up in 
different time periods. 
Statistics are taken from the Inland Revenue Quarterly Statistics on the WITC and Fe, August 2001 and 
November 1999. The difference in the number of families on FC and WITC is not, of course, entirely due 
to the reform of the welfare system, some of the changes are due to the trend increase in take-up. 
However, if we compare the number of people on FC in August 1997 (the same two-year time frame as 
August 19')9 and August 2(01), there were still only 758 thousand families on Fe. 
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The increased generosity of the WFfC came about due to four major changes relative 
to the FC system: 
1. An increased credit for children of between £ 19.85 and £ 25.95 per week; 
2. An increase in the earnings threshold for eligibility from £80.65 per week to 
£90 per week; 
3. A reduction in the taper off welfare from 70% to 55%; 
4. The introduction of a child-care credit of 70% of actual child-care costs up to a 
maximum of £150 per week (for two children, £100 for one child) week that 
replaced FC's partial childcare disregard. 
The largest cash gains as a result of the move from FC to WFfC went to those people 
who were at the end of the taper on Fe. This is shown in Figure 4.1. The figure 
shows the average weekly amount of the credit received by a working single mother 
with one dependent child aged between five and ten, and earning a wage of £3.15 per 
hour. As a result of the reform, individuals who were receiving the maximum credit saw 
a significant increase in the level of their payment. A number of individuals also move 
from being on the taper to being on the maximum. However, as noted above, the 
largest cash gains went to those individuals who were just at the end of the taper off 
FC, but for whom the WFfC reform created an entitlement to in-work benefits. 'X'hen 
we compare the wage growth of individuals on 'W'FTC, below, we will pay particularly 
close attention to this group of individuals. With regard to the child-care credit, in 
August 2001 it was estimated that approximately 12% of all recipient families had a 
childcare tax credit included in their reward, the average amount of which was £ 37.50 
per week (Inland Revenue, WFfC quarterly report, August 2001). 
143 
Figure 4.1 FC and WFTC weekly award, June 2000 
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4.2.2. Comparisons with other in-work benefit programs 
Several countries have relied on tax credits and/or employment/wage subsidies in their 
welfare to work programs. In this section we discuss programs in the US (the Earned 
Income Tax Credit) and Canada (the Self Sufficiency Project). The majority of work on 
welfare receipt and wage growth has used data from programs in these countries. The 
study by Gradus and Jusling (2001) reviews schemes that have been proposed and that 
are already operating in several European countries. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was introduced in the US in 1975 and is one of 
the oldest income support programs in the world. As with the move from FC to 
WFTC, the EITC was reformed in several tax acts throughout the 1980s and 1990s that 
vastly increased the scope of the program. Individuals are assessed for EITC eligibility 
on the basis of the taxpayer's income and the number of qualifying children. However, 
unlike the UK system of in-work benefits, the EITC has both a phase-in schedule (40% 
in 1996) and a phase out schedule (21% in 1996). This leads to a far smoother budget 
constraint than the one we observe for FC or WFTC. Also unlike the UK system, the 
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EITC is based on an individual taxpayer's income, and not the family income. l\fost of 
the work on the labour market impact of the EITC has concentrated on the labour 
supply effects; see Blundell (2000) and references therein. This is largely because the 
several reforms of the program throughout the 1980s and 1990s make it an ideal 
candidate for a natural experiment. 
The Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) was a federally funded experiment 
designed to determine the effectiveness of using earnings supplements to reduce the 
long-term dependence of welfare recipients on the state. The program is discussed and 
analysed in Card el at. (2001) and Connolly el at. (2001). Both of these papers consider 
the wage growth effects of the welfare program, and we discuss their results in the 
literature section below. 
From an economic evaluation perspective, the SSP is a well-designed experiment, in 
that treatment and control groups are easily observed. However, certain parts of the 
design differ greatly from programs operating in the UK. These design issues lead to 
differences in the incentive structure of the three programs that make direct 
comparisons between the programs difficult. The SSP, which began in the mid-1990s, 
was available to single parents with 12 months of welfare history and who could find a 
job that averaged 30 hours per week over a one-month period. Individuals who did not 
satisfy the eligibility requirements did not, however, lose all welfare assistance, as, unlike 
FC/WFTC, program participation did not alter the income assistance level. 
Supplement payments for individuals eligible for the SSP were based on earnings and 
were equal 50% of the difference between the participant's monthly earnings and a 
target earnings level in that period. The target earnings level, like the earnings threshold 
in FC/WFTC, was set so as to provide adequate income support while also creating 
positive incentives for work; see Connolly et al. (2001) for a full explanation of how 
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target earnings were estimated for each individual in the treatment group. The rule for 
supplement payments implies an implicit taper of 50% against any increase in earnings, 
which could either result from an increase in hours, or searching for a job with a higher 
wage. 
The major difference between SSP and the UK programs relates to the time frame 
during which the individuals could receive the credit. From the time of eligibility each 
participant has 12 months to take up the assistance. From that point they can only 
claim the benefit for a maximum of 36 consecutive months. 'Ibis creates a significant 
incentive for respondents to obtain higher wages by working harder or searching for 
better-paid jobs, otherwise they face a significant fall in earnings at the end of 36-
months. 'Ibis differs greatly from the FC/WFfC programs, where an individual can 
receive the credit almost indefmitely42. 
4.2.3. General literature on wage growth 
\Vhy do wages rise over a career? Over the past few decades a significant body of 
economics literature has emerged that attempts to answer this question. In this section 
we summarise the results of this research and consider how an individual's welfare 
status will inform any priors we have about their wage growth. Broadly speaking, we 
can attribute wage growth to four sources: the accumulation of labour market 
experience, the accumulation of job tenure (seniority), movements up the wage 
distribution through job mobility, and the accumulation of human capital. However, 
the lack of adequate data to analyse such complex economic behaviour has lead to a 
considerable debate over the relative importance of each factors. 
42 An individual can come of FC/WFfC if their children are no longer counted as dependent children. The 
average duration on FC/WFfC ranges from 19 months (couples) to 22 months Oone mothers). 
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The standard neoclassical explanation for the fact that wages rise with tenure is that 
individuals receive ftrm speciftc training that is productive and thus their marginal 
product and wage rises over time. Since the f1ItIl's spending on training declines as 
workers age, the gap between the wage and the value of the marginal product declines. 
Several papers have attempted to estimate the size of the real rate of return to tenure. 
For the US, the estimates of the return to tenure range from about 0.6% per year 
(Abraham and Farber, 1987) to 2.5% per year (Williams, 1991; Brown, 1989; Topel, 
1991). The average returns to experience have been estimated at around 2% per year 
(Williams, 1991). 
The estimates vary considerably depending on whether or not the authors confront a 
number of econometric problems that arise when estimating wage change equations. 
The two main issues are discussed in detail in Altonji and Williams (1998). Firstly, 
permanent differences across individuals in wage rates are likely to be correlated with 
heterogeneity in mobility. Secondly, endogenous mobility decisions induce spurious 
correlations between labour market experience, job tenure and job match quality. 
Overcoming these problems using cross-sectional data is almost impossible, and the 
usual approach is to use panel data. Zangelidis (2002) uses panel data to look at the 
wage growth of a group of UK workers over time. He fmds that the unobserved 
individual characteristics and job-match effects are correlated with both employer 
tenure and labour market experience, which leads to estimates of both these slope 
effects that are biased upwards. After eliminating the bias, through both 
instrumentation and differencing, the author fmds an average return to len years of 
tenure of just 7%. 
Wage growth due to job mobility is closely related to the literature on job matching. 
The wage growth premium due to mobility can also be attributed to improvements in 
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the match between a worker's skills and the requirements of a job. Gottschalk (2001) 
compares the wage gains of US workers who are consistently working for the same 
employer and those who change employers. In order to deal with the endogeneity that 
arises when individuals stay in jobs that are better matches, Gottschalk assumes a linear 
approximation of matching process - so the (log) wage increases linearly with tenure in 
the job. Gottschalk ftnds that mean wage growth between jobs is large in comparison 
to wage growth while working for the same employer. He notes that the results vary 
considerably by education, skills, and gender - male workers who are less educated 
having the largest wage growth premium. 
4.2.4. Literature on the labour market effects of wage subsidy programs 
Economic assessments of welfare programmes have tended to focus on the work 
incentive effects that operate via the programmes' impact on net incomes. Studies on 
the impact of the EITC in the US (see, for example, Eissa and Leibman, 1996) and 
FC/WFfC in the UK (see, for example, Blundell el al (2000) and Brewer el al (2003a)) 
have suggested that such policies are effective at encouraging individuals to work. 
However, exactly how effective FC/WFfC at increasing labour supply has been the 
subject of some debate. The evaluation of FC/WFTC suggests that the incentive 
effects on the labour supply of single parents (lone mothers) is counter balanced by the 
disincentive effects on the labour supply of couples (married women). 
The studies that evaluate the labour market effects of in-work welfare programmes 
have paid little attention to the qualiry of the jobs that are obtained. Indeed, the effect 
that such policies might have on the structure of gross wages faced by individuals in the 
economy has been largely ignored43• This is despite the fact that one of the frequent 
• 3 As noted, above, the exceptions are the papers by Card el al (2001) and Connolly el aL (2001, 200Za) . 
However, as we show, below, both these papers take very different approaches to analysing the wage 
effects of the Canadian SSP. 
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criticisms of wage-subsidy programmes is that they subsidise bad, poorly paid jobs with 
little or no prospects. In this paper we aim to fill the gap in the literature by 
considering how the incentive effects of a wage subsidy program would impact on the 
wages, and the growth in wages, of a given individual. 
Blundell and Walker (2001) mentioned a variety of reasons as to why income support 
programmes might affect the wage levels, and their rate of growth, of programme 
participants. As outlined above, welfare transfers in in-work welfare programmes are 
typically means-tested, that is, they explicitly serve to subsidise low wage work. To the 
extent that low skilled labour is inelastically supplied, we would expect any increase in 
the supply of unskilled workers arising from the programme to be accompanied by a 
decrease in gross wage rates faced by all unskilled workers and the size of this decrease 
would depend on the elasticity of labour demand. The fear that the demand side of the 
market will capture some part of a subsidy to the supply-side has often been expressed 
but we can ftnd no studies that have tried to estimate this effect. 
The tax incidence literature gives mixed messages - work by Gruber (1997) exploited a 
natural experiment in Chile where a payroll tax was imposed on some ftrms but not 
others. The study showed that gross wages were unchanged; while work by Bingley 
and Lanot (2002) exploited differential local tax changes across Denmark and showed 
that around half of the change in tax induced change in net wages were compensated 
for by offsetting changes in gross wages"". In the UK it was partly because of a fear that 
the increased generosity of WFfC (compared to Fq, and the change in its 
administration that would explicitly inform employers which workers were on WFTC, 
that resulted in the WFfC reform (October 1999) being introduced after the minimum 
wage (April 1999) was in place. It was hoped that the minimum wage would reduce the 
44 See also Leigh (2003) for the incidence of EITC in the USA. 
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possibility of ftrms being able to appropriate some of the beneftts of the subsidy to 
reduce their gross wage bill. The presence of the minimum wage further complicates 
the analysis we carry out below. \Vhen making comparisons of wage levels and wage 
growth we attempt to ftlter out individuals who are affected by the minimum wage, 
although, ultimately, we ftnd it makes litde difference to the overall results. 
Welfare recipients could also, and independently, experience lower rates of wage 
growth if their returns to wage enhancing investments are reduced from being on 
welfare. The lower return is due to the fact that WFfC was means tested. For example, 
take an individual on WFfC who faced an average marginal income tax rate of 22% 
and paying national insurance at 10%. If this person was receiving the maximum 
amount of WFTC for which they were eligible, then their implicit tax rate is no 
different from someone who was not on WFfC, i.e. 32%. However, if this person was 
on the WFfC taper, then they lost 55 pence of every pound ofWFfC for net earnings 
above the threshold. This means that they then faced an implicit tax rate of 69% (= 
0.32 + 0.55*(1.00-0.32)). The taper off family credit was 70 pence of every pound of 
FC above the net earnings threshold, therefore the effective marginal tax rate for 
individuals on FC was 80% (= 0.32 + 0.70*(1.00-0.32)). 
The existing empirical literature focuses on the impact of net constraints on short run 
(labour supply) behaviour - only Card et al (2001) and Gottschalk and Connolly (2001, 
2002a) have considered the long run implications for wage growth. 'W'hile we are used 
to thinking that low skilled workers enjoy little or no wage growth, recent evidence 
from the US suggests otherwise. Gladden and Taber (2000 and 2002) have shown that 
low skilled workers have a return to experience that is at least comparable with that of 
skilled workers. This implies that the common belief, by policy makers and 
economists, that low skilled workers are locked into dead end jobs in which wages 
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stagnate, is not actually supported by US data. However, the models that are used to 
explain the wage promes of (low skilled) workers tend to rely on the assumption of 
competitive labour markets, and in particular that workers are always paid their (gross) 
marginal products - i.e. the implicit assumptions underlying any empirical wage 
equation. 
There are several reasons why the wages of workers may depart from their marginal 
products. For example, the productivity of workers may not be apparent when they are 
hired and there may be reasons for having delayed compensation that pays workers 
more than their marginal products once they have acquired significant human capital 
that is, at least partly, job-specific. 
A second source of market imperfection comes from the credit market where it has 
been noted elsewhere, in the context of higher education, that it is difficult to borrow 
against human capital. Thus, low skilled individuals may be deterred from accepting 
jobs, which feature general training, even though that training might have a relatively 
large rate of return, because the starting wages are below their reservation wages. The 
papers by Card et at. and Connolly and Gottschalk do not consider the case where 
individuals can engage in human capital investment on-the-job. Some of the early 
research on training suggests that employees pay for their own general training in the 
form of lower wages and share the costs of fum specific training. Yet, according to the 
evidence in Booth and Bryan (2003) from the BHPS, most work-related training is 
viewed by its recipients as genera~ the majority is informal, the longest formal training 
courses are for induction purposes, and the vast majority of formal training takes place 
either at the workplace or at the employer's training centre. Training may not be just 
fum specific, but also industry specific. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), find that a 
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significant amount of training is indeed industry specific rather than firm specific, and 
that this would also feature some sharing of the costs. 
The training literature does therefore suggest that workers contribute to the costs of 
any training in the form of lower wages than would otherwise be the case. 
Furthermore, given credit market constrains, the role of FC/WFfC might have been to 
encourage low skilled workers to accept offers of jobs with very low starting wages and 
enable them to enjoy the resulting wage growth associated with the accompanying on-
the-job training4S• Therefore, the decision by FC/WFfC participants to train, and 
hence the subsequent wage growth, would depend on a present value calculation. 
How this calculation would be affected by a wage subsidy depends on the nature of the 
subsidy. Suppose the subsidy were means-tested and one were close to the end of the 
taper so that eligibility is almost exhausted. Then we might expect the future returns to 
training to be largely unaffected by the subsidy, since it is about to expire. However, the 
subsidy would affect the net costs of training since the training would lower the wage 
and this would be partly offset by the subsidy. If the subsidy were not means tested at 
all and if it were linear (t.e. the subsidy rate was independent of income) then the 
subsidy would reduce the benefits and costs by the same amount and we would not 
expect an effect on training and hence on wage growth of recipients compared to non-
recipients. 
The FC/WFfC subsidy is complicated by the maximum. As shown in Figure 4.1, 
there is a range of income were individuals receive a maximum subsidy and so the 
marginal subsidy is zero, while for earnings above this point the marginal subsidy is 
positive. This is the case where the programme reduces the benefits and does not 
45 The theoretical arguments are not, however, quite this simple in a world where labour supply is itself a 
choice variable. Suppose WfTC encouraged indh-iduals to work longer hours when their wages had grown 
sufficiently that they were no longer entitled, then this would increase the utilisation rate of human capital 
and thereby increase the return to it 
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reduce the costs and so we would expect less training to occur and smaller wage 
growth. In contrast, for higher earning individuals being close to the end of the taper 
generates the opposite incentive effects - FCjWFTC then reduces costs but might 
have little effect on benefits and we would expect more training and higher wage 
growth for recipients. In the empirical section, we use a model of the UK tax benefit 
system to estimate the two kink-points in the weekly FCjWFTC budget constraint. 
The fltst kink is the gross earnings at which individuals, given their family 
characteristics and other household income, go from being on the maximum to being 
on the taper. The second kink is the gross earnings at which individuals run off the 
taper and become ineligible for FCj\X'FfC - we call this second kink point the 
FCjWFTC runoff point. 
Unlike EITC, FCjWFTC was means tested against household income and so many 
secondary workers whose partners are in work might have been expected to be closer 
to the point where eligibility would be about to expire than to the maximum 
entitlement46• Thus, we would expect positive wage growth effects to be more likely for 
individuals with working partners present (two-earner couples) than for single parents. 
A final complication was the implicit time limited nature of FC/WFTC. Eligibility 
depended on having a dependent child so that as children age the household came 
closer to the point where the adverse impact of the programme on future benefits of 
training fell to zero and the effect was therefore positive. With this in mind, in the 
empirical section we use age of the youngest child in the household to instrument 
FCjWFTC take-up which we assume is endogenous in the wage growth equation. 
Administrative data shows that, in November 2002, the average award for two earner couples was 
approximately £59 compared to £86 for single earner households. 
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As noted, above, both the Card et oL and Connolly and Gottschalk papers consider the 
implications of a simple wage subsidy for job search. The paper by Card et oL argues 
that one of the features of the Canadian SSP was that it selected individuals with 
relatively flatter wage profUesH • The means tested structure of FCj\VFTC makes its 
implications for job search slighdy different. In particular, given that job search is also 
an investment decision, similar considerations will apply to job search as to training. If 
costs and benefits are similarly affected by the subsidy then there will be no impact. 
The costs of on-the-job search might be the forgone leisure while searching whose 
value, at the margin, is determined by the net wage and so is affected by the subsidy. 
Following on from the discussion of the literature on wage-growth and welfare receipt, 
we address some of the testable hypotheses (drawn from Card e/ ol (2001) and 
Connolly and Gottschalk (2002a) and from considerations of training) about the 
relative wage-growth of FCjWFfC recipients and non-recipients. The argument in 
Card et 01 would suggest lower within-job wage growth amongst FCjWFTC recipients, 
and Connolly and Gottschalk suggest lower job-to-job growth for the same group48. 
Our own arguments are less pessimistic and suggest positive effects on wage growth 
associated with those whose eligibility is either small and short-lived, because earnings 
are close to the point where entidement falls to zero, or because eligibility is expected 
to be short-lived due to the youngest child approaching independence. This could be 
due to job search considerations or training arising from the nonlinear form of the 
means tested wage subsidy. 
47 
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The theory that FC/WfTC may have Jelt<1ed individuals who. ex ante. had flatter wage prorlles is 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
In fact. Connolly II al (2002a) find no significant difference in the job-to-job wage growth for the 
treatment and control groups. Also. Card II al find that recipients of the wage subsidy had wage growth in 
line with that of similar individuals over the period. 
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In the next section we present the data and tabulate some of the evidence to address 
each of the above ideas. The sections that follow then introduce more complicated 
multivariate analysis that allows us to formally test the hypotheses. 
4.3. Data 
The analysis in this paper is based upon the five-quarter rolling panel of the United 
Kingdom Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a continuous, household 
survey, which provides a range of data on labour market statistics, as well as related 
topics such as training, qualifications, income and disability49. The survey has a panel 
design where each sampled address is interviewed for five waves. Interviews take place 
at three-month intervals with the fifth interview taking place a year after the first. 
During each quarter, interviews take place at about 59,000 addresses with about 
138,000 respondents, representing a response rate of around 80%. In anyone quarter 
there are five different cohorts, each from a different wave of the panel, that is, 
approximately 11,800 addresses in each quarter can be attributed to wave one, two, 
three, four or five. 
Prior to Spring 1997, the LFS only asked respondents about their earnings in the first 
wave of the panel. After this point individuals were also asked their wages in the fifth 
wave. This allows us to observe wage growth over a twelve-month period and using data 
from spring 1997 to Winter 2002 we construct a data set that contains information on 
twenty cohorts of individuals. Dropping the self-employed and those with missing data 
for crucial variables we are left with a total of 51,074 in the male sample - consisting of 
39,908 married or cohabiting of which 21,512 have dependent children, and 11,166 
49 The quarterly LFS is based on seasonal quarters, that is, Spring (March - May), Summer (June-
August), Autumn (September - November) and Winter (December - February). A full 
description of the data set, along with sampling and survey techniques can be found at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ST A TBASE/Source.asp?vlnk= 358M.fore= Y. 
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single men. We drop the small number of single-father families, which is too small for 
analysis. The female sample consists of 54,968 observations - 40,475 are couples 
(married and cohabiting) of which 19,934 have dependent children, and 14,493 are 
single-women households (4,852 with dependent children, that is lone mothers). The 
numbers in the table are for a balanced panel, that is, we drop those individuals who we 
do not observe in both wave one and wave five. The details of how the sample is 
constructed are given in the appendix to this chapter 50. 
The fact that the LFS provides us with five-quarters of data on a panel of individuals 
means that we are able to measure job tenure, job changes (both quits and layoffs) as 
well as wage growth. This is important, as it is well known in the literature that job 
tenure information in other datasets have been particularly unreliable; see Altonji and 
Williams (1998). In the LFS, further questions on whether or not individuals change 
jobs between waves allow us to remove those individuals who we believe are reporting 
. . b d 51 maccurate)o tenure ata . 
The main features of the wage growth data are presented in the figures below. The 
figures show cross plots of wage levels and wage growth for men and women based on 
two different definitions of wages. Wage growth can be defined with reference to 
hourly pay, which is recorded in the data for a subset of individuals who report earnings 
('reported hourly pay,), or as average hourly earnings derived from usual weekly 
earnings and weekly hours of work fearnings per hour worked,). The figures below 
graph the wage data for these two alternative defmitions for the three main groups of 
50 
51 
The LFS is a household survey; we would therefore expect the number of couples in the female sample 
(40,475) to be equal to the number of couples in the male sample (39,908). However, the discrepancy 
arises here because the panel is balanced separately for both men and women, that is we keep indil'dNals 
who are in the survey in both waves 1 and 5, employees in both waves and who report hourly earnings in 
both waves. 
In the few cases where it is obvious that an individual has misreported their job tenure, we drop 
the observations. 
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interest - married fathers, married mothers and lone mothersS2• \Vhile the average 
hourly wage fonned by dividing earnings by hours of work has larger variance than the 
hourly pay they are clearly closely correlatedsl• Measurement error in hours of work 
may help explain why the ratio has higher variance than the direct hourly pay measure. 
Figure 4.3, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.7 each show the scatter of changes in the average 
earnings per hour worked against changes in the direct measure of average hourly pay 
for each of the three groups, married/cohabiting dads, married cohabiting mothers, and 
single mums we look at. Once again, we ftnd that the variance in earnings per hour 
worked is clearly higher, however the strong correlation between the two variables 
remainsS4• Overtime hours will also contribute to a difference in the two measures -
this is because for those individuals who do not report actual hours in the week worked, 
we use the proxy variable 'usual hours worked', which may not correspond exactly to 
the earnings in that week. 
Given that there are no strong economic reasons for choosing one variable over the 
other, and the fact that the variables are closely correlated, hereafter we use the data on 
directly recorded hourly pay - although we would note that the substantive ftndings in 
the paper are not affected by this choice. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
both variables clearly measure different things - hourly pay may be a better indicator of 
household welfare (since its changes are independent of changes in recorded hours of 
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5] 
We have dropped the lone parents who an: men because they an: such a small sample. 
Simple regressions, for samples where they are both recorded, of one against the other have a 
slope of 0.83 (standard trrOr, 0.(02) and an intercept of 0.36 (standard Irror, 0.005) with an R-
squared of 0.76 for the fathers, and a slope of 0.82 (standard trrOr, 0.002) and an intercept of 0.31 
(standard trrOr, 0.003) with an R-squared of 0.77 for the mothers. For more detailed comparisons 
see Skinner It aI. (2002). 
Although we note that the variance in the average level (and growth) of earnings per hour worked is 
usually higher, for none of the three groups above is the estimate significantly different from the average 
value given by the hourly pay variable. 
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work), while average earnings per hours worked changes because both hours and 
earnings change. 
4.3.1. Data used to construct the tax benefit model 
In the next section we analyse the evidence on the average wage growth of individuals 
on FC/WFfC. We begin with a comparison of the summary statistics for different 
groups of individuals, and then introduce more structural multivariate analysis to see 
whether the results are robust. A key component of this analysis involves estimating 
the weekly FC/WFfC, thus allowing us to estimate eligibility and take up rates, as well 
as the maximum-taper kink point and the FC/WFfC run-off pointss, that is, the level 
of earnings required to take an individual off FC/WFfC. Furthermore, in order to 
make use of the 'natural experiment' that the FC-~'FfC reform induces, we need to 
estimate FC and WFfC eligibility pre- and post-reform. In order to estimate the 
FC/WFfC weekly amount, which is based on net household income, we have written a tax 
benefit model. The model estimates the net earnings and benefits for the respondent, 
and where appropriate, the spouse. We first estimate the income tax payable, followed 
by national insurance, unemployment benefit, and [mally FC or WFrc. The program 
uses tax parameters - rates, thresholds, etc - from the Inland Revenue for each [mancial 
year in the sample (1997 - 2002). 
ss From Winter 1992 - Winter 1999. the LFS asked respondents directly about the amount of Family Credit 
received. We use this data to crosscheck the output of our tax benefit model. 
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Figure 4.7 Average annual change In earnings per hour worked against annual 
change In reported hourly pay: Single mothers In the LFS 1997 - 2003 
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The LFS is a panel which re-interviews individuals and families every 13 weeks. We are 
able to track FC/WFfC status over each of the five waves of the survey. Table 4.1 
shows the breakdown of the data by FC/WFfC status. Around 18% of the 
households with children in the data were single mothers. Lone mothers are much 
more stable recipients with more than a third (34%) of lone mothers receiving the 
credit throughout waves 1 to 5, this represents a 'staying-on' rate over the 12-month 
period of 74.2% (1,565/(1,565+544)). The staying on rate for married mothers and 
married fathers is lower at 33.1 % and 49.5% respectively. 
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Table 4.1 FCIWFTC receipt for married couples and lone mothers 
Married dads Married mothers Lone mothers 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Always on 868 4.1% 432 2.2% 1,565 34.0% 
Never on 18,674 87.2% 17,588 89.2% 1,961 42.7% 
Off-on 1,000 4.7% 826 4.2% 527 11.5% 
On-off 884 4.1% 873 4.4% 544 11.8% 
Staying-on 49.5% 33.1% 74.2% 
rate 
21,426 19,719 4,597 
Notes: Data from the LFS 1997 - 2003. The totals in the table do not correspond exactly to those in 
the previous table for three reasons: firstly, because not all individuals answer the questions about 
receipt of FCIWFTC benefits; secondly. we drop individuals who make more than one transition over 
the 12 month period, i.e. on-off-on, or off-on-off, etc, as such observations are more likely to be 
recording errors than actual transitions; and thirdly, a number of households (76) record receipt of 
FCIWFTC but the household dataset shows no dependent children in the household. we therefore 
drop these observations. 
It is important to remember that the sample is a balanced panel of men and women, 
who are working and report hourly earnings in both waves 1 and 5 (this is despite the 
fact that receipt for a married mother could be due to the partner working). This 
explains all of the observed differences in sample sue between married fathers and 
mothers. The appendix shows the sample sue and proportions when we do not 
condition on working and reporting hourly earnings in waves 1 and 5 - the table shows 
that the proportions for married fathers and married mothers in these samples are 
almost identica~ as we would expect. 
The FC/WFfC take-up rate is shown in Figure 4.8. The take-up rate is estimated 
using the tax benefit model described in above. The take-up rate is defined as the 
number receiving and entitled divided by the number entitled. Brewer e/ al (2003a, 
2003b) have noted that the LFS will typically under-record take-up relative to both the 
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Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the sample used by the Inland Revenue in the 
quarterly statistics publications. This is partly because the LFS has no information on 
assets and so overstates the numbers entitled. However Brewer It al have made some 
comparisons with the FRS, and their results suggest that the under-recording of take-up 
is not a significant source of error. In fact, the main reason why our estimates of take-
up depart from official statistics is because we cannot include pipeline cases (who have 
claimed but not yet received) and we drop a number of non-entitled (according to our 
tax-benefit model) recipients. The fact that the tax benefit model classifies some 
families as 'not entitled', when the LFS record them as being receiving tax credits due 
to several factors. It is partly due to the reasons outlined above, i.e. pipeline cases and 
missing information on assets, and partly because of the way in which the Inland 
Revenue evaluated eligibility for FCjWFfC. As we noted in section 2, eligibility for 
FCjWFTC was evaluated every six months. The period during which families are 
observed in the LFS will not always coincide with the period when they were judged 
eligible or ineligible for FCjWFTC. This will give rise to some of the discrepancies we 
observe in the data. The dotted line in Figure 4.8 marks the advent of WFfC and 
there was a large increase in take-up in LFS shortly after the reform. 
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Figure 4.8 Take-up rate FCIWFTC 1997 - 2003 
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Notes: LFS (1997 - 2003). The take up rate is estimated using the tax benefit model described in 
section 3, and is defined as the proportion of eligible households who take up the tax credit. 
4.4.1. Wage Growth by FCjWFfC History 
Table 4.2 shows the mean percentage changes in the real wage between wave 1 and 
wave 5 broken down by FCjWFfC status. As noted, above, we use the hourly wage 
that is the directly observed hourly pay variable, similar fIDdingS apply for our 
constructed average hourly earnings. 
The FCjWFfC history variable describes each individual's FCj\'{!FfC status for all 
waves . Using the rules for eligibility for FCjWFfC, based on incomes and the number 
of dependent children in a household, we are able to calculate the maximum amount 
for which a household is eligibles6• The introduction of WFfC was phased in from 
October 1999, so between October 1999 and Spring 2000 it is not possible to identify 
whether these individuals in the LF are in receipt of FC or WFfC. Here we assume all 
such individuals post cohort 11 are 00 FC in wave 1 and we have checked that he 
Unfortunately the LFS docs not include questions regarding the amount of savings or childcare 
cxpendirurc in a household. We assume that savings (and childcare) arc equal to zero when calculating the 
maximum amount for which a household is eligible. 
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results in this section are not sensitive to whether we calculate the maxunum 
entitlement using FC rules or WFTC rules. As Table 4.1 showed, we consider four 
possible states for the FC/WFTC history variable (excluding the non-eligible recipients 
and those whose status changes more than once between waves 1 and 5): 
• Alwqys on - people who are in households that always receive the credit which is 
further divided into those receiving close to the maximum or more and those 
receiving less than 90% of the maximum; 
• Never-on are people who are in families that never receive the credit either 
because they do not take-up their eligibility or because they have no eligibility. 
This group of individuals is further divided in to eligible bllt never take-up, and 
• Off/ on are people who are Ul families that make a single off/on transition 
between waves 1 and 5; and 
• On/ off are people who make a single on/off transition between waves 1 and 5. 
The mean wage growth presented for each of the groups in Table 4.2 shows several 
interesting results, some of which are consistent with our priors the previous 
discussion, and others which are not. Firstly, the group that move from being on either 
FC or WFTC to not being on it generally experience relatively higher wage growth 
across almost all groups pre- and post-reform. This is not surprising, given that this is a 
group that ceases to be eligible becallse of their relatively higher wage growth. This is 
clearly the group of individuals who are close to the run-off point in wave 1. Therefore, 
in line with the discussion, above, on the cost and benefits of training or job search, we 
57 The LFS only reconls household income for wave 1 and wave 5, hence we are only able to estimate 
eligibility and take-up for these two waves. In Table 4.2, where we sub-divide the IItVIINII group into 
eligible and ineligible we use the estimate of eligibility in Wave 1. The implicit assumption is that eligibility 
in wave t is a reasonable proxy for eligibility in the other waves of the survey. 
166 
might expect this group of individuals to take up more (general) training (and hence get 
higher wages) -because the costs (wage-sacrifice) are subsidised, but they get more of 
the benefit stream because their entitlement is already close to the run-off point. We 
test this hypothesis formally below, estimating the probability of this group taking up 
(general) training, controlling for how close to run off point each individual is as well as 
the age of youngest dependent child in the household. 
In contrast to the group that move from off FC/\'{;'FI'C, the individuals that move on 
to FC/WFfC tend to have lower wage growth. We do not read too much into this 
result as, apart from the fact that the standard errors are relatively large (for the pre-
reform group in particular), clearly part of the reason they fall into eligibility for 
FC/WFfC is becalm they have lower wage growth. 
The non-entitled groups are, of course, higher wage workers and they typically exhibit 
modest levels of wage growth, while the non-take-up groups are lower wage workers 
and these typically exhibit higher wage growth perhaps because they are younger, have 
lower tenure, lower education, etc. Alternatively, this latter group may fail to take-up 
because they expect to be entitled for a short period either because of their anticipated 
high wage growth or because their wage levels are not amongst the lowest of recipients 
and they are close to the point where their entitlement to FC/WFfC would, in any 
case, be exhausted. They may also be entitled for a relatively shorter period if their 
children are closer to becoming independent than the entitled group who do take up 
the credit. A comparison of the mean age of the youngest dependent child in the 
family for the two groups confirms that this is indeed the case - that is, some of the 
eligible, non-take-up group will not bother with the credit because their children are 
close to becoming independent and it is therefore not worth the effort. In the sample 
of single mothers, pre-reform, the mean age of the youngest dependent child in families 
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who are eligible but do not take-up is 10.54 (standard error 0.3190), compared with a 
mean age for eligible families who do take up of 8.98 (standard error 0.2280). In the 
WFTC period, the same averages are 11.48 (0.2411) and 9.16 (0.1482). When we 
compare the difference in mean ages for married mothers and married fathers, we 
observe the same significant difference, although it is not as large - the full set of mean 
comparisons are shown in Table A4.16 in the appendix. 
Table 4.2 also shows the mean real wage growth for individuals on FC/WFTC for all 
five waves of the survey. The table shows the wage growth for individuals who were 
on the maximum (greater than or equal to 90% of the maximum) and those receiving 
less than the maximum (less than 90% of the maximum). This categorisation 
represents our crude attempt to capture the different incentives faced by the two 
groups of FC/WFTC recipients - that is, individuals on the maximum face a period of 
no 'tax' on their wage growth, and then, once they come on to the taper, a relatively 
longer period when their wage growth is taxed. In terms of their effect on the 
incentives to take part in wage enhancing activities (such as training and job search), 
these two forces are opposing, so it is difficult to predict whether we will observe 
relatively higher or lower wage growth for individuals on the maximum. The figures in 
Table 4.2 show that individuals on the max have higher mean wage growth, in both 
the FC and WFTC periods, relative to individuals on the taper. This would seem to 
imply that the net incentives for individuals on the max to take part in wage enhancing 
activities are positive. However, we also know that the group on the maximum 
FCjWFTC are the lowest wage group and we would expect them to be low tenure, low 
experience and hence high wage growth. We would also expect the eligible but no 
take-up group to be low wage workers, and hence have relatively higher wage growth, 
and the figures in the table conftrm this also. Interestingly, in the FC period, the no 
take up group have higher mean wage growth than individuals on the maximum -
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perhaps indicating that the prospect of the taper has some effect - but for women in 
the WFrC period, this pattern is reversed. 
It is also instructive to compare across periods. In terms of the different incentives 
facing (potential) FC/WFrC recipients, one of the significant changes due to the 
reform was the reduction in the taper from 70% for FC, to 55% for WFrC. This 
reduces the 'tax' on wage growth, and hence we would expect some increase in the 
wage growth for people on the maximum. For married/cohabiting men and women, 
the differences in the wage growth for the two groups are not very different, and 
certainly not significantly different. For single mothers, however, there is a significant 
increase in the wage growth for women on the maximum, and the wage growth now 
significantly exceeds that of single mothers on the taper. 
We noted, above, that individuals on the maximum, while gaining the full benefit of the 
wage subsidy, also, for a period at least, do not pay the associated 'tax' on wage growth 
because they are not on the taper. Thus, for a certain period the incentive effects of the 
wage subsidy are greater than zero. However, once they come off the maximum, 
individuals face a relatively long period on the taper. One reason for the higher 
observed wage growth observed for those on the maximum is that these individuals 
could have a high discount rate - that is, they place a greater emphasis on wage gains 
now, while they are not on the taper, and they are not so concerned about the fact that 
higher wage growth also brings them closer to the point where they move off the 
maximum and onto the taper. It makes sense, therefore, to test whether there is a 
correlation between wage growth and the distance between an individual's current 
earnings and the threshold earnings that moves them from being on the maximum to 
being on the taper. 
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Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 plot the growth in wages against the ratio of current 
earnings to the threshold level of earnings required to move an individual from being 
on the maximum to being on the taperS8. The threshold level of earnings is calculated 
using the eligibility rules for FC/WFfC and tax benefit model described in the data 
section. Figure 4.9 is drawn for single mothers on FC and receiving the maximum 
amount; Figure 4.10 is drawn for single mothers on WFfC receiving the maximum. 
The figures are drawn for single mothers only, as the comparison for married/coupled 
partners is complicated by the presence of the spouse or partner's earned income. 
Figure 4.9 shows, as expected, that there is a strong negative correlation between the 
wage growth of individuals on the maximum and how 'close' they are to coming off the 
maximum and onto the FC taper. The slope of the line through the scatter in Figure 
4.9 is -0.3133 (standard error 0.0774). Figure 4.10, for \X'FTC recipients on the 
maximum, also shows a negative correlation, though it is weaker (-0.1126) and 
insignificant (standard error 0.1063). The weaker relationship for \X'FTC recipients on 
the maximum might be explained by the fact that some of these individuals only came 
onto the maximum after the reform, and would previously have been on the FC taper. 
Thus, we observe more bunching in Figure 4.10 to the right of the figure, close to a 
ratio of 1, than we do in Figure 4.9 - also, the taper under \X'FTC was significantly 
flatter than that on FC (55% versus 70%), which would also partly explain the weaker 
correlation. 
We can also estimate the length of time it will take for a given individual to come off 
the maximum and onto the taper. Table 4.3 shows the mean number of years for 
single mothers to come off the maximum onto the taper. The number of years (Y) is 
In order to avoid problems associated with reduced sample size, the data in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10, 
and Table 4.3 refers to individuals on FC/WFTC in at least wave 1. The sample is not sptit into A"~'qysoll, 
Oil-4/. 1/ .. 
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estimated as Y=ln(T/E)/ln(l +g), where T the threshold level of earnings at which an 
individual comes off the maximum onto the taper; E are current weekly earnings; and g 
is the current growth rate of earnings (we use annual growth in the real wage). The 
estimate variable Y is purely a static measure of the number of years it would take a 
given individual to come off the maximum, it assumes constant growth rates, no 
changes in FC/WFfC eligibility rules, and no change in family circumstances, i.e. 
number and age of dependent children. The estimated number of years is calculated 
for the FC and WFfC periods separately. The first row of the table (FC>O*MAX) shows 
the mean years for a single mother receiving the maximum FC amount to come off the 
maximum. The estimates imply that a single mother, receiving the maximum FC 
amount, with average earnings growth, could expect to remain on the maximum for 
about 3.5 years - it should be the same in both the FC and WFfC periods, and it is. 
This is not a particularly short time period, and it is therefore not surprising that we 
would observe individuals on the maximum with relatively higher wage growth - the 
higher wages remain 'untaxed' by the taper for about 3.5 years. The second row 
(WFTC>O*MAX) in Table 4.3 shows the number of years that an individual receiving the 
maximum amount of credit can expect to remain on the maximum, given their current 
earnings growth. Given the increased generosity of WFfC, we might have expected 
the number of years to be greater than that for FC>O*MAX (row 1), however, this need 
not necessarily be the case, as the sample is different. WFTC>O*MAX contains 
individuals who would not have been in the FC>O*MAX sample. The final two rows of 
the table compare like-for-like individuals. The third row (FC>O*MAX & WFTC>O*MAX, 
FC (Y») shows the mean number of years for single mothers receiving the maximum FC 
amount (and who were eligible for both the FC and WFTC maximum amounts). The 
fourth row (FC>O*MAX & WFTC>O*MAX, WFTC (Y») shows the same figure for single 
mothers receiving the maximum WFfC amount. The table shows that the increased 
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generosity of WFTC means an increase in years on the maximum of about 1 year, 
although, the variance in the mean is large and the difference is not significant. 
Table 4.2 Wage (hourly pay) growth (% change) by FC and WFTC receipt status 
Married Men Married Women Lone Mothers 
FC Status Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err 
Always on 
Receipt<0.90 of max 7.90% 0.0219 6.45% 0.0415 5.41% 0.0176 
Receipt>0.90 of max 11.66% 0.0354 7.12% 0.0395 7.76% 0.0158 
Never on 
Non-takeup 15.06% 0.0147 9.07% 0.0094 9.20% 0.0144 
Not entitled 5.04% 0.0037 5.01% 0.0050 6.41% 0.0122 
Off/on -0.23% 0.0285 -4.48% 0.0441 3.65% 0.0352 
On/off 5.78% 0.0148 6.01% 0.0172 12.98% 0.0348 
WFTC Status 
Always on 
Receipt<0.90 of max 7.38% 0.0110 4.40% 0.0464 3.06% 0.0132 
Receipt>0.90 of max 7.42% 0.0222 12.57% 0.0335 15.39% 0.0165 
Never on 
Non-takeup 11.00% 0.0078 8.92% 0.0068 9.38% 0.0138 
Not entitled 5.32% 0.0028 4.83% 0.0036 3.33% 0.0110 
Off/on 3.24% 0.0104 3.83% 0.0145 7.77% 0.0145 
Onloff 9.88% 0.0145 7.99% 0.0213 7.91% 0.0389 
Notes: LFS (1997 - 2003). Wage here is defined as reported hourly pay. All growth is measured as 
real wage growth. Wages are deflated to January 2000 using the monthly RPI. Standard errors in 
italics. 
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Table 4.3 Single mothers receiving the maximum FCIWFTC, time taken to come 
onto the taper, given current wage growth, children and earnings 
Single mothers FC Period WFTC Period 
Receipt Years Std Err Years Std Err 
FC>O*MAX 3.44 0.18 3.69 a 0.46 
WFTC>O*MAX 3.28 a 0.16 3.58 0.50 
FC>O*MAX & WFTC>O*MAX, FC (y) 3.44 " 0.18 3.30 a 0.48 
FC>O*MAX & WFTC>O*MAX, WFTC (y) 4.26 " 0.22 4.51 " 0.60 
Notes: LFS, 1997 - 2003. The number of years (Y) required to come off the maximum is calculated as 
Y=ln(T/E)lIn(1 +g), where T is the threshold level of weekly eamings to come off the maximum onto the 
taper, given the number of dependent children in the household; E is the current level of weekly 
eamings and g is the growth rate of earnings (proxied for using the current growth in real wages). The 
number of years calculated is purely static in that it does not control for changes in hours or age(s) 
and number of dependent kids. (a) Obviously we do not observe the amount of WFTC (FC) received 
by a single mother in the FC (WFTC) periods. These figures are calculated using the tax benefit 
model described in the data section. 
Figure 4.9 The relationship between real wage growth and the ratio of current 
earnings to the level of earnings that moves individuals on the 
maximum onto the taper - single mothers only, FC period 
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The relationship between real wage growth and the ratio of current 
earnings to the level of earnings that moves individuals on the 
maximum onto the taper - single mothers only, WFTC period 
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4.4.2. Wage Growth by job tenure and FCjWFTC History 
Individuals on FCjWFTC have significantly lower levels of average job tenure than 
almost any other group. The mean job tenure for each of the three samples by 
FCj WFTC history is shown in Table 4.4. The table also shows the mean job tenure 
for a 'snapshot' of individuals - whether or not they were receiving FC j WFTC in 
wave 1. The mean job tenure for individuals on FCjWFTC (either for all five waves, 
or those on FCjWFTC in wave 1) is, not surprisingly, significantly lower than that for 
individuals in any of the other groups. The mean job tenure for single mothers always 
on the credit is just 47.5 months (standard error 1.4554), compared with a figure of 95.4 
(2.9833) for ineligible individuals never on the credit. We observe similar differences 
for the married fathers and married mothers groups, although the mean job tenure for 
each category of FC jWFTC history in the married fatller's sample is higher. 
1.2 
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Figures A4.20-A4.22 in the appendix shows the distribution of job tenure for each of 
the samples. The figures show that for both the female samples, almost half of the 
women we observe on FC/WFfC (10 wave 1) have job tenure of less than two years 
(about 60% of them have job tenure less than three years). We observe a similar 
bunching at low levels of job tenure in the married fathers sample, although the 
proportion of FC/WFfC recipients with job tenure of less than two years is slightly 
lower at around 40%. 
The wage growth literature suggests that job tenure is important for wage growth; see 
Altonji and Williams (1998) for example. We therefore compare the wage growth of 
FC/WFfC recipients and non-recipients by job tenure. Figure 4.11 plots the wage 
growth of married fathers by FC/WFfC history and job tenure. The next two plots 
show the same relationship for married mothers and single mothers respectively. The 
three figures are drawn for all individuals, regardless of whether they change jobs 
between waves. The next section compares job mobility for FC/'X'FTC recipients and 
non-recipients. Because the cell sizes decline rapidly for job tenure beyond four years -
particularly for individuals on FC/WFfC - we group these individuals into one 
category. Furthermore, the sample sizes are too small to divide the sample into non-
recipients who are eligible or ineligible, or recipients on the maximum and not on the 
maximum. The aim here is simply to see whether FC/WFfC recipients have wage 
growth that is in line with the wage growth of non-recipients with similar job tenure. 
In terms of the patterns of wage growth across categories of job tenure, FC/WFfC 
recipients (always on) and non-recipients (never on) in all three samples follow a very 
similar pattern - wage growth is highest in the low tenure groups, and declines with 
tenure. The higher wage growth at lower levels of job tenure is consistent with the 
idea that (genera~ training takes place early on in the job (as in Booth and Bryan, 2003). 
175 
The fact that we observe a similar shape for the a/llIqys 011 and lIever 011 groups, and 
assuming the shape is in part attributable to training, indicates that the take-up of 
training may not be affected by the wage subsidy. There is some weak evidence (for 
married fathers and single mothers) that the uve/ of wage growth within a given category 
of job tenure is higher for individuals never on FC/WFfC, compared with individuals 
always on FC/WFfC. However, the difference is not significant in any of the samples. 
In the multivariate analysis, we will formally test this hypothesis. 
For couples - married/cohabiting men and women - it is probably not wise to draw 
any concrete conclusions about relative wage growth, as we do not control for total 
household income. However, we do observe significantly lower wage growth in the off-
on group for both samples. This implies that low wage growth could be one of the key 
factors that result in a person taking up FC/WFfC. 
Table 4.4 Mean job tenure (months) by FCIWFTC history 
FCIWFTC history 
Always on 
Never on 
Eligible, no take-up 
Ineligible 
Off-on 
On-off 
Total 
On FCIWFTC, wave 
1* 
Not on FCIWFTC, 
wave 1** 
Observations 
Married dads Married mums 
Mean job Std E Mean job Std E 
tenure . rr tenure . rr 
60.2 2.3900 45.1 2.4942 
92.4 2.9930 72.5 1.0524 
125.6 0.7788 87.0 0.6840 
82.8 2.9293 60.5 2.2209 
90.6 3.1472 67.1 2.3958 
118.1 0.7014 81.0 0.5419 
62.8 2.0071 48.9 1.9460 
121.9 0.7289 82.4 0.5569 
21,426 19,719 
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Single mums 
Mean job Std. Err tenure 
47.5 1.4554 
75.4 3.4260 
95.4 2.9833 
61.0 4.0005 
51.1 2.5751 
66.1 1.2367 
48.2 1.3243 
81.9 1.9431 
4,597 
Notes: Job tenure is for wave 1 of the lFS 1997-2003. Standard errors in italics. (*) The on FClWFTC in 
wave 1 group is made up of the two groups Always on and On-off. (-) The Not on FClWFTC, wave 1 is 
made up of the two groups Never on and Off-on. 
Figure 4.11 Wage growth of married fathers by FCIWFTC history and Job tenure 
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Figure 4.12 Wage growth of married mothers by FCIWFTC history and Job tenure 
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Figure 4.13 Wage growth of single mothers by FCIWFTC history and Job tenure 
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Notes: Wage growth is the percentage change in real wages over a 12-month period. LFS 1992 -
2003 
4.4.3. Wage growth by qualifications and education 
The LFS contains a considerable amount of information on respondents' qualifications 
and skills. Wage growth (and perhaps the take-up of training) may be affected by these 
qualifications. So, in Figure 4.14 we break the sample by both highest qualification and 
FC/WFfC status. In order to make the figure easier to read, we show the proportions 
for the a/wqys on and never on groups only. The figure groups the highest qualification 
into National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) categories, which is the same grouping 
used by the DFES59 
S9 The exact definitions what constitute each NVQ level can be found at 
http://www.skillsbase.dfes.gov.uk/Database/Darabase.asp?sect=5&page=4. 
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Figure 4.14 Breakdown of highest qualificat ion by WFTC status 
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The data clearly shows that FC/WFfC recipients have lower qualifications than those 
parents who are never in receipt of FC/WFTC. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show the 
change in the log real wage between waves 1 and 5 by highest qualification observed in 
wave 1 for the a/IVery! 011 and never Of! groups. The sample used in Table 4.5 (for both 
the a/IVery! 011 and never 011 groups) contains all inclividuals, regardless of job tenure. In 
Table 4.6, we restrict the sample to people with job tenure (in wave 1) of two years or 
less. The motivation for this is so that we can make comparisons with individuals who 
we know are similar, not only in terms of qualifications, but also job tenure - which, as 
the previous section showed, is important for wage growth. The sample size for NVQ 
Level 4 and NVQ LevelS qualifications decreases significantly when we restrict job 
tenure to two years are less; we therefore merge these two groups in Table 4.6. 
The comparison of the wage gains shows that at the lower end of the qualifications 
spectrum FC/\VFTC recipients typically have higher wage growth than non-recipients. 
This is true even when we compare 'more similar' individuals by job tenure in Table 
4.6. As we would expect for people with lower job tenure, mean wage growth is higher 
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for both recipients and non-recipients, but wage growth for recipients is still higher. 
The comparisons are dogged by the relatively small sample sizes, as shown by the large 
standard errors. However, when we group the three samples of married fathers, 
mothers and single mothers, the difference in wage growth between recipients and 
non-recipients with NVQ less than level two is significant at 10% level. 
The main conclusion for the comparisons of wage growth by job tenure and highest 
qualification is that, in terms of wage growth, FC/WFTC recipients appear to do at 
least as well as similar individuals not on the FC/WFTC. One of the key factors that 
we have ignored so far is job mobility, and the wage gains associated with changing 
jobs. We now turn our attention to analysing wage growth by job stayers and job 
movers. 
Table 4.5 Real wage growth for FCIWFTC reCipients and non-recipients by 
highest qualification (wave 1) 
Married fathers Married mother Single mothers 
Qualifications Always on Never on Always on Never on Always on Never on 
Less than NVQ 7.9% 4.2% 6.7% 4.2% 8.7% 3.7% Level 2 
(0.0181) (0.0075) (0.0302) (0.0068 (0.0193) (0.0187) 
NVQL2 4.9% 6.7% 10.6% 5.5% 8.0% 5.7% 
(0.0235) (0.0066) (0.0376) (0.0055) (0.0151) (0.0135) 
NVQL3 6.8% 6.3% 9.1% 5.7% 4.5% 5.4% 
(0.0277) (0.0048) (0.0428) (0.0075) (0.0278) (0.0226) 
NVQL4 9.6% 6.6% -9.0% 6.5% 6.1% 6.8% 
(0.0513) (0.0081) (0.1488) (0.0077) (0.0368) (0.0234) 
NVQL5 2.5% 8.0% -1.2% 6.3% 8.1% 8.9% 
(0.1737) (0.0058) (0.0811) (0.0081) (0.0457) (0.0186) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations are for a balanced panel of employees in 
both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS, 1997 - 2003. Wage growth is measured in real terms, indexed to 
January 2000 prices using the monthly RPI. 
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Table 4.6 Real wage growth for FCIWFTC recipients and non- by highest 
qualification (wave 1), job tenure restricted to two years or less (wave 
1) for all Individuals 
Married fathers Married mothers Single mothers 
Always on Never on Always on Never on Always on Never on 
Less than NVQ 10.6% 5.4% 7.4% 5.5% 9.9% 4.8% Level 2 
0.0214 0.0182 0.0310 0.0120 0.0250 0.0248 
NVQL2 7.3% 6.5% 10.9% 8.1% 9.7% 10.8% 
0.0315 0.0164 0.0513 0.0109 0.0234 0.0208 
NVQL3 9.3% 10.1% 12.5% 7.8% 6.8% 2.5% 
0.0434 0.0104 0.0804 0.0157 0.0404 0.0552 
Greater than 9.1% 11.5% -8.4% 6.6% 8.7% 8.2% NVQ Level 3 • 
0.0572 0.0120 0.1089 0.0126 0.0429 0.0302 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations are for a balanced panel of employees in 
both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS, 1997 - 2003. The sample is restricted to individuals with job tenure 
less than ore equal to two years. (*)NVa Level 4 and Level 5 are grouped due to small sample sizes. 
Wage growth is measured in real terms, indexed to January 2000 prices using the monthly 
RPI. 
4.4.4. Job changes and wage growth 
The LFS allows us to identify two groups of workers: those who continue to work with 
the same employer over the five waves (12-month period): "job-stayers"; and those 
who change employers: "job-movers,>6o. Several papers have noted the importance of 
mobility in wage growth. The literature that relates migration decisions to investments 
in human capital provides some support for the hypothesis that labour mobility can 
also be seen as an investment in human capital (see Widerstedt (1998) and references 
therein). Gottschalk (2001) also finds that the relative wage gains for job-movers are 
considerably larger than those for job-stayers. The Connolly and Gottschalk model· 
60 The second group could be further divided into quits and layoffs, however, for FC/WFTC recipients in 
particular we have few observations of the latter. We therefore ignore this distinction here, furthennore, 
individuals' answers to questions about reasons for leaving their job may not be t 00% truthful, making any 
distinction between quits and layoffs likely to be measured with some error. 
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predicts that individuals on the SSP programme would be less mobile (because they 
have fewer incentives to search for a more highly paid job). We can test a couple of 
basic hypotheses using the data from the LFS. Firstly: are individuals who are always on 
FC/WFfC more or less likely to leave their jobs? And secondly, are their wage changes 
comparable with FC/WFTC non-recipients who also leave their jobs? 
Using the LFS we can determine whether an individual moved jobs using one of two 
variables. The fIrst variable is the answers to a question in each wave that asks them 
whether or not they have left a paid job in the previous thirteen weeks61 • The second 
job-change indicator variable is constructed from the job tenure data, if job tenure in 
wave 5 is less than 12 months and less than job tenure in wave 1 we take this as an 
indication that the respondent has changed jobs at some point over the last 12 months. 
Each of the two job change indicators should, of course, match - however, due to 
measurement error associated with misreporting62, for a handful of individuals this is 
not always the case. These individuals are dropped from the sample. 
The proportion of individuals who change jobs is shown in Figure 4.15. Figure 4.16 
shows the differences in wage growth across each of the groups. For each of the 
samples, FC/WFfC a/wqys on have substantially higher probability of moving jobs 
between wave 1 and 5 compared to Never on. In fact, for married fathers and mothers 
the A/wqys on group are twice as likely to change jobs relative to the Never on group. 
While these fIgures are suggestive, unfortunately the cell sizes are too small to do a 
reliable breakdown by whether individuals are receiving the maximum or something 
61 The question does not actually ask the respondent whether the job they left was their ",ai" job. However, 
given that very few of FC/WFTC recipients in the sample have a second job, we assume the answers to 
the question refer to having left their main job. 
62 As noted in Altonji and Williams (1998) there is a tendency for individuals to report job tenure with error, 
particularly after changing jobs. 
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less63 • This would be useful to see if FC/WFTC were acting as an on-the-job search 
subsidy - since effective on-the-job search might require some reduction in working 
hours and consequent reduction in income which would be smaller for those in the 
taper than for those on the maximum. 
H owever, wage growth in Figure 4.16 is higher for the Alwqys 011 job movers relative to 
Never on job movers. As we no ted above, the cell sizes are small, however, when we 
group the three samples the difference in wage growth for job movers is significant at 
the 5% level. Thus, at least part of the additional real wage growth experienced by 
FC/WFTC recipients that we observed compared to non-recipients in the previous 
section (fable 4.5 and Table 4.6) might be attributable to them quitting more 
frequently to take higher paid jobs. 
Figure 4.15 Job changes by FC/WFTC status 
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Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The % changing jobs is defined as the proportion of each sample 
who leave at least one paid jobs in the 12 months between wave 1 and wave 5 of the 
survey. 
63 The cell sizes of individuals who change jobs between waves for each of the samples are: married fathers 
139 (AI""!}! on), 1550 (Ntlltron); married mothers 81 (Alwqy!on). 1747 ( tttrOIl); and single mothe.rs 188 
, Iwqy! on), 11 8 (Nttu on). A signi ficant weakness of using the LFS panel to analyse job change is that 
people who leave jobs are also more ~kely to leave the survey. 
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Figure 4.16 Wage growth by FCIWFTC status 
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Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. Wage growth is measured in real terms, indexed to January 2000 
prices using the monthly RPI. 
4.4.5. Starting wage, wage growth, and FCjWFfC status 
The prevIous three sections have all presented evidence to show that FCjWFfC 
recipients have characteristics that are unlike those in the generaJ popuJation. That is, 
they typically have low job tenure, fewer qualifications, and are more mobile in terms of 
changing jobs. None of this is particuJarly surprising; after all, the tax credits are 
targeted at these types of individuaJs. However, the evidence presented in each section 
goes one step further, comparing the mean wage growth of FCjWFfC recipients and 
non· recipients by each of these characteristics. The results so far indicate that 
FCjWFfC certainly do not seem to fare any worse in terms of wage growth, and under 
some comparisons (by qualifications and job mobility) they seem to experience higher 
wage growth on average. In this section we present one [maJ comparison of mean 
wage growth by FCjWFfC status - by quantile of the starting (wave 1) wage 
distribution. 
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There is a small literature that relates the importance of the initial wage to career wage 
growth; see for example, Gladden and Tabor (2002)64. Connolly and Gottschalk (2002) 
develop a model that incorporates the wage level-wage growth trade-off into a model of 
on-the-job search. In the next chapter we look in more detail at how the wage level-
wage growth trade off might be affected by the presence of a wage subsidy. In this 
section, as in the previous three sections, we simply compare the mean wage growth 
FC/WFfC recipients and non-recipients with a similar characteristic - namely that they 
both occupy roughly the same position in the wage distribution. 
Not surprisingly, we find that the majority of FC/WFfC recipients in the A/way! on 
group are concentrated in the lower quantiles of the wage distribution. Figure 4.17 
shows the proportion of individuals in the A/way! on and Never on groups in each 
quintile of the wage distribution in wave 1. The quintiles are calculated separately for 
each of the three samples, but across all individuals both on and off FC/WFfC. Over 
77% of married fathers in the A/way! on group are in the bottom quintiles of the wage 
distribution (of married fathers). About half of married mothers in the A/way! on group 
are in the bottom quintile, compared with just over a quarter of single mothers in the 
A/way! on group. 
Figure 4.18 shows the average change in the log hourly wage for each of the three 
samples by quintiles of the starting wage. The cell sizes for the upper quintiles are very 
small for the A/way! on group, and we do not report the mean wage growth for these 
quintiles. For married/couples men and women, the mean wage growth for 
FC/WFfC in the fIrst and second quintiles is lower. This contradicts the results from 
the previous comparisons of mean wage growth, although the difference for married 
64 Gladden and Tabor consider the starting wage at the time of entering the labour market. They 
wish to use this as a proxy for the heterogeneous characteristics that potentially bias the slope 
coefficients in a log wage equation. That is, it is the permanent (unobserved) component of the 
wage equation. 
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mothers is only marginal and it is also insignificant65• For married fathers, however, 
the differences are large and significant - in the first quintile the difference in mean 
wage growth for theA/w~s on and N ever on groups is 10.8% (standard error 0.0167), the 
difference in the second quintile is 9.3% (0.0249) . The pattern for single mothers is 
completely the opposite - single mothers in the A /ways on group at the bottom o f the 
wage distribution have higher wage growth than their counter parts in the Never 011 
group. The difference in the mean s is 6.1% (s tandard error 0.0311). Mean wage 
growth for single mothers in the A/ways 011 group in the second quintile is also higher 
(3 .3%), but the difference is not significant. 
Figure 4.17 Position of FCIWFTC reCipients in the wage distribution (wave 1) 
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Notes: LFS. 1997 - 2003. The quinliles of the wage distribution are estimated separately for each of 
the three samples 
6S ror married mothe.rs. the difference in mean wage growth bctwcen the A lwqys on and N e'tr on group in the 
first quintile is 0.3% (standard error 0.0284). for the second quintile the difference is 4% (s tandard error 
0.0326). 
Figure 4.18 % Wage growth by qulntile of the wage distribution (wave 1) and 
FCIWFTC status 
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Notes: LFS, 1997 - 2003. The quinti les of the wage distribution are estimated separately for each of 
the three samples. We do not report wage growth for quintiles where the cell size is too small. 
The analysis in this section, and the previous comparisons, all summarise the mean 
wage growth of FC/WFrC recipients according to various characteristics. Overall, the 
conclusions from the analysis of the summary statistics above are quite mixed. On 
some comparisons, such as qualifications and job change, we find that FC/WFfC had 
higher mean wage growth on average; whereas on other comparisons their wage growth 
appears to be either lower (comparisons with the eligible but not take up group) or 
pretty much the same (comparisons by job tenure). In the next section we attempt to 
clear up some of this confusion by making 'cleaner' comparisons - first by comparing 
the mean wage growth of recipients and non-recipients according the natural 
experiment outlined above; and second by estimating multivaria te models of wage 
growth, controlling for FC/WFrC receipt and a whole range of characteristics. 
4.5. Wage growth and the FC/WFTC reform 
Much of the analysis above has supported the idea that wage growth was affected by 
FC/ WFrC status in ways that give credence to the idea that wage subsidies affect wage 
growth via incentives for on-the-job acquisition of human capital through training. 
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However a major concern with the results above is that, while we control for some of 
the observable differences between individuals, we fail to control for Ilnobseroab/e 
differences between individuals - and in particular unobservable differences between 
individuals that might affect both the take-up of FC/WFfC and wage growth. The rest 
of the paper looks a two different ways to dealing with this problem. Firstly, in this 
section we exploit the FC-WFfC reform ('the reform,) in order to identify individuals 
that only become eligible for tax credits after the reform. We then compare the wage 
growth of these individuals with that of similar individuals in the past following a 
simple difference-in-difference approach. The next section parameterises the wage 
growth equation and estimates wage growth controlling for FC/WFfC status and also 
including selectivity correction terms. The correction terms are derived from a 
bivariate probit of FC/WFfC take-up in both waves, assuming correlation in the 
unobservables from both FC/WFfC take-up equations (wave 1 and wave 5) and the 
wage growth equation. 
As noted, above, one approach to dealing with the problem of unobservables in 
FC/WFfC participation and wage growth is to exploit the WFfC reform. The WFfC 
reform extended the taper higher up the income distribution, so that individuals, who 
were originally paid too well to be entitled to FC, became entitled to WFfC after the 
reform (Figure 4.1 showed that the change in the maximum was modest by 
comparison). Thus we can identify the pre-reform individuals who are not entitled to 
FC but would be entitled to WFfC had it been introduced. In principle, the group of 
newly entitled (post-reform) individuals is the same, on average, to those who were in 
this part of the wage distribution prior to the WFfC post-reform and hence were not 
subject to the effects of the taper. That is, the WFfC reform presents us with a natural 
experiment that allows us to compute a difference-in-differences estimate of the effects 
of the taper on wage growth. 
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Table 4.7 presents the raw data for these comparisons. All of the fIrst six groups in the 
table are entitled both pre- and post-refoon and are split into recipients and non-
recipients and then further divided into level of receipt (on the maximum/not on the 
maximum). The seventh group are those who are floated onto tax credits by the 
refoon. And there is a fmal group, not shown, which are those people who are not 
entitled and not receiving either pre- or post-refoon. In each case, we have grouped the 
data across types of individual to try to get more precise estimates. FC and WFfC refer 
to levels of entitlement while R refers to receipt. Note that someone with FC>O will 
necessarily have WFfC>O because WFTC was more generous for all individuals. 
Consider the non take-up groups ftrst. The FC>O, R=O group real wage growth was 
9.8% and post WFTC this becomes 9.7% which suggests that the macroeconomic 
environment for low wage workers was not changing much over this period. This is 
reinforced by inspecting the O<FC<0.9*max, R=O subgroup - which is the part of the 
non-takeup group with not quite so low wages - here wage growth is also practically 
unchanged going from 8.8% to 8.7%, while the FC>0.9*max, R=O subgroup, which is 
a very low wage group, saw wage growth rise from 13.2% to 14.8%. 
Comparing those who are on the maximum and who take-up (FC>0.9*max, R>O) we 
see that wage growth rises from 12.8% to 18.0% (a difference of 5.2% which is 
statistically signifIcant) perhaps reflecting the increase in the incentives for wage growth 
arising from the fall in the taper. As we noted, above, one reason for this might be that 
the maximum plateau got longer under WFfC so that, for given wage level and wage 
growth, recipients of the maximum could expect to remain on the maximum for longer 
- delaying the time when the wage gains would be subject to the taper (see Table 4.3, 
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10). 
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The receiving group not on the maximum (denoted O.9*max>FC>O, R>O) is the group 
that tells us about the effect of the fall in the taper from 70% to 55%. Table 4.7 shows 
that wage growth falls slightly from 5.9% to 5.1 %, though the difference is insignificant. 
The fall in wage growth could be due to the fact that the tapered region has got longer, 
so for given wage and wage growth WFfC recipients can expect to remain on the taper 
for longer than FC recipients. This delays the time when the wage gains become free of 
the taper. 
Table 4.7 Wage growth under FC and WFTC 
FCIWFTC takeup group 
FC>O,R>O 
FC>0.9*max, R>O 
0<FC<0.9*max, R>O 
FCIWFTC non-takeup group 
FC>O,R=O 
FC>0.9*max, R=O 
0<FC<0.9*max, R=O 
Newly entitled group 
FC=O, WFTC>O 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. 
FC period 
Mean Std Dev. 
0.081 
0.128 
0.059 
0.098 
0.132 
0.088 
0.033 
0.007 
0.014 
0.010 
0.006 
0.013 
0.006 
0.023 
WFTC period 
Mean Std Dev. 
0.094 
0.180 
0.051 
0.097 
0.148 
0.087 
0.039 
0.007 
0.017 
0.010 
0.006 
0.016 
0.006 
0.016 
The most informative group, however, is the FC=O, WFTC>O group whose wages 
made them newly eligible to WFTC post reform but who were ineligible for FC pre-
reform. Here wage growth rises from 3.3% to 3.9% perhaps reflecting the changes in 
incentives that have occurred (none of the newly entitled group would be entitled to the 
maximum). This wage growth change of just 0.6%, although still statistically 
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insignificant, is larger than the extrapolation from the (slighdy poorer) group who are 
on the taper both pre and post reform (O<FC<O.9*max, R>O). This might reflect the fact 
that the newly entided are likely to be closer to the point at which they cease to be 
entided to credit and so face a shorter period of time over which they have to pay the 
taper on their wage gains. 
While Table 4.7 presents the results of a natural experiment, it might still be desirable 
to examine the effects of the reform using multivariate methods. Although this natural 
experiment is unusual, since it allows us to compare individuals in the same parts of the 
wage distribution both pre and post reform, there may still have been changes that 
occurred over time that changed the composition of the FC>O, R>O and FC=O, 
WFfC>O groups. For example, the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, just 
6 months ahead of the WFTC reform, may have inflated wage growth prior to the 
reform. Inspection of the data did not reveal any changes at that time or just before. 
Another change was the treatment of childcare costs, which became more generous 
under WFTC. Inspection of the data for mothers with pre-school aged children in the 
household, where formal childcare expenses are more of an issue does not reveal large 
differences relative to the group with older children. Moreover, inspection of the 
observable characteristics (age, job tenure, education, etc.) of these two groups before 
and after the reform does not show any significant changes in characteristics. 
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4.5.1. Econometric model of wage growth and FC/WFTC receipt 
In this section we present the results of a multivariate analysis of wage growth, where 
the wage growth equation includes controls for FC/\VFfC status over the five waves 
of the survey. The wage growth equation for individual i is specified as follows 
, , 
~w; =a+XI P+HI y+E; (1) 
where XI is a matrix of characteristics, such as job tenure, experience and 
qualifications; HI specifies FC/\VFfC history over the five waves, and EI is an error 
term. Ignoring the question of eligibility for now, the latent variable underlying the 
decision to take-up FC/WFTC is given by 
(2) 
(3) 
where Fl;· refers to wave 1 of the survey, and FS I • refers to wave 5. The observed 
variables, either on FC/\VFfC,(Fl"FS;) = 1, or not on FC/WFTC, (Fl;,FS;)= 0, 
are defined as follows 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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Given that we drop observations of individuals who make more than one on-off or ojJ-on 
transition, the four groups deftned previously in the paper can defmed according to 
Fl/ and F5/: 
Alw'!}s on: Fl; = 1 and F5; = 1, 
Neveron: Fl; = 0 and F5; = 0, 
Off-on: FI; = 0 and F5/ = I , 
On-off: FI; = I and F5; = 0, 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters in the wage growth equation, 
we need to confront several endogeneity problems. Firstly, there is a double selection 
problem, relating to attrition from the survey and also the decision to participate in 
employment in both waves. Secondly, FC/WFTC status itself may be endogenous, as 
the unobserved characteristics that determine the four states above are also likely to be 
correlated with wage growth. We follow the usual approach to dealing with each of 
these problems, flrstly estimating Heckman-type selection terms to account for the self 
selection into employment, then estimating a reduced form equation to obtain 
instrumented estimates of the probability of being alw'!}s on FC/WFTC or never on. We 
explain each of these steps in turn. 
4.5.2. Self-selection and attrition 
As we mentioned above, there are actually two selection issues when it comes to using 
the LFS panel to analyse wage growth. The ftrst issue relates to attrition from the 
survey itself. With regard to the relationship between attrition and observable 
characteristics, the ONS has gone to some lengths - including the inclusion of booster 
samples in the survey - to ensure that the sample in each wave of the survey remains 
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representative of the population. In Table A4.17 we provide some comparisons of 
the mean characteristics of individuals who remain in the survey for all five waves 
('balanced,) and individuals who leave before the fifth wave66• The table shows the 
means for the key characteristics that we have analysed throughout the paper, for the 
three groups of single mothers, married/couples mothers, and married/couples fathers. 
The [111al row in the table shows that the attrition in the survey - measure as the 
proportion of individuals in wave 1 not present in wave 5 - is not insignificant, 39% of 
the sample of singles mothers and about 27% from each of the sample of 
married/couples fathers and mothers. However, the characteristics of the individuals 
in each of the samples are, on average, very similar. There are a few characteristics on 
which the samples differ (though not for all three groups). Single mothers in the 
balanced panel, are more likely to be on FC/WFfC, at least in wave 1, 17.4% of the 
sample of individuals who leave before wave 5, and 21.4 % of the balanced panel. The 
individuals in the balanced panel also have higher mean job tenure (in wave I), 
although, relative to the stock of job tenure in each group, the difference is small -
ranging from 6 months for single mothers, to around 12 months for married fathers. 
Finally, we also observe that individuals in the balanced panel have, on average, fewer 
qualifications - a greater proportion of individuals in the balanced panel state that their 
highest qualification is an NVQ level 1 - although, as before, the differences are small. 
Overall, comparisons of the observable characteristics of individuals in the balanced 
panel with those who leave the survey before wave 5 indicates that selection on 
observables in probably not a serious problem. A greater problem, due to the attrition, 
is selection (out of the survey) on tlnobservables, particularly if the unobservables are also 
66 The table places no restrictions on working or reporting an hourly wage in one or both waves. For 
individuals not working, the work related characteristics are clearly not included in the calculation of the 
means 
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correlated with either wage growth or the FC/WFfC status. One way to address this 
problem is to estimate and include Heckman-type selection tenns in the estimation of 
the structural fonn equations, as we do for self-selection into and out of employment. 
However, this is very difficult to do in practice, as some of the key variables affecting 
the decision to enter or leave the survey, such as changes in family circumstances, will 
not be observed because people do not remain in the survey. It might be possible to 
use values from previous waves for these variables - however, this raises the further 
problem of introducing spurious correlations into the analysis because of problems 
relating to recall bias; see Jiminez-Martin and Perrachi (2002) for an example from the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey. Given that modelling the selection decision leading to 
attrition is just very difficult to with this the data (or, indeed, any data), and that it 
probably poses more problems that it solves, we assume, conveniently, that the it does 
not bias the results of our estimated parameters below. 
4.5.3. Self-selection into and out of employment 
In order to construct a sample to analyse wage growth, we need to constrain the sample 
to those individuals who not only are in the survey in both waves, but also who are in 
employment in both waves. Table 4.8, below, shows the flows into and out of 
employment between wave 1 and wave 5 of the LFS. The table shows that in wave 1 a 
high proportion of married fathers are in employment, with no difference between the 
on FC/WFfC and not on FC/WFfC groups. However, by wave 5 of the survey, we 
can see that over 9% of employed fathers on FC/WFfC (wave 1) have left 
employment, compared with just 4% for fathers not on FC/WFfC. Married mothers 
have, of course, a much lower probability of being in employment in the first place -
70% for mothers not on FC/WFfC, 48% for mothers on FC/WFfC (whose receipt is 
obviously in respect of partner's earnings). The exit rate from employment for 
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mothers on FC/WFfC is also higher than the not on group, 13% versus 6%, a similar 
to married fathers. Single mothers not receiving the credit have a relatively low 
probability of being in employment in wave 1, just 34%. Single mothers receiving the 
credit must all be employment in order to receive the credie, and interestingly we ftnd 
the exit rate from employment for single mothers is about the same (8% or 9%), 
regardless of whether they are receiving the credit or not. 
We estimate a bivariate probit in order to model the employment decision in both 
waves. The bivariate probit model has been used in many other studies where 
researchers are confronted by a double selection problem and the decisions they are 
trying to model are not independent; see, for example Heitmueller (2004) and Mohanty 
(2001). The model can be used to calculate selection correction terms - mills ratios -
that are analogous to the commonly used Heckman selection terms. 
The selection correction terms, outlined in equations (12) and (13) below, are slighdy 
different from the typical Heckman selection terms (where the decisions are 
independent), in that they are modifted using the correlation matrix of the 
unobservables from the latent variable models underlying the participation decision n 
both waves. 
67 In the survey we observe smaD proportion a single mothers (4%) receiving the tax credit but reporting 
themselves as not employed. Apart from the ob\;ous reporting error explanation, this situation could also 
arise because of the gap between evaluation periods for FC/WfTC eligibility (6 months). We drop these 
indi~duals from the sample. 
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Table 4.8 Participation by In employment by FCIWFTC status, waves 1 and 5 
Wave 1 Wave 5 
Married/couples fathers 
Employed, wave 5 
Employed, wave 1 Conditional on employed in 
wave 1 
FCIWFTC status No Yes Obs. No Yes Obs. 
Not on FCIWFTC (W1) 13% 87% 33,546 4% 96% 29,320 
On FCIWFTC (W1) 13%* 87% 2,336 9% 91% 2,027 
Observations 4,535 31,347 1,294 30,053 
Married/couples mothers 
Employed, wave 5 
Employed, wave 1 Conditional on employed in 
wave 1 
FCIWFTC status No Yes Obs. No Yes Obs 
Not on FCIWFTC (W1) 30% 70% 38,018 6% 94% 26,742 
On FCIWFTC (W1) 52%* 48% 2,594 13% 87% 1,243 
Observations 12,627 27,985 1,829 26,156 
Single mothers 
Employed, wave 5 
Employed, wave 1 Conditional on employed in 
wave 1 
FCIWFTC status No Yes Obs. No Yes Obs. 
Not on FCIWFTC (W1) 66% 34% 8,166 8% 92% 2,771 
On FCIWFTC (W1) 0% 100% 2,241 9% 91% 2,241 
Observations 5,395 5,012 441 4,571 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. (*) For married/coupled fathers and mothers, receipt of family could be in 
respect of the partner working above the threshold level of hours (16) - hence, unlike single 
mothers, the proportions in these cells need not be zero. All three samples are for individuals of 
working age, 16 - 64 (men) and 16 - 59 (women) 
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Write the latent variables underling the decision to participate in waves 1 and 5 as: 
. ' PI; = n; t5 + '1'1.1' (12) 
(13) 
Where an individual will participate in wave 1 if PII' > 0, and in wave 5 if P51' > O. 
The decisions to participate in wave 1 and 5 are not independent and the error tenns 
from the latent variable models will be correlated, PI/'I.I/'S -:t- O. In this case, the error 
tenns from the wage growth equation and the two latent variables (&;,'I'1.;,'I'5,;) are 
jointly nonnally distributed, with mean zero and covariance matrix 
(14) 
where, consistent with standard practice, we nonnalise the variance of the error tenns 
from the latent variable models Ul/'ll,O'I/'/ to unity for identification purposes. Results 
of the bivariate probit are shown in Table 4.9. Estimation of the bivariate probit by 
maximum likelihood allows us to calculate to two selection correction tenns, ~.I and 
(15) 
(16) 
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\Vhere P = PI/II.I/IS is the correlation in the error tenns, as estimated by the bivariate 
probit (fable 4.9), ,s(.) and <1>(.) are the standard nonnal density and distribution 
functions respectively, and F(.) is the bivariate standard nonnal distribution function. 
The lamda selection correction tenns given by (15) and (16) are included as regressors 
in the wage growth equation. 
Table 4.9 Results of bivariate problt for employment In wave 1 and wave 5 
Employment Employment 
~wave 1~ ~wave 5~ 
Log of hourly pay+ 1.8499 1.8788 
(29.21)** (29.11)** 
Male 0.2230 0.1653 
(9.39)** (6.89)** 
Age 0.1353 0.1308 
(20.67)** (20.01)** 
Age Squared -0.0018 -0.0018 
(22.28)** (21.93)** 
Number of dependent children -0.1978 -0.1853 
(30.24)*" (28.49)** 
Married/partner 0.3871 0.3615 
(23.66)** (22.05)** 
NVQ level 2 0.1316 0.1400 
(7.27)** (7.64)** 
NVQ level 3 0.0115 0.0042 
(0.50) (0.18) 
NVQ level 4 -0.1778 -0.1933 
(4.41 )** (4.72)** 
NVQ levelS -0.7289 -0.7373 
(13.59)** (13.49)** 
Constant -5.1323 -5.0104 
(48.79)** (47.86)** 
Rho (Standard error) 0.9274575 0.0018 
Observations 73736 73736 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; • significant at 5%: •• significant at 1% 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The sample includes the three groups, single mothers, and married/couples 
fathers and married/couples mothers. Robust z statistics in parentheses; (+) significant at 10%; (*) 
significant at 5%; (-) Significant at 1 %. (+) Hour1y pay for individuals not in employment is estimated 
as the fitted value from a regression of log hour1y pay on experience, experience squared, schooling 
and qualifications, marital status, number of dependent children, controls for health status (work 
limiting disability), region (Government office regions) and time (year dummy variables). We do not 
report the results from estimating the wage equation in this chapter. Chapter 4 also uses selection 
correction terms for employment, and the results from estimating the same wage equation are shown 
at the end of that chapter. 
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4.5.4. Instrumenting FC/WFTC status 
Individuals who chose to take up FC/WFfC are not a randomly selected bunch of 
people. Indeed, some of the characteristics that lead to them to taking up the credit are 
also likely to be correlated with wage growth. This means that the coefficients on 
FC/WFfC status in the wage growth equation (1) are likely to be biased. In order to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of FC/WFfC status on wage growth, we 
instrument take-up in wave 1 and wave 5. Equations (2) and (3) specified the latent 
variables that underlie the observed variables 'On FC/WFfC' wave 1, and 'On 
FC/WFfC' wave 5. Then, equations (4) to (11) showed how these latent variables 
translate to the observed Alwqys on, Never on, Off-on, and On-off groups. 
In order to identify the effect of FC/~'FfC status on wage growth we need a valid 
instrument, that is, a variable that affects take-up of FC/~'FfC but not wage growth. 
We use age of the youngest dependent child in the household as the instrument. Every 
individual in the sample is a parent, and therefore potentially eligible for FC/WFfC. 
One of the key factors that determines take-up (and eligibility) is how old the 
dependent children are. Table A4.16 in the appendix shows that amongst the eligible 
group, age of the youngest dependent child does affect the decision to take up. If the 
eldest child is closest to the age when the family becomes ineligible for FC/WFfC , 
and eligible individual is less likely to take up. This is also illustrated in Figure 4.19, 
which shows the probability of take-up for single mothers (who are all eligible) by age 
of the youngest dependent child. The dotted lines in the figure show the confidence 
interval around the mean. 
The results from estimating the bivariate probit of FC/WFTC receipt in both waves are 
shown in Table 4.9. The first two columns show the coefficients for receipt in wave 1 
and wave 5 for all individuals regardless of whether they were entitled to receive any 
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FC/WFrC or not. The second two columns restrict the sample to individuals who are 
entitled, or eligible, for some FC/WFTC amount. Given the arguments ouilined 
above, the effect of the NVQ variable is we would expect - FC/WFrC recipients have 
fewer qualifications. The effect of the age of the youngest dependent child also goes in 
the right direction - tlle older the youngest dependent child, the less likely you are to 
either be receiving the credit (columns 1 and 2), or taking up the credit (columns 3 and 
4) . The bivariate probit also includes a control for tlle total award (or entitlement) for 
which a family is eligible. As in Brewer et 01 (2003b), the amount of the credit for which 
you are eligible (equal to zero for the non-entitled) positively affects tl1e probabili ty of 
receipt and take-up. 
Figure 4.19 
Pr(take·up). single 
mothers 
Take-up of FCIWFTC by age youngest dependent child - single 
mothers 
100% .. r------------------------------------------------------------1 
90% ··r-----------------------------------------------------------~ 
.... ............. 
80% r,~-4~~~~~~----~----------~~----------------------~ 
70% +' __ "_"_"'_"_"_"'_"_" ._ ... _ .. __ " __ . .. _ . . _ .. _.-:_ . • _ .. _ ... _ .. __ .:.:.:~,, ._,,_.~~ .. _"'  ....... .. ... . . . . 
::: .. r--------------------------------------... -.. -... -.~~.--~--= .., .. ~ ...~ ..~ ..-... -.. -\~~ 
40% .. r----------------------------------------------···-··-··-··-···~ ·~~-~\~,~ 
..... " .... \ . 
30% ··r-------------------------------------------------------~·~~ 
..•. ~\-
20% 
10% +---------------------------------------------------------~~ 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Age of youngest dependent child 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003 . Figure shows the probability of a single mother taking up the credit 
conditional on eligibility for the credit 
202 
Table 4.10 Results from estimating the bivariate probit for take-up In wave 1 and 
wave 5 (OLS) 
Eligible and non- Sample restricted to people eligible in each 
eligible 
wave 
Bivariate probit estimation for FCIWFTC FC~~TC On On FCIWFTC On FCIWFTC, FCIWFTC, 
receipt In both waves wave 1 waveS wave 1 waveS 
Age youngest child in the household (*) -0.0097 -0.0133 -0.0180 -0.0149 
(5.19)** (8.58)** (6.86)** (6.17r 
Entitlement 0.0042 0.0047 0.0018 0.0024 
(22.10)- (25.79)** (6.70)** (9.16)** 
NVQ Level 2 -0.1232 -0.1092 -0.2002 -0.1429 
(5.63)** (5.11)- (6.82)** (4.75)** 
NVQ Level 3 -0.2688 -0.2639 -0.2243 -0.1846 
(10.53)- (10.88)** (6.32)** (5.17r 
NVQ Level 4 -0.5103 -0.4523 -0.5063 -0.3950 
(14.80)- (14.41)** (10.59)** (8.34)** 
NVQ LevelS -0.8787 -0.8081 -0.7718 -0.7036 
(21.74)** (22.44)- (12.54)** (11.26)** 
Cohort effects 0.1091 0.2124 0.1127 0.2717 Summer 1997 - Summer 1998 
(1.66)+ (3.08)- (1.21) (2.69)** 
Autumn 1997 - Autumn 1998 0.0789 0.1537 0.0943 0.2245 
(1.20) (2.21)* (1.01 ) (2.22)* 
Winter 1997 - Winter 1998 -0.0113 0.1880 -0.0089 0.3112 
(0.17) (2.71)- (0.09) (3.06)-
Spring 1998 - Spring 1999 -0.0008 0.1533 0.0210 0.3242 
(0.01) (2.28)* (0.22) (3.24)** 
Summer 1998 - Summer 1999 0.0658 0.0889 0.1443 0.3466 
(0.98) (1.29) (1.52) (3.40)** 
Autumn 1998 - Autumn 1999 0.0560 0.2286 0.0395 0.3975 
(0.84) (3.42)** (0.43) (4.03)-
Winter 1998 - Winter 1999 0.1236 0.3010 0.1694 0.5067 
(1.90)+ (4.58)- (1.85)+ (5.20)** 
Spring 1999 - Spring 2000 0.1304 0.4503 0.2010 0.6441 
(2.01)· (6.86)- (2.20)* (6.63)** 
Summer 1999 - Summer 2000 0.0715 0.4282 0.1406 0.5977 
(1.08) (6.49)** (1.51 ) (6.06)** 
Autumn 1999 - Autumn 2000 0.0911 0.4503 0.0564 0.5398 
(1.39) (6.86)- (0.62) (5.64)** 
Winter 1999 - Winter 2000 0.1462 0.4299 0.1570 0.5857 
(2.27)· (6.55)- (1.76)+ (6.16)** 
Spring 2000 - Spring 2001 0.1849 0.7675 0.1206 0.7088 
(2.89)- (12.19)- (1.36) (7.57)** 
Summer 2000 - Summer 2001 0.3208 0.7999 0.2793 0.8041 
(5.17)** (12.81)- (3.22)- (8.69)** 
Autumn 2000 - Autumn 2001 0.2625 0.6842 0.2353 0.7145 
(4.14)- (10.72)- (2.66)- (7.60)** 
Winter 2000 - Winter 2001 0.2388 0.6448 0.3303 0.7467 
(3.74)- (10.03)- (3.66)** (7.79)** 
Spring 2001 - Spring 2002 0.6115 0.7029 0.6722 0.8001 
(10.17)** (11.07)- (7.83)** (8.68)** 
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Eligible and non- Sample restricted to people eligible In each 
eligible 
wave 
Bivariate problt estimation for FCIWFTC FC~~C On On FCIWFTC On FCIWFTC, FCIWFTC, 
receipt in both waves wave 1 waveS wave 1 waveS 
Summer 2001 - Summer 2002 0.5369 0.6881 0.7028 0.8558 
(8.91)- (10.91)** (8.10)- (9.21)-
Autumn 2001 - Autumn 2002 0.3913 0.5580 0.4800 0.6682 
(6.42)- (8.75)- (5.54)- (7.18)-
Winter 2001 - Winter 2002 0.5398 0.7645 0.6742 0.9152 
(8.83)** (12.03)- (7.69)- (9.74)-
Constant -1.4642 -1.5661 -0.1778 -0.8379 
(27.82)- (27.96)- (2.35)* (10.19)** 
Observations 39177 39177 9693 9693 
Rho 0.8592 (0.0051) 0.8749 (D.0062) 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The sample is restricted to Individuals with dependent children aged under 
19 only, who are employess in both waves and report earnings in both waves of the survey. The 
amount of the tax credit to which individuals are entitled enters the regression in levels, as it takes a 
value of zero for all non-entitled individuals in the first set of regressions. The omitted categories for 
the dummy variables are: NVQ level 1, and the cohort spring 1997 - spring 1998. 
We now move on to presenting the results from estimating the wage growth equation 
set out in equation (1). When we control for FCjWFfC receipt in the wage growth 
equation we only include a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual was a/ways on and 
equal to zero if the individual was nevtr on. That is, we omit the two on-off and off-on 
groups. The main reason for this is so that we can make a comparison of the wage 
growth for FCjWFfC recipients and non-recipients for two 'clean' groups, that is two 
groups whose wage growth and receipt behaviour is not likely to be further complicated 
by other types of endogeneity. For example, the on-off group could come off FCjWFfC 
becalm the have higher wage growth, independently of the age of their dependent 
children (and vice-versa for off-on). Therefore, for these groups, the IV outlined above 
may not allow us to identify the relationship between wager growth and receipt. We 
leave this analysis for future work. 
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4.5.5. Results from estimating the wage growth equation 
Results from estimating the wage growth equation are presented for two types of 
individuals (i) all individuals, regardless of eligibility; and (ii) eligible individuals only. 
The regression results for each of the groups are presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. In 
order to keep the sample size reasonably high, the regressions in Table 4.12 group 
married parents and single parents. 
Looking at the full sample first (fable 4.11), the non-IV results show that the a/wCf)'! on 
group did enjoy a wage growth premium relative to the never on group. The differences 
range from around 2.8% higher wage growth for married men, to 2.3% for single 
mothers. However, the inclusion of the other control variables, in particular job 
change (positive for couples, but negative for single mothers), job tenure (-) and 
training (+), means that the effect of FC/\l;'FTC receipt is only verging on significance 
(10% level only for married men). The selection correction terms are also significant in 
several of the regressions, implying that the omission of these terms from the wage 
growth regression would perhaps result in biased estimates of the coefficients. 
For married/couples men and women, the size of the coefficient on the a/wCf)'! on 
dummy variable does not change significantly when we compare the non-IV and IV 
results. For single mothers, the sign on the coefficient has changed from being positive 
to being negative - implying a wage growth penalty for single mothers in the a/wCf)'! on 
group. However, for all three groups the size of the standard error has also increased, 
and we would not reject the null here that the wage growth differences between the 
a/wqy! on and never on groups is zero 
Finally, in Table 4.12 we compare the wage growth of FC/WFTC recipients and 
receipients for all three groups, splitting the sample by eligibility. The non-IV results 
are very similar to those for each of the groups in Table 4.11, we observe a wage 
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growth premium for FCjWFfC recipients of 2.9%. The results for the IV on the full 
sample show that the wage growth premium falls to around 2.2% (but not significantly 
different from zero) In the sample of eligible individuals, the IV measure of receipt has 
fallen to around 1 % and is also insignificant. The results for the IV on the eligible 
sample are consistent with the results we saw above for the natural experiment. Both 
comparisons used very different approaches to try and compare the wage growth of 
individuals who only differ according to whether they receive FC/WFfC. 
Furthermore, the results of both approaches imply that the wage growth of individuals 
on FCjWFfC is not very different from similar individuals not receiving the credit 
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Table 4.11 Results from estimating the wage growth equation (OLS), by group 
Married dads Married mothers Single mothers 
The dependent variable Is Non-iV IV Non-iV IV Non-IV IV 
change In log real hourly pay 
Always on FCIWFTC 0.0282 0.0243 0.0230 
(1.69)+ (1.55) (1.53) 
Always on FCIWFTC 0.0316 0.0174 -0.0071 (Instrumented) 
(1.08) (0.44) (0.28) 
Training spell between wave 1 0.0198 0.0197 0.0213 0.0213 -0.0075 -0.0092 
and wave 2 (a) 
(2.43)* (1.88)+ (3.11)** (2.53)* (0.50) (0.51 ) 
Changed jobs between waves 0.0260 0.0261 0.0223 0.0224 -0.0108 -0.0090 
(1.20) 1.03 (1.34) (1.08) (0.29) (0.19) 
Job tenure (wave 1) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
(2.91)** (2.46)* (2.57)* (2.12) (2.40)* (2.32) 
NVQ Level 2 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0048 0.0050 0.0345 0.0356 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.47) (0.41) (1.40) (1.19) 
NVQ Level 3 0.0170 0.0169 0.0087 0.0088 0.0230 0.0223 
(1.32) (1.05) (0.70) (0.59) (0.79) (0.65) 
NVQ Level 4 0.0167 0.0167 0.0059 0.0062 0.0254 0.0206 
(1.05) (0.82) (0.41) (0.36) (0.76) (0.51) 
NVQ Level 5 0.0218 0.0218 0.0149 0.0151 0.0374 0.0271 
(1.44) (1.13) (1.06) (0.89) (1.07) (0.62) 
Selection correction (lamda1) 0.1426 0.1454 0.0163 0.0180 0.0517 0.0593 
(1.95)+ (1.64)+ (0.48) (0.41) (1.11) (1.04) 
Selection correction (lamda2) -0.1009 -0.0991 -0.0662 -0.0647 0.0011 0.0081 
(1.66)+ (1.36) (2.17)* (1.76)+ (0.02) (0.13) 
Constant 0.0444 0.0445 0.0561 0.0555 0.0305 0.0434 
(2.57)* (2.44)* (2.75)** (2.65) (0.63) (0.90) 
Observations 5839 0.0316 12440 12440 2052 2052 
R-squared 0.0056 1.08 0.0031 0.0030 0.0072 0.0062 
Sample probability a/ways on 0.052 0.0244 0.500 !0.0028l !0.0013l !0.011l 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. The sample is restricted to individuals in either the a/ways on or never on 
groups. Wage growth is measured in real terms, deflated by the monthly RPI. (a)Training spell 
controls for whether or not the individual had at least one of spell of job related training in the year. 
The wage growth of individuals in cohorts affected by the minimum wage (cohorts where the first 
wave occurs before April 1999, and fifth wave after that point) might be affected by the introduction 
of the wage floor. We control for this by filtering out Individuals whose wage in the first wave is 
lower than the introductory level of the NMW. IV estimates bootstrapped (500 replications) to 
obtain standard errors. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1 %. 
207 
Table 4.12 Results from estimating the wage growth equation 
All individuals Eligible individuals only 
Non-IV IV Non-IV IV 
Always on FCIWFTC 0.0286 0.0198 
(3.04)- (1.81)+ 
Always on FCIWFTC 0.0097 (Instrumented) 0.0222 
(1.37) (0.52) 
Training spell between wave 0.0178 0.0142 0.0141 
and wave 2 (a) 0.0176 
(3.58)- (2.92)- (1.37) (1.14) 
Changed jobs between waves 0.0200 0.0201 -0.0213 -0.0210 
(1.60) (1.35) (0.76) (0.59) 
Job tenure (wave 1) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(4.30)- (3.61)- (2.18)* (1.85)+ 
NVQ Level 2 0.0050 0.0055 0.0024 0.0034 
(0.73) (0.72) (0.19) (0.21 ) 
NVQ Level 3 0.0107 0.0114 0.0161 0.0172 
(1.36) (1.25) (1.00) (0.87) 
NVQ Level 4 0.0071 0.0078 0.0026 0.0034 
(0.81) (0.75) (0.11) (0.12) 
NVQ Level 5 0.0163 0.0167 0.0062 0.0061 
(1.86)+ (1.65)+ (0.21) (0.16) 
Selection correction (Iamda 1 ) 0.0242 0.0300 0.0014 0.0099 
(1.35) (1.40) (0.05) (0.30) 
Selection correction (lamda2) -0.0612 -0.0579 -0.0279 -0.0227 
(2.96>- (2.35)* (0.82) (0.54) 
Constant 0.0556 0.0544 0.0681 0.0678 
(5.81)- (5.70)- (3.41)- (3.31)** 
Observations 20331 20331 4429 4429 
R-sguared 0.0035 0.0031 0.0030 0.0025 
0.08077 0.3186 
Samele erobabili~ a/wal.s on {0.0019! {0.0007! 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. See notes for Table 4.11. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
+ significant at 10%; • significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 %. IV estimates bootstrapped (500 
replications) to obtain standard errors. 
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4.6. Conclusions and suggestions for further work 
A criticism often levelled at in-work support programmes is that the individuals who 
respond to the incentives to join the labour market may end up in "dead end jobs" -
that is, jobs that have few prospects for progression up the wage/ occupation 
distribution. The argument behind this proposition is never spelled out explicitly but 
seems to rely on a lack of incentives, for both worker and firm, to make investments in 
factors that promote wage progression - such as on-the-job search and training in 
general skills. 
The main aim of this paper was to test whether this was indeed the case exploiting the 
natural experiment offered by the reform of Fe to WFfC. The balance of the 
evidence presented above, which is relies on summary statistics, natural experiments 
and multivariate analysis, would seem to indicate that at lVorst FC/WFfC recipients 
experience wage growth that is not significantly different to that for non-recipients -
and there is some evidence to suggest that some individuals, receiving the maximum 
amount of the credit for example, have significantly higher wage growth. 
These results suggest that in-work welfare programmes can be designed to offer wider 
incentives beyond simply promoting the incentive to work. In particular, if such 
programmes can be designed to promote wage growth then there will be further, long 
run, effects on work incentives. Indeed, we would expect a policy that promoted wage 
growth would be good for long run work incentives even if there were no direct effect 
of the reform on work incentives. TIlls is because work is the utilisation rate of human 
capital - so policies that promote human capital formation will, in an intertemporal 
modeL also promote future work incentives. 
Further research is prompted by the analysis here. A structural model that captures the 
way in which the net returns to wage progression investments is affected by the level of 
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FC/WFfC receipt and the level of the taper would be amenable to multivariate 
modelling, and could easily be incorporated into the estimation above. The evidence 
from such an analysis would provide lessons for how such programmes might be better 
designed to capitalise on this effect. The level of receipt and the size of the taper playa 
role in determining how long individuals expect to remain on the programme and so 
capture the idea that receipt is, to an extent, time limited. A further time limit is created 
through the dependence on the presence of children in the household - as when 
children cease to be dependent entitlement ends. Since time limiting sharpens 
incentives it would be useful to factor this effect into the analysis. We have touched the 
surface of some of these questions in the analysis presented in this paper, and age of 
the youngest dependent child is the instrument we use to model FC/WFfC take-up in 
the wage growth equation. An analysis such as is outlined here should be combined 
with labour supply modelling to provide a vehicle for simulating the long run impact of 
in-work welfare. The evidence presented above, takes the behaviour of the spouse as 
partner as being entirely exogenous (except for single mothers). The different results we 
observe for single mothers would seem to suggest that the presence of the spouse is 
important. Any further analysis along the lines suggested above should consider 
endogenising the wage growth behaviour of the spouse in the model. Finally, the 
analysis should be applied to consider the impact of the introduction of Working Tax 
Credit to individuals who are not parents. 
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Appendices 
Constructing the LFS sample 
Excluding children, we have a possible total of 416,283 individual observations. The 
male and female samples are for individuals who were employees in both waves 1 and 
5, and who also provided earnings and hours information in both waves. The loss of 
over two-thirds of the sample as we remove certain individuals may lead to some 
selection problems. However, as we moved from one level of the data to the other, we 
crosschecked the individuals in each sample using the means and distributional 
information for the entire LFS and published data from National Statistics68• Further 
summary statistics are provided in Table A4.t7. 
Table A4.13 Constructing the LFS sample 
Total respondents in waves 1 & 5 
Women 
Men 
Less 243,183 inactive and/or Women 
unemployed in one or both waves 
Men 
Less 24,755 self-employed In one or Women 
both waves 
Men 
Less 42,303 individuals who do not 
provide hourly earnings information in Women 
both waves 
Men 
Total final sample 
Sample 
size 
217,912 
198,371 
416,283 
81,Q52 
92,048 
173,100 
74,387 
73,958 
148,345 
54,968 
51,074 
106,042 
Notes: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1997 - Winter 2002. 
Breakdown of employed/self-employed by wave 
Em I d Employed Self-employed Self-
p oye (w1), self- (w1), employed 
both waves employed (w5) Employed (w5) both waves 
74,387 
73,958 
601 
1,301 
581 
1,236 
5,483 
15,553 
61 For example, we compared the age distributions, job tenure data, mean wages, occupation and industry 
distributions, welfare receipt, reb';on, income, etc. The information is available on request. 
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Table A4.14 Breakdown of the LFS sample (balanced panel) by household type 
Cohort/ female sample Married women, Married women, Single women, Single women, 
nochllden children no children children 
Spring 1997 - Spring 1998 1,179 1,093 494 241 
Summer 1997 - Summer 1998 1,115 1,152 502 231 
Autumn 1997 - Autumn 1998 1.203 1,091 594 238 
Winter 1997 - Winter 1998 1.130 1,102 561 221 
Spring 1998 - Spring 1999 1,073 1,088 492 262 
Summer 1998 - Summer 1999 1,147 1,033 515 249 
Autumn 1998 - Autumn 1999 1,143 1,100 513 271 
Winter 1998 - Winter 1999 1,023 1,073 520 256 
Spring 1999 - Spring 2000 1,050 1,005 468 287 
Summer 1999 - Summer 2000 1,092 985 528 225 
Autumn 1999 - Autumn 2000 1,011 950 486 220 
Winter 1999 - Winter 2000 960 986 429 225 
Spring 2000 - Spring 2001 949 937 412 258 
Summer 2000 - Summer 2001 928 932 404 221 
Autumn 2000 - Autumn 2001 901 912 451 262 
Winter 2000 - Winter 2001 918 917 460 208 
Spring 2001 - Spring 2002 953 879 441 246 
Summer 2001 - Summer 2002 941 893 459 226 
Autumn 2001 - Autumn 2002 909 950 438 242 
Winter 2001 - Winter 2002 916 856 474 263 
Total 20,541 19,934 9,641 4,852 
Cohort/male sample Married men, no Married men, Single men, no Single men, 
children children children children 
Spring 1997 - Spring 1998 1,017 1,223 505 100 
Summer 1997 - Summer 1998 1,014 1,269 521 102 
Autumn 1997 - Autumn 1998 1,050 1,196 532 99 
Winter 1997 - Winter 1998 1,013 1,242 542 86 
Spring 1998 - Spring 1999 1,011 1,192 480 80 
Summer 1998 - Summer 1999 1,053 1,181 520 79 
Autumn 1998 - Autumn 1999 1,036 1,141 532 100 
Winter 1998 - Winter 1999 925 1,120 494 81 
Spring 1999 - Spring 2000 900 1,079 442 72 
Summer 1999 - Summer 2000 922 1,032 488 74 
Autumn 1999 - Autumn 2000 928 1,049 473 71 
Winter 1999 - Winter 2000 900 1,043 512 76 
Spring 2000 - Spring 2001 853 999 435 64 
Summer 2000 - Summer 2001 826 981 445 80 
Autumn 2000 - Autumn 2001 830 1,004 442 86 
Winter 2000 - Winter 2001 810 954 415 69 
Spring 2001 - Spring 2002 821 916 441 78 
Summer 2001 - Summer 2002 812 944 444 71 
Autumn 2001 - Autumn 2002 814 1,017 407 89 
Winter 2001 - Winter 2002 861 930 463 76 
Total 18,396 21,512 9,533 1,633 
Notes: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1997 - Winter 2002. 
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Table A4.15 FCIWFTC receipt for married couples and lone mothers - not 
conditioning on Individuals working and reporting hourly earnings In both 
waves 1 and5 
Married dads Married mothers Single mothers 
FCIWFTC history Frequency "/0 Frequency % Frequency % 
Always on 1,919 4.4% 1,973 4.5% 1,922 17.4% 
Never on 37,603 86.3% 37,722 85.7% 7,227 65.4% 
Off-on 2,229 5.1% 2,304 5.2% 1201 10.9% 
On-off 1,845 4.2% 2,011 4.6% 703 6.4% 
Staying-on rate 51.0% 49.5% 73.2% 
43,596 44,010 11,Q53 
Notes: The numbers in the table refer to the balanced panel from the LFS (1997 - 2003), that is, 
individuals observed in households in waves 1 and 5. However, the sample is neither conditioned 
on the individual working in both waves, or reporting hourly earnings in both waves. 
Table A4.16 Comparing the mean age of the youngest dependent child in the family for 
eligible families who take-up and do not take-up the credit 
Married dads Married mothers Single mothers 
Mean age StdE" Mean age StdE" Mean age StdE" child child child 
Eligible for FC 
Take-up 14.10 0.4475 8.54 0.4476 8.98 0.2280 
Never take-up 14.46 0.3561 9.12 0.1331 10.54 0.3190 
Eligible for WFTC 
Take-up 13.85 0.2574 7.34 0.2477 9.16 0.1482 
Never take-up 14.51 0.1928 8.96 0.0896 11.48 0.2011 
Notes: The numbers in the table refer to the balanced panel from the lFS (1997 - 2003). 
Figure A4.20 Distribution of job tenure by FCIWFTC history - married fathers 
Percent 
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Figure A4.21 Distribution of job tenure by FCIWFTC history - married/mothers 
Percent 
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Figure A4.22 Distribution of job tenure by FCIWFTC history - single mothers 
Percent 
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Notes: The distributions in Figures A 10 - A 12 refer to job tenure in wave 1 of theLFS 1997 -
2003. The on FCIWFTC group also refers to wave 1 of the survey and includes individuals in 
Ihe a/ways on group and the on-off group. 
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Table A4.17 Attrition in the LFS, comparison of mean characteristics 
Single mothers Married/couples mothers Married/couples fathers 
Present in Present in Present in 
wave 1, not in Balanced wave 1, not Balanced wave 1, not in Balanced 
wave 5 in wave 5 wave 5 
Receiving FCIWFTC 0.1737 0.218 0.0766 0.071 0.0764 0.071 
(wave 1) % 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Age (wave 1) 32.9513 34.542 37.3433 37.370 39.9422 39.866 0.141 0.089 0.070 0.035 0.076 0.039 
Job tenure months 57.5489 63.817 74.0724 78.612 103.8326 116.124 
(wave 1) (*) 1.303 1.061 0.803 0.466 1.023 0.587 
Hourly pay. wave 1 (*) 6.3015 6.553 7.1512 7.485 10.3372 10.862 0.085 0.064 0.078 0.038 0.092 0.046 
Hourly pay, wave 5 (*) 6.7660 7.006 7.3154 7.901 11.2179 11.649 0.157 0.075 0.110 0.042 0.196 0.051 
Hours of work, wave 1 28.7126 27.126 28.0762 26.789 45.0982 44.984 
(*) 0.278 0.203 0.155 0.084 0.133 0.072 
Hours of work, wave 5 30.3677 27.651 30.0771 26.656 43.9613 44.123 
(*) 0.490 0.193 0.300 0.080 0.289 0.070 
Number of dependent 1.6519 1.768 1.6903 1.881 1.6917 1.881 
children 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.004 
Age of youngest child 8.0841 7.665 8.3795 7.527 8.3814 7.523 
in HH under 19 0.069 0.045 0.049 0.024 0.049 0.024 
NVC level 1 % 0.5113 0.441 0.4129 0.309 0.3738 0.278 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
NYC level 2 % 0.2608 0.295 0.2743 0.301 0.1384 0.151 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
NYC level 3 % 0.1145 0.126 0.1296 0.146 0.2766 0.302 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
NYC level 4 % 0.0616 0.075 0.0848 0.114 0.0688 0.086 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
NYC level 5 % 0.0518 0.063 0.0984 0.130 0.1424 0.183 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Observations(**) 6781 10796 15905 42241 15881 42107 
*Attrition 39% 27% 27% 
Notes: LFS, 1997 - 2003. Variables marked with an (*) are only counted for individuals in work. 
Hourly pay is as reported in the survey by the respondent and is measured in nominal terms. (**) The 
sample sizes here are larger than those in Table A4.13 and A4.14, as the comparisons included in 
this table, although for families with dependent children only, do restrict the sample to workers or 
reporting of hourly earnings. 
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5. Tax Credits and training 
In the previous paper we discussed how the presence of a wage subsidy, tax credits in 
the UK for low paid workers, could affect wage growth by changing the incentives 
workers have to partake in activities that enhance their wages. One activity that we 
suggested might be affected was (formal) training. In this paper we directly compare 
the take-up of training by FC/WFTC recipients and non-recipients. 
The previous paper outlined in detail how the incentives for taking part in any wage-
enhancing activity are potentially affected by the tax credit. Furthermore, the means-
tested nature of the subsidy meant that different recipients were potentially affected in 
different ways. Thus, the net effect of the subsidy on wage growth was difficult to 
determine in theory. The empirical evidence on wage growth showed that many 
workers receiving Family Credit (FC) or the Working Families' Tax Credit (\X'FTC) had 
higher mean wage growth. However, when we controlled take-up of the subsidy in a 
multivariate model, we found that much of the wage growth premium that FC/WFTC 
recipients seem to enjoy becomes insignificant. 
There are several reasons as to why we might look at the effect of the tax credits on 
trainging take-up, separately from their effect on the outcome of training, i.e., wage 
growth. Perhaps the most important reason is that the wage enhancing effects of any 
training may not be observed during the twelve-month period of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) for which we observe people. It may also be the case that the wage 
subsidy could affect wage-growth, without actually affecting training (or vice-versa), as 
discussed in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). The Acemoglu and Pischke paper argues 
that the wage subsidy could essentially remove part of the lower tail of the wage 
distribution, thereby bunching workers around a single point (the minimum wage in 
their example) and reducing the slope of the experience-earnings prome, independently 
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of the effect on training. Both of these arguments imply that we may want to examine 
the impact of tax credits on training, independent from their impact on wage growth. 
We use the extensive training questionnaire in the LFS to compare the both the offer 
and take-up of training for FC/WFfC recipients and non-recipients. Also, as before, 
we will make use of the 'natural experiment' induced by the FC-WFfC reform in 
October 1999 in order to compare individuals who occupy similar positions in the wage 
distribution. 
In the remainder of this paper we present evidence on the take up of training by 
FC/WFfC recipients and non-recipients. We ftrst discuss the existing literature and 
evidence on wage subsidies and training, then move on to a comparison of the 
summary statistics, and fmally conclude with some multivariate analysis of training take-
up. 
5.2. Literature on training and wage subsidies 
Previous studies that have examined the impact of wage subsidies on training or skill 
formation have concentrated on the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Heckman 
et al. (2002), or the minimum wage; see Arulampalam et al. (2004) and Metcalf (2004) 
for the UK, Fairris and Pedace (2004) and Neumark and Wascher (2001) for the US. 
The main reasons as to why we would expect training to be affected by a wage subsidy 
were discussed in the previous paper - the arguments follow directly from the standard 
model of capital accumulation developed by Ben-Porath and Becker. Human capital 
theory predicts that in a competitive labour market investment in general training is 
fmanced through lower wages on the part of workers receiving the training (Rosen, 
1972). In the case of the minimum wage, raising the wage above the lower rate where 
workers essentially 'pay' for training was thought to reduce training. Alternatively, if 
the market for low paid workers (i.e. workers affected by the minimum wage or eligible 
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for tax credits) is viewed as a monopsony, as in Arulampalam et af. (2004), then the 
introduction of a minimum wage can increase training. This is because in a monopsony 
the return to human capital is compressed, thus allowing ftrms to retain some of the 
increased surplus associated with higher human capita1. The introduction of the 
minimum wage can further compress the wage structure, thereby increasing the amount 
of training offered by ftrms. 
The evidence of the impact of the minimum wage on training is mixed. Arulampalam 
et al. (2004) look at the impact of the UK minimum wage on training, and ftnd no 
evidence that the minimum wage reduced the training of workers covered. Indeed, 
they report that the introduction of the minimum actually increased the training for 
workers affected by between 8% and 11%. They conclude on the basis of this evidence 
that the predictions of the human capital model in a competitive labour market are not 
supported by the data. Neumark and Wascher (2001) use cross-state variation in the 
US state minimum wage to test the impact on training. Their fIndings are strongly 
supportive of the predictions of the classical human capital model - the incidence of 
training is reduced by between 1 % and 2% for every 1 % increase in the minimum wage. 
Fairris and Pedace (2004) use establishment level data to look at the impact of the 
minimum wage in the US on training. In contrast to the Neumark and \Vascher paper, 
they find no effect for the minimum wage, on either the take-up or intensity of 
•• 69 tra11ll1lg . 
The wage subsidy provided by in work beneftts like a tax credit is fundamentally 
different from a minimum wage type subsidy. This is because the subsidy part of the 
69 The contrasting results between Neumark and Wascher (2001) and Farris and Pedace (2004) are at least 
partly explained by the fact that the latter use establishment level and individual observations of people 
affected by the minimum wage. The Neumark and Wascher paper uses state level observations of the 
minimum wage combined with individual observations of the take-up of training. which, as argued by Fairris 
and Pedace, can lead to incorrect estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on training. 
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take-home wage is paid for by the state, and not by the employer - or, to put it another 
way, the costs of training for FC/WFTC recipients are shared with taxpayers. From 
the employer's perspective the tax credits could increase the provision of training, as 
there are now more workers willing take up jobs with training that entail a wage 
sacrifice. From the worker's perspective, the presence of a tax credit wage subsidy can 
both increase and decrease their incentives to take up trainingg. The added incentive 
comes from the fact that the lower paid jobs (with training) that would otherwise be 
below the reservation wage are raised above the reservation wage by the wage subsidy. 
At the same time, the tax on wage growth induced by the taper off welfare reduces the 
workers' incentive to take part in any wage enhancing activity as part of the associated 
wage growth is taxed away. 
The only paper to have studied the relationship between training and the wage subsidies 
due to tax credits is Heckman at al (2002). The Heckman paper considers the impact 
of the US EITC on recipients' training. The paper looks at two different types of 
training. Firstly, training that involves learning by doing, that is, training that is 
complementary to labour supply and working hours (and therefore implicitly involves 
no wage sacrifice). Secondly, they look at training that they classify as on-the-job, 
which is assumed to be substitutable for labour supply rcostly time investments,) - in 
other words, time spent in on-the-job training involves a wage sacrifice because it is 
time not spent working. The presence of a tax credit has different implications for the 
two types of training70• They argue (and provide supportive evidence) that the effects 
on learning-by-doing training are positive, because the subsidy induces a net increase in 
labour supply. 
70 The LFS definition of on-the-job training is actually closer to the Heckman II (JL definition of ' learning-by-
doing'. Although we clarify the LFS definitions below, in practice, the questions we use from the survey do 
not allow us to differentiate fully between training that is It,arning-by-doing and more formal types of 
training that might involve an implicit or explicit wage sacrifice. As we outline bdow, we estimate that at 
least two-thirds of the training we observe is more formal training that potentially involves a wage sacrifice. 
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In the Heckman tl aL model, the effect of the subsidy on fonnal training (on-the-job) 
depends on whether individual ever leaves the 'phase-out' schedule - or, what we call 
the 'taper off welfare'. For individuals on the taper, the wage subsidy always declines 
while wages increase. Heckman tI aL find that for individuals who never come off the 
taper, typically lower educated high school dropouts, the EITC substantially reduces 
training. In contrast, individuals who are close to coming off the taper - in particular, 
early-on in their working life - typically have increased training as a result of the EITC. 
5.4 A model of training in the presence of a wage subsidy 
In order to motivate our analysis of the training effects of the FC/\VFTC we present a 
simple model of human capital accumulation in the presence of wage subsidies. This is 
the model developed by Heckman at aL (2002) in their analysis of EITC and on-the-
job-training. The model is just a fonnal representation of the human capital 
accumulation process due to Ben-Porath (1967), but with an added wage subsidy 
component. For simplicity, assume individuals only live for two periods t = (1,2). 
Training can only take place in period one to enhance the stock of existing human 
capital {HJ in period one. Any time spent training, is time not spent working. The 
stock of human capital in period two is given by 
(1) 
where the investment (training) function has the properties F' > 0, F" < O. The 
variable s measures the proportion of time spent training, 0 S s S 1. In order to 
analysis the comparative statics from the ftrst order maximising conditions, we assume 
that at least some training and work takes place in period one, i.e. 0 < s < 1 . 
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Workers are paid a wage equal to a price per efficiency unit of capital (R) multiplied by 
the stock of human capital. In the absence of a wage subsidy and with perfect capital 
markets, individuals chose training s in the first period to maximise lifetime earnings 
RH {l-s}+ RH2 
• I +r ' 
(2) 
where r is the interest rate. In the presence of a wage subsidy in both periods 
(UTI' UT2), equation (2) becomes 
(3) 
Choosing a level of training s in order to maximise lifetime earnings, and using the fact 
that H2 = H. + F(s), gives the optimality condition 
(1 )RH (1 + til2 )RF'(s ) + til. • ~ ~-..:..::-~~ 
l+r 
(4) 
Given 0 < s < 1, we can see that the choice of s is independent of R, but decreasing 
in the discount rate r (the investment return) and the initial stock of human capital. 
and therefore the wage in period one RH.. The effect of the wage subsidy on training 
depends on whether the sae of the subsidy changes over time7l • If the subsidy is 
constant over time til. = til2 , then investment in training is not affected. If the subsidy 
is smaller in period two, til. > til2 , then training is decreased compared to the case 
where til. = til2 , and if til. < til2 , then training is increased compared to the case where 
71 The appendix in the Ileckman tl aL paper contains a modified version of the first order conditions that take 
account of the fact that the EITC has both a phase-in and a phase-out schedule. 
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The question we want to answer in this paper is, do FC/WFfC recipients do less 
training than non-recipients? The "natural experiment" induced by the FC-~'FTC 
reform allows us to make the comparison using like-for-like individuals. The capital 
accumulation framework above also allows us to set out some testable hypotheses 
about the take-up of training by FC/~C recipients at different points on or off the 
taper. In empirical section that follows, we test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals on FC/WFfC and at the top of the taper, who have just come 
off the maximum, will be less likely to take up training than similar individuals close to 
the end of the taper who are about to come off FC/~'FfC. This is because relative to 
the latter group, individuals at the top of the taper face a longer period of having their 
wage growth 'taxed'. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who become eligible for WFfC as a result of the reform will be 
less likely to take up training, compared with similar individuals prior to the reform. 
This is because the groups who become entitled as a result of the reform (and who 
subsequently take up) face the prospect of having their wage growth taxed. 
We test these hypotheses comparing both the summary statistics and the results from a 
multivariate model training take-up and FC/~'FTC receipt. 
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5.4 Data used to analyse the effect of FC/WFrC on training take-up 
We use the five-quarter rolling panel of the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) to 
analyse the take-up of training amongst FC/WFfC recipients. This is the same dataset 
that we constructed to analyse the relative wage growth of FC/\VFTC recipients in the 
previous chapter. As before, we also make use of the Tax Benefit model of the UK 
that was constructed for the analysis of wage growth. We use the tax benefit model to 
calculate the threshold level of earnings that either moves a recipient from the 
maximum onto the taper Cmaximum kink' point), or from taper and off the tax credit 
altogether ('run-off point'). We analyse the take up of training separately for each of 
the three groups: (i) married fathers; (ii) married mothers; and (iii) single mothers. Each 
sample is restricted to individuals of working age who have completed full time 
education and who are employees. 
The training questionnaire in the LFS contains a significant amount of information 
about work related training, taking place both within the last quarter and within the last 
four weeks. The survey usually asks a more detailed set of questions to the subset of 
individuals that have had some work related training in the last four weeks. These 
questions cover areas like the number of hours spent training, where the training 
actually took place (on site/off site) and whether the employer paid for the training. 
For the purposes of testing the hypotheses outlined above we will concentrate on the 
questions about training taking place over the entire quarter, not just the last four 
weeks. The subset of individuals who have had training in the last four weeks is 
obviously a lot smaller than the full sample. Therefore, using the questions that ask 
about training in the last quarter has the added appeal of keeping the total sample size 
large - which was one of the issues we had with the analysis in the last chapter. 
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The two key questions we use from the LFS are: 
(1) [Haveyou had] Any job related training in the last three months? [Yes/No], 
(2) [Is] Education or training oifered [in the IVOrkplaceJ? 
The second question is only asked to individuals who answer 'No' to the fIrst question. 
Therefore, we assume that individuals who answer 'Yes' to at least of the questions 
work for an employer who has offered them some fonn of work-related training in the 
last three months72. 
Question (1), above, covers a broad range of types of training, and unfortunately it is 
not possible to differentiate between different types of training (fonnal or infonnal for 
example), or even training intensity, for training that has occurred within the last 
quarter. However, as we noted, above, the LFS does ask about the type of training if 
the training took place in the last four weeks. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the 
type of training for individuals who say they have had work related training in the last 
four weeks. The data is shown separately for each of the three groups, and recipients 
and non-recipients73• The figure shows that across all groups, about two-thirds of 
training occurs 'away from the job', with the remainder taking place on-the-job74• The 
most signifIcant difference between FC;'\~'fTC recipients and non-recipients is that the 
former have more training which takes place "on-the-job", always at the expense of 
training "away from the job". We do not believe this difference is attributable to them 
being on the tax credit, rather it is a direct reflect of the relative position of the two 
72 
73 
74 
The questions are only asked to respondents of working 1Ib>e, 16-64 for men and 16-59 for women. 
Respondents still at school, on government training pnlgrams, or on college-based work placements are not 
asked the question either. 
In contrast to the previous Chapter, where we went to some k'flgths to distinguish identify individuals who 
remain on the credit for a1 waves, and those who are never on the credit, we will not make that distinction in 
this chapter. The reason for this is that for most of the comparisons in the paper we look at the take-up of 
training within quarter or wave, unlike wage growth, which occurs over aU five waves. 
"On-the-job" training is defmed as .... .tearning by example and practice while acrually doing the job. Any 
training conducted in a classroom or training section, even if on the employer's premises is not "on the job 
training". (Labour Force Survey User Guide: Volume 3: "Details ofLFS variables 2002"). 
224 
types o f individual in the income and skill distribu tions. FCjWFTC recipients are 
typically low-skilled, low-income individuals and the proportion o f people who say that 
training in the last four weeks was on-the-job is significandy higher for people with low 
skills and low income.7S • 
Figure 5.1 Type of training in the last 4 weeks, by FCIWFTC status 
Single mothers, on FCNoIFTC 10-......... ----..... - ....... 47% 
Single mothers , not on FCNIIFTC _~v...- 55% 
Married/couples mothers, on 1----'"'"'II'ftI-----
FCNoIFTC 46% 
Ml rrted/couple. mothers, not on 1-__ _ 
FCNoIFTC N.''''-- 52% 
Married/couples 'athers, on I-:===:Jm==== 
FCNoIFTC '" 
48% 
Mimed/couples fathers , not on ':::::=:Jlm:=~::: 
FCNoIFTC '" 
55% 
0% 10ll. 20% 30% 50% 60% 70% 
t:l on the job training • training away from job 
11% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
16l1. 
16'{. 
BOll. 90ll. 100% 
o both 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The training questions refer to training that occurred in the last four weeks. 
If we assume that the proportions in Figure 5.1 also apply to the training questions 
that we are interested in - that is, job related training occurring in the last quarter -
then we can say that at lea t two-thirds of the training we observe is consistent with the 
type of general training that is referred to in the human capital accumulation model, i.e. 
training that is more likely to be associated with a wage or an earnings sacrifice. 
7S In the sample o f married fathers, 44% o f fathers with highes t quali fication L'<jual to VQ level say training 
occurred on. the·job, compared with 23% for fa thers with VQ level 5. The same propo rtions fo r ma.rried 
mothers (single mothers) are 42% (36%) and 25% (24%) respectively. The pattern across the income 
distribution is similar, although, somewhat surprisingly, it is n.shaped fo r married morhers. Although we d 
not examine it in rhis paper, an interesting avenue for futu re research would be [ 0 test whether rhe take·up 
of Fe /WFTe affects the !JPl of training recipien ts undertake, i.e. would it be the type o f training thar 
involves more o r less wage sacri fice. We discuss [his in the conclusion. 
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5.4 Summary statistics on the effect of FC/WFfC on training 
In this section we present summary statistics of the effect of FC/~'FTC on the take-up 
of training. That is, we compare the proportion of individuals taking up training 
according to certain characteristics, such as whether they are on or off FC/~C, 
whether they are on or off the FC/~C taper or how close they are to the run-off 
point on the taper. In the next section we present some multivariate models of training 
take-up that include a further set of controls such as the existing stock of human 
capital, job tenure, current earnings, etc. 
As we noted above, the LFS not only allows us to identify whether individuals have 
taken up work related training within the quarter, but we can also observe whether or 
not their employer offered them any training. Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of 
employees who say that they were offered at least one spell of work related education 
or training in the last 12 months. The variable is derived from the quarterly questions, 
and, given this, it is not really possible to distinguish between a long single spell of 
training (between quarters) or multiple single spells - thus, the variable refers to at least 
one training spell or at least one offer of training. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of 
individuals who take up training, conditional on the employer offering them some work 
related training. The sample sizes and standard errors for all of the fIgures presented 
in this section are shown in Table AS.4 in the appendix. 
Figure 5.2 shows that individuals on FC/\X'FTC are less likely to be in jobs where they 
are offered some work related training. The differences range from about 4% for 
married mothers to about 8% for single mothers. The fIgure implies that more than a 
third of married fathers (and about the same for mothers) receiving FC/\X'FTC are in 
jobs where they are offered no work related education or training over a period of 12 
months. Without controlling for individual characteristics it is not possible to say 
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whether any of this difference is directly attributable to the fact that these individuals 
are on FC/WFfC. 
The next two figures show the proportion in each group who, conditiollaloll beillg offired 
work related training in the workplace, take up the training. F igure 5.3 is backward looking 
and considers the entire previous 12 months. Potential multiple training spells are not 
double counted. 
Fig ure 5.4 is also backward looking, but only considers the last quarter. The pattern in 
botl1 figures is quite similar - FC/WFfC recipients, when 'offered' training are 1m likelY 
to take it up . A key omitted variable here is likely to be the type of training that is 
offered - the type of training offered to FC/WFTC is likely to be very different, 
perhaps offering a lower return Interestingly, the difference in the take up rate of 
training is similar to the differences in the types of training between groups that we 
observed in F igure 5.1 - perhaps the greater proportion of the training that FC/WFfC 
recipients 'turn down' is just not worth their while taking up. 
Figure 5.2 Proportion of employees offered trainIng at least once in the last year 
Married/couples mothers not 173% on FCIWFTC I I I I I I Married/couples mothers on 
FCIWFTC " I 9% 
Married/couples fathers not on I I I I I I 
FCIWFTC 70% 
Married/couples fathers on I I I I I I 
FCIWFTC 164% 
Single molhers not on I I I I I I 17 % FCIWFTC I I I I I I 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC ~9% 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Proport.lon offered work r elated t rai n ing in the last 12 months 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The figures refer to any offers of work related training in the last 12 months. 
The associated standard errors and sample sizes are show in Table AS.4 in the appendix. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are employees in a/l five waves of the survey. 
90% 
Figure 5.3 Proportion of taking up work related training least once in the last 
year, conditional on the employer offering training 
Married/couples falhers not on 
FCIWFTC 
Married/couples fathers on 
FCIWFTC 
Married/couples mothers not 
on FCIWFTC 
Married/couples mothers on 
FCIWFTC 
Single mothers not on 
FCIWFTC 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
18 % 
I I I 
1750 • 
I I I 
186Yo 
I I I 
182% 
I I I 
185· 
I I I 
18% 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Proportion taking up the offer of training at least once in the last year 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The figures refer to any training spell in that has occurred in the last 12 
months. Multiple training spells for the same individual are not double counted . The assodate 
standard errors and sample sizes are show in Table AS.4 in the appendix. The sample is restricted to 
individuals who are employees in all five waves of the survey. 
Figure 5.4 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last quarter, 
conditional on the employer offering training 
Married/couples mothers nol 
on FCIWFTC 
Married/couples mothers on 
FCIWFTC 
Married/couples fathers not on 
FCIWFTC 
Married/couples fathers on 
FCIWFTC 
Single mothers not on 
FCIWFTC 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC 
0% 
145% 
I I I 
143% 
I I I 
141% 
I I I 
137·~ 
I I I 
151% 
I I I 
145% 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Proportion taking up the offer of training in the last 3 months 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The figures refer to any training spell in that has occurred in the last 
quarter. The assodated standard errors and sample sizes are show in Table AS.4 in the appendix. 
60% 
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In the next two figures, Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, we compare the take up of training 
amongst a subset of FC/WFfC recipients and non-recipients. Figure 5.5 represents 
our test of Hypothesir 1 outlined above. That is, it compares the proportion of 
FC/WFfC recipients who take up training, according to whether they are (a) within 
20% of the earnings that would take them off the maximum onto the taper (individuals 
close to the maximum kink); or (b) they are within 20% of the earnings that would take 
them off FC/WFfC altogether (the run-off point).76 The figure shows that for all 
three groups, individuals who are closer to coming off the credit are also more likely to 
take up training. Table A5.4 in the appendix shows the raw data for all the figures 
presented in this section. The sample size for individuals on FC/WFfC but close to 
the run-off point can get relatively small, for married fathers in particular. However, 
the sample size is still large enough for the difference to be significant for single 
mothers and married mothers77• The comparison of the means would seem to support 
Hypothesis 1. In the multivariate analysis below we will test whether the difference is still 
significant when we control for observable characteristics, such as education and job 
tenure. 
Figure 5.6 shows the results from testing Hypothtsis 2. The figure compares the 
average take-up training for the two groups of individuals affected by the natural 
experiment induced by the FC-~'FTC reform. The first group are workers, who in the 
FC-period were not entitled to any FC amount, but if WFfC had existed at the time, 
they would have been entitled to some WFfC amount. The second group are workers, 
76 
77 
The weekly FC/WFfC amount is evaluatcd on total household net earnings. Thcrefore, for couples where 
both partners are earning. we hold the partner's earnings constant in order to estimate the t-amings 
associated with each of these kink points. 
The fact that a s4,mificant number of single mothers Ilill go to the effort of collecting the tax credit even 
when they are relatively close to the runoff point is interesting. This is in contrast to married couples or 
partners who are ",,,,-b less likely to collect the credit when they are close to the runoff point. The marginal 
value of the welfare payment makes the extra effort worthwhile for single mothers, despite the fact that they 
might remain on the credit for a relatively shorr period of time. 
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who in the WFfC-period, who, similarly to the first group, were not entitled to FC, but 
who are entitled to WFfC, and who takt liP Iht mdil. The figure shows significant 
differences for both groups. Individuals on WFfC are much less likely to take up 
training (conditional on it being offered to them) than similar individuals in the income 
distribution who are not on WFfC. If we believe that these comparison groups 
represent a genuine natural experiment, then the effect of the tax credit is to reduce 
significantly the take up of training amongst WFfC recipients. This result is slightly 
puzzling, given that the wage growth comparisons in Chapter 3 showed almost no 
differences for these two groups. If the difference remains significant in the 
multivariate analysis below, then the disparity in the results between the wage growth 
chapter and those presented here would certainly seem to require some explanation. 
We discuss this in more the detail in the conclusions section at the end of the chapter. 
Figure 5.5 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last 13 weeks -
comparing FCIWFTC recipients by posit ion on the taper 
Married/couple. father. witNn • 20% of 152°1. the run·otf point 
I I I I 
Married/couples lathers ..... thln +/. 20% of 145% the maximum kink 
I I I I Married/couple. mothers 'Nithln - 20% of 151% the run-off potnt 
, I I I 
Married/couples mother. within +/. 20% 142% of the maximum kink 
I I I I 
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Single mother. wthin • 20% of the run-off 154% point 
I I I I Single mothe" within +/- 20% of the 1470 maximum kink 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Proportion taking up the offer of training In the last year quarter 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The figures refer to any training spell in that has occurred in the last 
quarter. The proportion taking up training is conditional on the employer offering job-related training 
in the quarter. The associated standard errors and sample sizes are show in Table AS.4 in the 
appendix. The 'run-off point in the figure refers to the eamings that the individual would have to earn 
in order to become ineligible for FCMlTC. The maximum kink refers to the earnings an individual 
would need to earn to put them at the kink point between the maximum amount of tax credit for which 
they are eligible (given working hours and the number and age of the dependent children in the 
household) . 
Figure 5.6 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last 13 weeks -
comparing FCIWFTC recipients on the taper pre-reform w ith recipients 
on the taper post reform 
Married/couples father. WFTC period I 8°1. (FC-O. WFTC>O) 
I I I 
Married/couples fa1hen Fe period 15 % (Fe-a, WFTC>O) 
I I I 
Marriedlcouple. mothen WFTC period 14 % (FCaO. WFTC>O) 
I I I 
Marrledlcouj)lel mother. Fe period 164% (FC-O. WFTC>O) 
I I I 
~ngle mother. WFTC perJod (FCaa, 14 % WFTC>O) 
I I I 
Single moth .... Fe per~ (FC-o, 16 % WFTC>O) 
~ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
Proportion taking up the offer of training In the last year quarter 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. See notes for Figure 5.6 
60% 
80% 
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Figure 5.7 Proportion of taking up work related training in the last 13 weeks, 
Natural experiment- comparing FCIWFTC recipients .... 
Married/couples fathers WFTC 
period 
Married/couples fathers Fe period 
Married/couple. mothers WFTC 
period 
Married/couples mothers Fe period 
Single mother. WFTC period 
Single mothers FC period 
0% 
1· 8% 
I I l 
15 B% 
I I I 
14 % 
I I I 
" 164% 
I I I 
14 % 
I I I 
16 % 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
Proportion taking up the offer of training In the last year quarter 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. The figures refer to any training spell in that has occurred in the last 
quarter. The associate standard errors and sample sizes are show in Table AS.4 in the appendix. 
5.3. Multivariate analysis of the effect of FCjWFTC on trainjng 
In this section we present the results of the multivaria te analysi of the take-up of 
training. The dependent variable in the analysi is training take-up, conditional on the 
employer offering work related training, in the last qua.rter78. The analysis does not 
make use of the panel nature of the data, and each qua.rter of data is treated as an 
independent cross-section79• We estimate the following regression: 
78 We recognise that a complete model o f training and rc/wr-rc receipt would require modell ing o f the 
training ~r also, ns rC/WFTC recipients may be more or less Ukely to self-select themselves into jobs 
where job related training is not really on offer. Ilowevcr, while this might lead to biased cstim. tes of the 
effect of FC/\VFTC receipt on training, at a millimum the results from the regression an, lysis Can be 
interpreted as correlatio n c efficients, and perhaps indicative of a stronger causa l relationship. nc avenue 
for future wo rk would be to model the offer of rraining joindy with the decision t take up the training. 
'The LFS panel could be used to control for individual fLXed effects that joindy affect the take up o f rraining 
and rC/ WFl' receipt. Unear probability model of changes in training rake up and changes in 
FC/WFl"C, similar to that used by Arulampalam t l al. (2004) to analyse the impact f the minimum wage on 
rraining, would be one way to do this. We I ve this as an avenue fo r futu re research, 
80% 
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where s; is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an individual took part in some work 
related training in the last quarter. The matrix XI contains personal characteristics that 
affect the decision to do some training. The capital accumulation model outlined above 
motivates some of the characteristics for inclusion in XI - current stock of human 
capital (highest qualification), job tenure, size of firm and industrial sector. The variable 
F; is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is receiving FCj'W'FfC in the 
quarter and zero otherwise. The parameter &1 is an error term with the usual 
assumptions, &1 - N(O,a). 
As we discussed in detail in the previous chapter, FCj'W'FfC receipt is likely to be 
endogenous, particularly if there are unobserved characteristics that jointly affect the 
take up of training and FCjWFTC receipt. In order to deal with this, we instrument 
FCj'W'FfC receipt in the training probit. We estimate a FCjWFTC take up equation, 
although unlike the previous chapter where we were interested in an individual's 
FCj'W'FfC status across all waves, here we only wish to model an individual's 
FCj'W'FfC status within the quarter in which they are observed. We therefore estimate 
a probit model (as opposed to a bivariate probit) of FCj\~'FfC receipt, where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if the person is currently receiving FCj\~C and zero 
otherwise. The instrumental variable (IV) is the age of the youngest dependent child in 
the household, which we assume affects FCjWFTC receipt, but not the take-up of 
Table M.7 shows the results from estimating the FCjWFTC receipt regression for 
each of the three groups, single mothers, marriedj couples mothers and 
80 A regression of training on age of the youngest dL-pendent child shows that the IV does not explain any of 
the variation in training. This is supportive of its use as an IV. 
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married/ couples fathers. The results show that the probability of being on FC/WFfC 
is, not surprisingly, decreasing in income. The sign on age of youngest dependent child 
is also in the direction that we would expect - given household income, a parent is less 
likely to be on FC/WFfC the older their dependent child. The effect of both the 
income and age of dependent child variables merely confum the way in which the rules 
for eligibility of FC/WFfC work. Table AS.7 also shows that the probability of being 
on FC/WFfC is decreasing in education, and, for single mothers is n-shaped in age, 
but u-shaped in age for married parents. The fitted values from the probits presented 
in Table AS.7 are used as an exogenous measure of FC/WFfC receipt in the training 
equation. 
The questions on job related training are only asked to individuals who are in 
employment. This creates a similar selection problem to the one we encountered in 
when we looked at wage growth. However, because we do not restrict the sample to 
individuals employed throughout the 12 months of the survey, the selection problem is 
more straightforward. The training equations include a term to control for self-
selection into employment, which is just the standard inverse mills ratio from two-stage 
estimation procedure, where the first stage is a probit for participation in employment. 
The results from estimating the probit for participation in employment are shown in 
Table AS.6 in the appendix to this chapter (fable AS.S shows the wage equation 
estimated to calculate a fitted value of log hourly pay for individuals not in 
employment, which is then included in the participation equation). Finally, the probit 
models that include the instrumented estimated of FC/WFfC are all bootstrapped (500 
replications) in order to obtain the standard errors. 
The results from estimating the probit model of training take up on individual 
characteristics and FC/WFfC receipt are shown in Table S.t. In order to keep the 
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sample size as large as possible (which will become important when we look at some of 
the sub groups later) we look at take up within the last three months. This means that 
we are implicitly treating multiple training spells as a single training spell. The results 
show that the correlation between training and FC/WFfC is negative, consistent with 
the analysis of the summary statistics in section 2.3. Interestingly, the relationship 
between training and FC/WFfC receipt remains significantly negative, even when we 
control for a whole range of other characteristics. The marginal effects associated with 
being on FC/WFfC are shown at the bottom of the table. Single mothers on 
FC/WFfC are 7.5% less likely to take up job related training, married mothers are 
3.8% less likely and married fathers 5.8% less likely. As we outlined above, these 
results, though significant, need to be caveated. 
The first major caveat relates to the fact that the take-up of training dependent variable 
is conditional on the employer offering work related training in the fll"st place. A 
complete model of the effect of FC/WFfC on training would need to model the 
training offer also. It is unlikely that the type of training offered to FC/WFfC 
recipients is similar to that offered to other types of workers, and this will affect take up 
rates (we return to this below in the discussion on the endogeneity of the FC/WFfC 
receipt variable). That said, however, the other controls included in the regression, in 
particular, job tenure, income and the current stock of human capital should also pick 
up some these effects. Indeed, when we run a regression of training take-up on 
FC/WFfC status only, we find that the negative coefficient increases significantly, 
implying that these other variables are picking up some of the variation associated with 
the different types of training that these individuals are potentially offered. 
The other major caveat we would place on the results in Table 5.1 relates to the 
discussion above on the non-random take-up of FC/WFfC. The second row in the 
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Table 5.1 shows the coefficient on the instrumented estimate of FC/\X'FTC receipt, as 
estimated by the probit model in Table AS.'. Using the instrumented value for 
FC/WFfC receipt renders the effect insignificant in the single mothers and married 
mothers equations. However, the effect is still negative and significant in the married 
fathers regressions. In fact, using the instrumented values for FC/WFfC increases the 
negative correlation between FC/\X'FTC receipt and training. The marginal effects 
have increased almost three-fold, now the decrease in training of married fathers is 
12.7%. 
The IV-results would seem to imply that not accounting for the endogeneity of 
FC/WFTC receipt introduces a positive bias into the estimates of the effect of 
FC/WFfC on training. There could several reasons for the positive bias. For example, 
individuals who expect high wage growth in the future, may be less likely to take up 
FC/WFfC but more likely to take up training. This explanation of the bias might 
make sense, if there were no other controls in the equation that were good proxies for 
future wage growth. However, this is clearly not the case, the equation includes several 
variables that are reasonable proxies for future earnings - including job tenure (-), 
highest qualification by NVQ level (+), and fum size (-). Another possible explanation 
for the positive bias might the type of training on offer. If FC/\X'FTC recipients are 
more likely to be offered training that is not really worth taking up - because the 
returns are lower - then this would introduce a positive bias. Clearly, in order to 
identify the true effect of FC/WFfC receipt on training, we would need to model 
jointly FC/WFTC receipt, take-up of training, and the offer of training from the 
employer. We are not going to do that in this paper - instead, we are going to estimate 
the effect of the tax credit by comparing individuals at different points on the taper (or 
not on the taper as is the case for the natural experiment individuals). 
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Table 5.1 The determinants of training take-up In the last quarter, comparing 
FCIWFTC recipients and non-reclplents 
Dependent variable equals 1 If Married fathers Married mothers Single mothers 
take up training offered Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV 
FCIWFTC receipt -0.1505 -0.0994 -0.2022 
(3.95)- (2.48)* (4.81)-
FCIWFTC receipt (IV) -0.3267 -0.3157 0.1393 
-2.09 -0.73 0.42 
Log total household eamed 
-0.0186 -0.0416 0.013 0.0869 -0.0087 -0.0012 income 
-1.47 -2.70 -1.13 5.06 -0.3 -0.03 
NVa ievel2 0.2324 0.2258 0.2372 0.2386 0.3596 0.3373 
(7.20)- 6.60 (7.73)- 5.40 (5.51)- 5.19 
NVa level 3 0.2389 0.2247 0.361 0.3885 0.4831 0.4719 
(8.78)- 7.49 (11.03)- 8.58 (6.46)- 6.15 
NVa level 4 0.4155 0.4007 0.6135 0.6308 0.7815 0.8003 
(11.16)- 10.50 (15.19)" 11.33 (8.25)" 7.76 
Nva level 5 0.3515 0.3394 0.6242 0.6016 0.7632 0.8243 
(10.66)" 9.02 (17.24)" 11.18 (7.74)" 6.54 
Job tenure (months) -0.001 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0015 
(12.05)- -11.19 (8.22)- -6.85 (6.18)- -4.94 
Firm size, 11-19 employees -0.0578 -0.0755 -0.0093 0.0540 0.0247 0.0246 
-1.36 -1.80 -0.27 1.10 -0.31 0.30 
20-24 employees -0.0058 -0.0073 -0.0435 -0.0345 -0.0218 -0.0195 
-0.12 -0.16 -1.07 -0.59 -0.23 -0.21 
25-49 employees 0.031 0.0304 0.0164 0.0523 -0.064 -0.0752 
-0.84 0.77 -0.51 1.18 -0.9 -1.10 
50+ employees 0.0565 0.0548 -0.013 0.0578 -0.1024 -0.1056 
(1.93)+ 1.81 -0.51 1.65 (1.82)+ -1.93 
Industry: utilities (electricity gas 0.22 0.2403 0.1545 -0.1461 0.0256 0.0204 & water supply) 
(3.41)- 3.57 -1.22 -0.56 -0.12 0.09 
Industry: construction 0.0191 0.0312 -0.0097 -0.3914 -0.0085 -0.0001 
-0.56 0.96 -0.1 -0.83 -0.04 0.00 
Industry: wholesale, retail & 0.032 0.0362 0.0543 -0.3769 -0.115 -0.1444 
motor trade 
-0.97 1.10 -1.28 -6.08 -1.19 -1.52 
Industry: hotels and 0.1101 0.1278 0.0105 -0.3025 -0.1014 -0.1100 
restauranting 
-1.35 1.51 -0.17 -1.69 -0.87 -0.94 
Industry: storage and 0.0661 0.0630 0.0531 -0.2893 -0.2201 -0.2388 
communications 
(2.10)* 1.91 -0.9 -2.40 (1.74)+ -1.78 
Industry: financial intermediation 0.2975 0.2968 0.1558 -0.2621 0.0917 0.0936 
(7.05)" 6.79 (3.16)- -6.22 -0.78 0.78 
Industry: estate, renting and 0.1982 0.2152 0.1627 -0.2743 -0.1867 -0.1863 business activity 
(5.77)" 6.47 (3.32)- -3.90 (1.72)+ -1.80 
Industry: public administration 0.3966 0.3992 0.2284 -0.2708 0.0479 0.0481 
and defense 
(13.72)- 13.55 (5.17)- -3.67 -0.47 0.48 
Industry: education 0.4204 0.4136 0.3359 -0.1119 0.1433 0.1471 
(11.33)- 10.54 (8.28)- -1.46 -1.5 1.67 
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Dependent variable equals 1 If Married fathers Married mothers Single mothers 
take up training offered Non-IV IV Non-IV IV Non-IV IV 
Induslry: health and social work 0.4674 0.4590 0.3373 0.1157 0.1731 0.1624 
(11.82)- 11.56 (8.67)- 0.65 (1.98)· 1.90 
Industry: Other 0.0845 0.0977 0.1588 -0.4747 0.1227 0.1235 
(2.11)* 2.46 (2.80)- -3.50 -1.05 1.06 
Selection correction employment 0.0285 0.0052 0.1455 0.1445 0.2608 0.1824 (inverse mills ratio) 
-0.36 0.06 (1.98)* (1.88)* (2.31)* 1.63 
Constant -0.1848 -0.0164 -0.4637 -0.4370 -0.1257 -0.2755 
(2.01)· -0.14 (4.86)- (4.65)" -0.58 -0.85 
Marginal effects 
FCIWFTC receipt -0.0756 -0.0382 -0.0581 
(4.81)- (2.50)* (3.96)" 
FCIWFTC receipt (IV) 0.0559 -0.1258 -0.1273 
(0.48) (1.03) (2.15)* 
Observations 4424 22865 22196 23231 21839 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, (+) significant at 10ok; (*) 
significant at 5%; (-) significant at 1 %. The sample is restricted to employees who are offered 
training by their employer in the quarter. The marginal effects are coefficients from a linear probability 
model. IV estimates bootstrapped (500 replications) to obtain standard errors. 
5.4 The effect of the FCjWFfC taper on the take-up of training 
Hypothesi! 1 says we would expect the take-up of training to be higher for those 
individuals closer to the run-off point of FC/\~'FTC. In Table 5.2 we present the 
results from a probit model of training take-up in the last quarter, where the 
explanatory variable includes a dummy variable that indicates an individual's relative 
position on the FC/~'FTC taper. The sample used for the estimation in Table 5.2 is 
individuals on FC/\X'FTC onlY. \X'e do not estimate a model to instrument each 
persons position on or off the taper. 
The dummy variable in Table S.2, "D-min= (loJI 10 f71n-ojf~ is defmed as follows: 
D-min= 1 if Y(current)/Y(run-off»0.8 and 
D-min=O if 0.8< (Y(current)/Y(max))< 1.2, 
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where Y(cumnl) are current net (individuaQ earnings, Y{nm-ojJ) is the threshold level of 
earnings required to take an individual off FC or \XTIC altogether, and Y(max) is the 
threshold level of earnings at the maximum kink point (i.e. between the maximum and 
the taper). As an alternative to D-min, we could have also included in the regression a 
(bounded) continuous variable equal to the ratio of current earnings to the threshold 
earnings at the run-off point (l.e. Y(current)/Y(run-off)). J Iowever, as we outlined 
previously, both in the introduction to this chapter and the previous chapter, the net 
incentive effects of the tax credit for individuals nol at either end of the taper are not 
that obvious. Therefore, in order to obtain a 'cleaner' estimate of the effect of the 
taper, we restrict the sample to individuals who are at the 'sharp' end of the taper. 
Table 5.2 shows that the probability of FCjWFTC recipients taking up training is 
affected by their position on the taper. The effect is strongest for single mothers, 
where the mean difference in take-up, controlling for observables is almost 14% (on an 
average training take-up rate of 53%). The marginal effects for married mothers and 
fathers are also negative, but insignificant. 
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Table 5.2 The determinants of training take-up In the last quarter - comparing 
FCIWFTC recipients by position on the taper off welfare. 
Dependent variable equals 1 If take up training offered Single Married Married 
mothers mothers fathers 
D-min = Close to run off point (a) 0.3587 0.2757 0.0616 
(3.69)·· (1.S3) (0.26) 
Log of total household earned income -0.1644 -O.OS28 -0.0183 
(1.86)+ (0.42) (0.18) 
Job tenure (months) -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0027 
(5.01)·· (2.28)· (5.28)" 
NVa level 2 0.2173 0.1889 0.0148 
(2.26)· (1.38) (0.14) 
NVa level 3 0.2718 0.2791 0.1329 
(2.37)· (1.65)+ (1.29) 
NVa level 4 0.6201 0.4016 0.3518 
(4.66)·· (2.01)· (2.07)· 
NVa levelS 0.4806 0.6626 0.S798 
(2.90)·· (2.82)·· (3.44)·· 
Constant 0.5915 -0.0135 -0.0042 
(1.44) (0.02) (0.01) 
Marginal effects 
Close to run off point (b) 0.1378 0.1074 0.0266 
(3.71)·· (1.52) (0.30) 
E(training in the last quarter) 0.5274 0.5083 0.4428 
(0.0359) (0.0286) (0.0179) 
Observations 1223 545 1057 
Pseudo R2 004 0.02 0.03 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. Absolute value of z statistics In parentheses. (+) significant at 10°.4; (*) 
significant at 5%; (*") significant at 1% level. The sample Includes employees on FCIWFTC only. la) 
Individuals are split between those whose earnings are within +/- 20% of the FClWFTC maximum kink 
point (Close to run off point equal to zero). and those whose earnings are within 20% of the FClWFTC 
run-off point (Close to run off point equal to one). Ib) The marginal effects are coefficients from a linear 
probability model. 
We recognise that the estimates in Table S.2 are unlikely to identify the 1,," effect of 
the taper on training, for the reasons outlined above (unobserved heterogeneity 
affecting the choice to be on/off the taper, and fact that the training offer is not 
modelled). However, the inclusion of the other controls in the equation, in particular, 
current stock of human capital (NYQ) and job tenure, should go some way towards 
mitigating the problem. Furthermore, the shear size of the effect implies that an 
instrumentation of D-min is unlikely to change the fundamental result - the position on 
the taper matters. \'\'e now move on to consider a different approach to testing the 
effect of the taper on training, comparing take-up according the FC-\'{'FTC reform 
natural experiment. 
The effect of the FC/WFTC taper on the take-up of training - Natural 
experiment 
The nature of the 'natural experiment' induced by the FC/WFTC reform has already 
been discussed in some detail, so we will go straight to a discussion of the results in 
Table 5.3. The vari.1ble controlling for FCj\,{TIC receipt in Table 5.3 (\,{TIC 
period, FC=O & \XTIC>O) is equal to 1 for individuals in the WfTC period who 
would have been ineligible for FC, but post-reform became eligible for WFTC and also 
took up the credit. The variable (\'<'FTC period, FC=O & WFTC>O) takes a value of 
zero for the same type of individual in the FC-period, who were not on the credit (as 
~C was not yet available). 
The results show a strong negative correlation between \'<TIC-receipt and the take-up 
of training. The marginal effects exceed those observed in Table 5.2, ranging from 
training being around 16% lower for \'<FTC (married mothers) to being around 20% 
lower (single mothers and married fathers). 
The results in tIlls section, and the previous two sections, would indicate that there is a 
negative correlation between being on FCj\'l:TIC and taking up training. Furthermore, 
we fmd that amongst the group of FCj\'\FTC recipients, the relative position on the 
taper has a significant impact. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions 
of the theoretical model in Heckman ,/ aI., in that for individuals close to coming off 
the taper, the net incentive effects of the subsidy are likely to be positive; whereas for 
those individuals just coming onto the taper, the net incentive effects are likely to be 
negative. However, the results on training take-up also seem to be illfonnsltnl with the 
results from the previous chapter, which showed that wage growth for FC/~'FTC 
recipients and non-recipients was quite similar. 
Table 5.3 The determinants of training take-up In the last quarter - Natural 
experiment sample 
Dependent variable equals 1 If take up training Single Married Married 
offered mothers mothers fathers 
WFTC period, FC=O & WFTC>O (a) -0.5945 -0.4464 -0.6414 
(4.56)·· (3.78)·* (7.08)·· 
Log of total household earned income 0.8932 0.1805 0.7410 
(1.81)+ (0.59) (2.75)·· 
Job tenure (months) -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0024 
(3.01)·* (2.56)* (6.10)·* 
NVQ level 2 0.0044 0.2043 0.1184 
(0.02) (1.70)+ (1.15) 
NVQ level 3 0.2677 0.1541 0.0588 
(1.20) (1.08) (0.62) 
NVQ level 4 0.4295 0.5374 0.4781 
(1.97)* (3.99)·· (3.26)·* 
NVQ levelS 0.3801 0.5439 0.5776 
(1.56) (3.80)·* (4.25)·" 
Constant -5.1402 -1.2319 -4.3767 
(1.83)+ (0.73) (2.92)·* 
Marginal effects 
WFTC period, FC=O & WFTC>O (b) -0.2162 -0.1711 -0.2403 
(4.61)·* (3.86)·* (7.24)** 
E(training in the last quarter) 0.5857 0.6086 0.5238 
(0.0214) (0.0209) (0.0188) 
Observations 461 958 1281 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.04 0.07 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. Absolute value of z statistics In parentheses, (+) significant at 10°,{,; (*) 
significant at 5%; ( .. ) significant at 1% level. (a) Individuals are split between those who. In the FC 
period. are ineligible for FC, but eligible for WFTC were it available (WFTC period, FC"O & 
WFTC>O equal to zero, the control group), and those who, in the WFTC period, are Ineligible for 
FC, but eligible for WFTC and take it up (WFTC period, FC=O & WFTC>O equal to one). (b) The 
marginal effects are coefficients from a linear probability model. 
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5.4. Conclusions 
In this paper we set out to test directly whether FC/\'\'FTC receipt affects the training 
take-up of individuals. We have shown that training is indeed affected by FC/WFTC 
receipt, and that the effects are significant. Furthennore, the position on the taper 
occupied by a FC/WFTC recipient has important consequences for how it affects 
training. We found that individuals close to coming off the taper were much more 
likely to take up the training than individuals just coming onto the taper. These results 
are consistent with the incentive effects of the taper as predicted by the standard 
human capital accumulation model. 
The negative effects of FC/WFfC receipt on training are somewhat puzzling, given 
that in the previous chapter we found FC/\"\'FfC receipt had little impact on the 
relative wage growth. Thus, the lower training results are difficult to reconcile with the 
lack of any observable wage growth effect. One explanation might be the type of 
training that is done by individuals on FC/WFfC - as well as the type of training that 
is offmd to them. The analysis we carried out in this chapter did not explicitly control 
for the !;pt of training, nor did it examine in detail the transmission mechanism from 
training to wage growth. \'<'e believe that both these areas represent substantial 
avenues for future research into the long-tenn labour market effects of tax credits in 
the UK 
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Appendix - summary statistics and tables 
Table AS.4 Summary statistics for training take up 
Table AS.4 Raw data for Figures 2 • 6 
Figure S.2 
Probability of 
% offered job related training by employer In employer 
offering work SE N the last 12 months related 
training 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC 78.0% 0.0101 1,689 
Single mothers not on FCIWFTC 84.6% 0.0112 1,038 
Married/couples mothers on FC/WFTC 81.8% 0.0096 1,606 
Married/couples mothers not on FC/WFTC 65.9% 0.0030 13,550 
Married/couples fathers on FCfVVFTC 75.0% 0.0069 2,390 
Married/couples fathers not on FCIVVFTC 86.6% 0.0027 15,409 
Figure S.3 
Ok accepting the offer of job related training Probability of 
by employer In the last 12 months taking up SE N training 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC 69.4% 0.0127 1,316 
Single mothers not on FCIWFTC 76.8% 0.0143 678 
Married/couples fathers on FCIWFTC 63.7% 0.0114 1,793 
Married/couples fathers not on FC/WFTC 69.9% 0.0040 13,347 
Married/couples mothers on FC/WFTC 66.8% 0.0128 1,316 
Married/couples mothers not on FC/WFTC 72.7% 0.0041 11,639 
Probability of 
% offered job related training by employer In employer 
offering work SE N the last 3 months related 
training 
Single mothers on FCIWFTC 59.9% 0.0047 10,655 
Single mothers not on FC/WFTC 65.7% 0.0042 12,583 
Married/couples fathers on FC/WFTC 49.7% 0.0050 10,016 
Married/couples fathers not on FC/WFTC 69.6% 0.0014 43,096 
Married/couples mothers on FC/WFTC 66.7% 0.0014 41,371 
Married/couples mothers not on FC/WFTC 56.8% 0.0062 6,357 
Figure S.4 
% accepting the offer of Job related training Probability of taking up SE N by employer In the last 3 months training 
Single mothers on FC/WFTC 44.5% 0.0062 6,386 
Single mothers not on FCfVVFTC 50.9% 0.0055 6,264 
Married/couples fathers on FCfVVFTC 36.6% 0.0066 4,977 
Married/couples fathers not on FC/WFTC 41.1% 0.0016 29,969 
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Table AS.4 Raw data for Figures 2 • 6 
Married/couples mothers on FCIWFTC 42.6% 0.0019 26,910 
Married/couples mothers not on FCIWFTC 45.0% 0.0081 3,735 
Figure 5.5 
% accepting the offer of Job related training Probability of 
by employer In the last 3 months, FCIWFTC taking up SE N 
reclE!ients on/off taE!er trainlns 
Single mothers within +/- 20% of the maximum 46.8% 0.0297 284 kink 
Single mothers within· 20% of the run-off point 54.5% 0.0193 670 
Married/couples mothers within +/- 20% of the 42.2% 0.0524 90 maximum kink 
Married/couples mothers within· 20% of the 51.5% 0.0261 367 run-off pOint 
Married/couples fathers within +/- 20% of the 45.0% 0.0186 714 
maximum kink 
Married/couples fathers within· 20% of the run- 51.9% 0.0980 27 off point 
Figure 5.6 
% accepting the offer of Job related training Probability of by employer In the last 3 months, FCIWFTC taking up SE N recipients and non-recipients, natural training 
exe.erlment (al 
Single mothers FC period (FC=O, WFTC>O) 67.7% 0.0363 167 
Single mothers WFTC period (FC=O, WFTC>O) 47.3% 0.0371 182 
Married/couples mothers FC period (FC=O, 64.4% 0.0186 662 WFTC>O) 
Married/couples mothers WFTC period (FC=O, 47.4% 0.0401 156 WFTC>O) 
Married/couples fathers FC period (FC=O, 58.1% 0.0174 807 WFTC>O) 
Married/couples fathers WFTC period (FC=O, 38.5% 0.0315 239 WFTC>O) 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. (a) The Natural Experiment is a comparison of the training take 
up of two groups from identical positions in the wage distribution. The first group, in FC 
period (FC=O, WFTC>O). are in eligible for FC. but were WFTC available they would be 
eligible to receive some tax credit. The second group. in the WFTC period. are identical In 
respect of ineligibility for FC and eligibility for WFTC. the only difference is that they can 
and do receive a tax credit. 
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Table AS.S Wage equation to predict log hourly pay for participation in 
employment regression 
Dependent variable Is the log Single mothers Married/couples Married/couples 
of re~orted hourll ~al mothers fathers 
Age 0.0411 0.0490 0.0702 
(8.52)- (17.56)- (27.84)-
Age2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008 
(6.77)- (15.45)- (23.82)-
Age left full time education 0.0415 0.0383 0.0297 
(12.19)- (26.29)- (21.98)-
NVQ level 2 0.1503 0.1393 0.2036 
(13.16)- (24.84)- (28.62)-
NVQ level 3 0.1919 0.2036 0.2632 
(12.73)- (27.07)- (42.94)*" 
NVQ level 4 0.5087 0.4953 0.4430 
(29.84)- (62.27)- (50.43)'" 
NVQ level 5 0.6381 0.6540 0.6141 
(26.47)- (62.62)- (60.80)-
Number of dependent children -0.0469 -0.0393 -0.0082 
(7.24)- (13.36)- (2.88)-
dda disabled 0.0317 0.0540 0.1265 
(0.96) (3.17)- (6.88)-
work-limiting disabled only -0.0178 -0.0081 0.0597 
(0.53) (0.45) (3.43)-
not disabled 0.0595 0.0700 0.1700 
(2.83)- (5.72)- (13.77)-
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.0169 -0.0022 0.0114 
(0.82) (0.23) (1.13) 
East Midlands 0.0207 0.0019 0.0525 
(0.87) (0.18) (5.04)-
Eastern -0.0107 -0.0225 0.0773 
(0.33) (1.61) (6.14)-
London 0.1488 0.0866 0.1204 
(7.68)- (9.21r (12.68)-
South East 0.0480 0.0544 0.0509 
(1.90)+ (4.46)- (4.17)-
SouthWest 0.0087 -0.0007 0.0503 
(0.35) (0.06) (4.43)·· 
West Midlands 0.0533 0.0510 0.0248 
(2.56)· (4.75)- (2.25)· 
North West 0.0016 0.0289 0.0179 
(0.09) (3.09)- (1.89)+ 
Wales -0.0392 0.0054 0.0416 
(1.70)+ (0.49) (3.65)-
Scotland -0.0494 -0.0008 -0.1240 
(1.49) (0.06) (8.79)-
Year 1998 0.0091 0.0010 0.0006 
(0.44) (0.11) (0.07) 
Year 1999 0.0270 0.0316 0.0281 
(1.37) (3.37)- (2.98)·· 
Year 2000 0.0751 0.0479 0.0316 
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Dependent variable Is the log Single mothers Married/couples Married/couples 
of rel!orted hourl~ I!a~ mothers fathers 
(3.73)** (5.09)** (3.34)** 
Year 2001 0.1523 0.0813 0.0651 
(7.55)- (8.66)- (6.87)-
Year 2002 0.1933 0.0990 0.0888 
(8.66)- (9.55)- (8.56)-
Year 2003 0.2068 0.1096 0.0689 
(5.50)- (5.55)" (3.33)-
Constant -0.1749 -0.1465 -36.8485 
(1.65)+ (2.52)* (12.60)-
Observations 8614 42516 44841 
R-squared 0.35 0.32 0.30 
Notes: LFS 1997 - 2003. Robust t statistics in parentheses, (+) significant at 10%; (*) 
significant at 5%; (**) significant at 1% level. The omitted values for the categorical 
variables are NVQ level 1; DDA disabled and work limiting disabled; Northem region; and 
the year dummy variable 1997. 
TableA5.6 Problt regressIon for participation In employment 
Dependent variable Is equal to 
one If an employee, zero If not Single mothers Married/couples Married/couples employed (self-employed mothers fathers 
omitted) 
Log real hourly pay (fitted value) 1.8725 0.6748 2.5116 
(13.66)- (9.91)- (37.19)-
Age 0.1293 0.1676 -0.1063 
(13.20)- (27.40)- (15.50)-
Age2 -0.0016 -0.0021 0.0008 
(12.81)" (26.95)- (10.13)-
Number of dependent children -0.1859 -0.2216 -0.1183 
(15.81)- (37.32)- (22.04)" 
NVQ level 2 0.1788 0.3352 -0.2205 
(5.71)- (21.36)- (10.19)" 
NVQ level 3 0.0996 0.1940 -0.4961 
(2.36)* (8.71)" (21.44)" 
NVQ level 4 -0.1411 0.3508 -0.7364 
(1.61) (8.17)" (18.81)-
NVQ level 5 -0.6013 -0.0715 -1.4807 
(5.14)- (1.20) (27.32)-
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.0223 0.0713 0.0286 
(0.55) (3.20)- (1.23) 
East Midlands -0.0252 0.0582 -0.0304 
(0.58) (2.52)* (1.23) 
Eastern 0.0057 0.0570 -0.1354 
(0.10) (2.07)* (4.54)** 
London -0.5263 -0.1609 -0.4262 
(12.55)- (7.56)- (18.60)-
South East -0.2067 0.0040 -0.0555 
(4.39)- (0.15) (1.97)-
SouthWest 
-0.0058 0.0939 -0.0084 
(0.12) (3.65)- (0.30) 
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Dependent variable Is equal to 
one If an employee, zero If not Single mothers Married/couples Married/couples 
employed (self-employed mothers fathers 
omitted) 
West Midlands -0.1756 0.1163 -0.0994 
(4.35)- (4.76)- (3.98)-
North West -0.0569 0.0448 -0.0375 
(1.56) (2.13)- (1.72)+ 
Wales 0.1374 0.0701 -0.0377 
(2.92)- (2.76)- (1.41) 
Scotland -0.0677 -0.0219 0.1200 
(1.38) (0.84) (4.34)-
Year 1998 -0.0208 0.0196 0.0105 
(0.54) (1.01) (0.51) 
Year 1999 -0.0165 0.0123 -0.0371 
(0.43) (0.64) (1.82)+ 
Year 2000 -0.0827 0.0223 -0.0370 
(2.08)- (1.14) (1.80)+ 
Year 2001 -0.2150 -0.0066 -0.1085 
(4.95)- (0.33) (5.17)-
Year 2002 -0.2480 -0.0141 -0.1723 
(5.05)- (0.62) (7.30)-
Year 2003 -0.1126 -0.0020 -0.1123 
(1.35) (0.04) (2.37)-
Married NA 0.0767 0.2135 
(5.32)" (14.18)-
Constant -5.0732 -3.8721 -1.1437 
(32.10)" (38.88)- (11.73)-· 
Observations 25214 84994 83464 
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.07 0.07 
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Table AS.7 The detennlnants of FCIWFTC take-up 
Dependent variable Is on FCIWFTC In the quarter, Single Married Married 
families with de(!endent children onl~ mothers mothers fathers 
Log household income (net) (a) -0.4369 -0.4121 -0.8743 
(15.74)** (19.06)** (49.42)** 
Age youngest dependent child -0.0167 -0.0148 -0.0410 
(5.45)** (5.18)** (15.96)** 
Age 0.0478 -0.0638 -0.0335 
(6.51)** (5.56)** (3.69)** 
Age squared -0.0008 0.0005 0.0003 
(7.59)** (3.29)** (2.46)* 
NVQ level 2 -0.0291 -0.1674 -0.1694 
(0.93) (7.06)** (6.58)** 
NVQ level 3 -0.0835 -0.2515 -0.3216 
(2.16)* (8.07)** (13.74)** 
NVQ level 4 -0.4191 -0.3404 -0.5349 
(9.22)** (8.78)** (12.31)** 
NVQ levelS -0.7878 -0.4276 -0.6028 
(14.10)** (9.32)** (14.56)** 
Constant 0.3470 1.0268 1.6563 
(2.54)* (4.83)** (9.37)** 
Pseudo-R2 0.0813 0.0767 0.2013 
Observations 10966 50105 52347 
Notes: LFS 1997 -2003. In contrast to the bivariate probit estimation in Chapter 3, we do not make 
use of the panel nature of the data. The data is essentially treated as a repeated cross-section, 
where each observation of an individual on FCNJFTC is independent of other observations of the 
same individual. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, (+) significant at 10%; (*) significant at 
5%; (**) significant at 1%. (a) FCmFTC receipt is evaluated in respect of net household income, 
hence we include net income in the probit. 
249 
6. Conclusion 
We have analysed the relationship between wages and job satisfaction. We show that 
job satisfaction is positively effected by earnings, even after controlling for the 
simultaneity bias between the two equations. The effect of earnings on job 
satisfaction, is however small. We estimate that an increase in average earnings of 
about 20% will only tend to increase the probability of an individual being satisfied 
with their job by around 7%. 
The results from the job satisfaction paper also show that earnings comparisons can 
affect job satisfaction. However, we do not fmd conclusive evidence that earnings 
comparisons in the past have a significant impact on job satisfaction in the future. 
Self-reported job satisfaction judgments are likely to be correlated with unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. One of these unobserved characteristics could be the extent 
to which an individual has a positive outlook on life. We include in the regression 
individual's responses to questions about their future flOancial situation and flOd that 
these are strongly correlated with job satisfaction. Furthermore, we find that the 
inclusion of these varL1bles in the regression does not really alter the size of the 
(relative) earnings effect. This implies that unobserved heterogeneity may not be a 
major issue with the estimates we present here. 
Chapter 2 showed that the returns to education in an economy are closely reLued to 
the degree of technology bias in the economy. \'('e used to approaches to analyse the 
relationship. The first approach a pnori divides countries into technology leaders and 
technology followers. We show that technology followers can respond to increases in 
the relative supply of skilled labour by developing more technology and thereby 
increasing the return to education. In contrast, in those cOlmtrics that can only develop 
technologies more slowly, or perhaps through importing them, we observe strong 
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negative correlation between the return to education and the relative supply of skills. 
The second approach used a model of capital skill complementarity in production, as 
developed by Griliches, that shows the return to education increasing with the stock of 
capital equipment per worker. These results are entirely consistent with results in the 
literature that relates changes in the wage structure to changes in technology, and in 
particular computer use, over time. Interestingly, our estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labour and capital equipment are very similar to results 
reported elsewhere in the literature. 
In the last two chapters we consider some of the long run labour market effects of tax 
in work welfare programs that are tax credits in the UK We show that, contrary to 
popular beliefs, workers who are receiving the tax credit do not end up in dead end 
jobs with few prospects for wage growth. The extent to which incentives for wage 
growth are affected by the means-tested nature of the tax credit is also examined. We 
find that the incentives are indeed very different for individuals at different points on 
the taper off welfare. 
In contrast to the favourable evidence on the effect of the wage subsidy on wage 
growth, we find the subsidy has significant negative effects for the take up of training. 
The results presented in the last chapter are perhaps the most obvious area where 
significant future research could bear fruit. As we note in the chapter, we ignore the 
endogeneity of the training offer, the decision to take up the offer of training and the 
decision to be on the tax credit. We also note that this is likely to bias the effect of the 
tax credit on training downwards. Future work in this area should consider alternative 
econometric approaches to identifying the effect of tax credits on training. Methods 
such as propensity score matching and other semi- or non-parametric approaches 
might usefully be employed. However, the 'data hungry' nature of such approaches 
does not bode well for the anlaysis of tax credits. The labour force survey is a sample 
251 
of over 11,000 households in every quarter, yet we found that many of the 
comparisons we made in the analysis were restricted by very small cell sizes. 
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